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ABSTRACT 
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN THE NEW NHS. 
THE IMPACT OF THE NHS REFORMS ON PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 
AND THE EFFECT ON QUALITY OF CARE 
This study aims to examine the impact of the NHS Reforms on doctors and nurses in 
two North London hospitals, in relation to both changes to the nature of professional 
practice, and the effect on quality of care offered by professionals to their patients. 
A case study approach is utilised, combining quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies to explore the consequence of the policy implementation. A survey 
was carried out to examine the nature and scope of the effects on professional 
practice, of the NHS Reforms, and to collate examples of improvements and 
deteriorations in quality of care offered to patients. In-depth interviews were carried 
out with senior managers in both hospitals and also their purchasing Health Authority, 
to identify key features of the policy implementation process. In-depth interviews 
were also carried out with doctors and nurses in both hospitals, working in a range 
of clinical specialities to explore the experience of professional practice within a 
changing policy environment. It emerged that there was a shared experience, across 
both hospitals and professions, of increasing levels of stress, increasing workload and 
increasing levels of conflict with managers. There is evidence of both improvements 
and deteriorations in the quality of care offered to patients, but whereas improvements 
were largely related to the quality element of structure, the deteriorations were closely 
related to the process element. Analysis of the interview data revealed three distinct 
responses by professionals to the NHS Reforms, and these related to the differing 
values and belief systems which were held. Two groups of professionals - the 
Traditional and the Transformed - have adapted to the changing milieu of the NHS, 
but the third - the Transitional - have become disenfranchised from the system within 
which they practice. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Pag 
e 
Chapter 1 
Introduction to the Study 
Chapter 28 
Methodology of the Study 
Chapter 3 33 
The Background to NHS Care in Britain 
Chapter 4 57 
The Challenge to the NHS 
Chapter 5 80 
Reforming the NHS 
Chapter 6 104 
The Quality of Care in the NHS 
Chapter 7 128 
The Nature and Scope of the Impact of the 
NHS Reforms on Professional Practice 
Chapter 8 150 
The Changing Nature of Professional Practice 
Chapter 9 178 
The Impact of the NHS Reforms on the 
Quality of Care Delivered by Professionals 
Chapter 10 220 
A Typology of Professional Response to the 
NHS Reforms 
Chapter 11 247 
Professional Practice in the NHS: 
A Consideration of the Findings 
References 251 
Appendices 269 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
A matter of political, professional and public concern 
The National Health Service (NHS) has always been a key issue on the political 
agenda, and a topic of much public debate, and never more so than in the 1990s. 
Health care reform has been an area of government consideration, not only in Britain, 
but throughout the world during the last five years, and it is the translation of that 
consideration into action which has kept the NHS firmly in the public eye. 
From the political perspective, concern about the NHS has mainly focused on the 
escalating cost of services, which was viewed as incompatible with the overall policy 
aim of reducing public expenditure. Health care professionals have expressed 
concern about both the overall health status of people in Britain, and the maintenance 
of professional standards. Public concern about the availability of services, and 
perceived shortages and inequalities has been the subject of much media interest. 
Professor Keen (Francome & Marks 1996 p ix) has noted that `We are clearly very 
close to a moment of irreversible decision about the future of the NHS. ' What that 
decision is likely to be will, in large, be determined by how the NHS Reforms of the 
1990's are perceived and evaluated, and as yet such evidence remains scanty. This 
thesis will suggest that the Reforms which were implemented during 1991 have had 
a number of unintended, and frequently unrecognised consequences, which are likely 
to have long term effects for patients, health care professionals and the NHS itself. 
Rationale and aims of the study 
The NHS Reforms can be seen to have presented both health care professionals and 
managers of health care services, with what is likely to have been the most extreme 
and extensive set of changes they will have encountered. These Reforms, in setting 
out to restructure, refocus and reorganise health care funding and provision, had also 
to accomplish a change in the culture and ethic of health care professionals, and a 
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remodelling of the traditional power relations within the organisation. It was not only 
the structure and process of health care provision that was to change, but also the 
values and beliefs which underpinned the system. Whilst frequently the target of 
change, in terms of reorganisation, it was generally recognised that the changes of the 
early 1990s were the most far-reaching, and to an extent, the most unpredictable, for 
unlike previous changes which were based on an assessment of existing difficulties, 
and considered planning to overcome those problems identified, these new changes 
were to be largely based on economic and political theory, previously untested within 
the field of public health care provision. Implementation was to be enacted without 
pre-testing, even on a limited scale, and so even the most committed proponents of 
the reforms could not claim to be able to identify the precise impact that these 
changes would have, above and beyond the primary aims which were envisaged. 
Politicians, professionals and managers were embarking on a journey into uncharted 
territory, and whilst many might have claimed to be able to foresee the eventual 
destination, none could predict the byroads which would be traversed. It is only by 
reflecting on the process of change as it is experienced, and by examining a range of 
the multiplicity of outcomes of change as they become evident that it will be possible 
to evaluate the impact of the NHS Reforms on the contemporary British health care 
system. Indeed it may prove to be some considerable time before the full impact of 
the changes will emerge, as it is likely that such changes will have long term effects 
on the health care system itself, the professionals who engage in practice within that 
system, and the patients who seek health care. 
Previous evaluative studies of the NHS Reforms of the 1990s have been limited in 
terms of both number and scope, and whilst government statistics have been utilised 
to focus on a positive picture of the Reforms in relation to the increase in total 
number of patients treated, reduction in waiting times and increasingly effective use 
of limited resources, there has also been a negative focus from the media which has 
highlighted bed closures, inequalities in access to care and shortages of services. 
Both positive and negative aspects have been supported by field studies, but empirical 
evidence remains mixed, inconclusive and unclear (Hughes 1993). Indeed, the ability 
to evaluate something as large and indeterminate, has been questioned, because even 
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if the changes can be clearly described, how can value be attributed to such changes? 
(Cribb 1995). 
It can be argued that much of the lack of clarity which can be seen in relation to the 
attempts to evaluate the NHS Reforms is due to the fact that there has been a failure 
to address an adequate range of perspectives in this evaluation, in particular the 
nature of relationship of the health care professional to the patient has been accorded 
little attention. For patients, whilst of course the structures and outcomes of care are 
important, the process of care is also a key way in which they will judge health care 
provision, and for the patient, the essence of the health care services that they receive 
can be seen to be expressed in the relationship between the health care professional 
and the patient. The impact of the NHS Reforms on this relationship between 
professional and patient is an area which has been largely ignored in the area of 
hospital practice. The centrality of the health care professional/patient relationship 
can allow this relationship to be the barometer of change in health care services, 
because whatever the nature of the change it is inevitably reflected at the interface of 
service delivery, the interaction between health care professional and patient. 
Studies which have focused on one aspect of health care provision in relation to the 
effects of the health care Reforms - the structure and macro-processes of health care 
(Appleby et al 1994), equity (Whitehead 1994), patient choice (Mahon, Wilkin & 
Whitehouse 1994) - can only provide a snapshot of the effects of the NHS Reforms. 
It could be argued that the evaluation of a human service within a complex 
organisation with multi-factorial influences is severely restricted without a 
consideration of the human element, for whilst policy decisions are debated at length, 
both within and outside the political arena, the implementation of policy inevitably 
rests on those individuals who may have had little input to such debate. In relation 
to the provision of health care services within the NHS in general, and within NHS 
hospitals in particular, this human element is best represented by the relationship 
between the health care professional as the direct provider of care, and the patient, 
the direct recipient of care, a relationship which of necessity remains central to health 
care delivery. To examine the effects of policy implementation only in terms of 
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specific, measurable performance indicators, whilst providing information which is 
both significant and valuable, displaces the centrality of the human relationship. Such 
a one dimensional approach lends itself to manipulation of the data, for of what 
relevance is the length of wait for treatment without a consideration of the process of 
treatment or of the differing experiences of diverse categories of patients during that 
period in which they wait for health care intervention? In terms of evaluating the 
effects of policy changes on the quality of care that is delivered by health care 
providers, attention needs to be paid to structure, process and outcome (Donabedian 
1980). Current hospital performance indicators focus on structure, measuring such 
detail as the organisation of waiting times and length of stay, and the thrust of current 
research into evidence based care focuses on outcomes. The processes of care remain 
largely monitored internally, through the standard setting and audit framework, and 
thus not widely utilised in terms of policy evaluation. 
The aims of this study, therefore, are twofold, firstly to examine the impact of the 
NHS Reforms on the professional practice of doctors and nurses in the two main 
provider NHS Hospital Trusts of a North London Health Authority, relating both to 
the changes to the nature of professional practice, and changes to the quality of care 
delivered to patients by health care professionals. The second aim of this study is to 
construct a typology of professional response to the Reforms, with particular 
reference to the value and belief systems which underpin professional practice. To 
attempt an evaluation of the health care Reforms requires the determination of 
whether or not there has been a philosophical shift amongst health care professionals. 
It is claimed that the NHS is founded on distinct philosophical principles (Caldwell 
and Francome 1993) and so there needs to be a consideration of this aspect of 
professional practice in order to fully determine the impact of the policy changes. 
Outline of the development of the thesis 
Following on from the rationale and aims of the study discussed in this chapter, 
Chapter 2 will detail the research design and methodology. The key methodological 
issues and the essential criteria which the study had to meet will be identified, 
describing how the research was designed, and the basis for the research approach 
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adopted will be considered. The different methods used for data collection will be 
outlined, as will the strategies for data analysis and integration. Difficulties which 
were encountered during the study will be examined, along with the strategies 
employed to overcome these problems. 
Chapter 3 explores the background to NHS care in Britain, discussing how the health 
care system which pre-dated the NHS came to be viewed as problematic, and 
examining how the foundations for the NHS were laid. The way in which the vision 
of a nationalised health care system came to be translated into a reality will be 
explored, highlighting the roles of both the politicians and the professional bodies. 
An overview will be given of the first thirty years of the NHS in Britain. 
In Chapter 4, the development of a challenge to the NHS will be analysed, examining 
political, ideological and economic influences, and tracing the policy developments 
during the last twenty years. The role of the growth in managerialism, and the 
strengthening ideology of the New Right in paving the road to health care reform will 
be explored. 
Chapter 5 examines in detail the proposals for reform presented in `Working for 
Patients' (1989a). The philosophy underpinning the proposals is examined, as is the 
response to the proposals from the politicians, the professionals and the public. The 
implementation of the proposals contained in the White Paper is outlined, and 
evidence of the effects of this implementation is assessed. 
In Chapter 6 the focus is on quality of care, outlining philosophical, political and 
practical perspectives. The issue of quality in the NHS is discussed, and the 
strategies for quality assurance which have been utilised are examined. Factors which 
have been highlighted as influences on quality of patient care are explored, and the 
impact of the NHS Reforms on such care is analysed. 
Chapter 7 presents the findings of the study in relation to the nature and scope of the 
impact of the Reforms on professional practice. Data collected from interviews with 
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managers and professionals is analysed to explore the way in which the NHS Reforms 
were implemented in the two hospitals are compared, and similarities and differences 
are identified. Reflections of managers and professionals on the success of the 
reforms are considered. A survey of professionals is utilised to examine changes in 
workload and levels of conflict and stress are detailed and related to profession, place 
of work and area of clinical speciality. 
In Chapter 8 the changing nature of professional practice since the implementation of 
the NHS Reforms is investigated, again utilising interview and survey data from 
doctors and nurses. A number of specific ways in which the NHS Reforms have 
created a change in professional practice are identified, and similarities and 
differences are highlighted between hospitals, professions and area of clinical 
speciality. 
Chapter 9 explores the impact of the NHS Reforms in relation to the quality of care 
delivered by doctors and nurses to their patients. Overall changes are discussed, and 
examples of both improvements and deteriorations in the quality of care obtained 
from the survey are used to analyse both the level and the nature of this change. 
Differences existing between hospital, profession and area of clinical speciality are 
identified, and explored through analysis of the interview data. Differences between 
the nature of improvements and deteriorations will be demonstrated, using a matrix 
constructed from two accepted quality frameworks. 
In Chapter 10 the existence of a change in the value and belief system which 
underpins professional practice is demonstrated, and used to construct a typology of 
professional response to the NHS Reforms. Three distinct models are identified. 
Traditional professionals, who rather than changing their beliefs, had consolidated and 
strengthened their commitment to a system which views health care as a social right, 
as a result of their experience of the implementation of the Reforms. Transformed 
professionals, on the other hand, appeared to have moved their beliefs towards a 
stronger commitment to a health care system which views health care as a service 
commodity. Transitional professionals shared some of the beliefs of the other two 
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groups, and experienced some conflict in their assumptions about what a health care 
system should value. Characteristics of each type of professional are examined in 
relation to a variety of criteria emerging from an analysis of the interview data. 
Finally, in Chapter 11, the major findings of this study are highlighted, and 
discussed. The possible long term effects of the changes which have been 
demonstrated are suggested, and areas for further study are identified. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
Methodological issues 
The evaluation of health and welfare policy, whether on a large or a small scale, can 
never be anything other than problematic and complex. In terms of evaluating the 
impact of the NHS Reforms, no matter how the research question is formulated, there 
remain several important methodological issues: 
(1) The NHS Reforms, whilst subject to staged implementation were, as 
previously mentioned, implemented without any form of pre-testing, 
controls or pilot studies, and so comparative studies have not been 
possible. The options for evaluating the impact of the Reforms, 
therefore, is limited to either the monitoring of change over time, or 
the comparison of actual with predicted outcome (Appleby et al 1994). 
(2) It is not possible to control for all the social, political and professional 
changes which were happening alongside the implementation of the 
Reforms, and so isolating the effects of the Reforms is extremely 
difficult. These changes include increasing awareness of the 
demographic changes impacting on the health care system, and a 
transformation in the process of nurse education, among others. 
(3) The time available to complete an evaluative study of the NHS 
Reforms is limited, for it is recognised that, as full implementation is 
achieved, so the system will become accepted as the status quo, and 
professionals will have increasing difficulty in identifying the changes 
in their practice which can be directly related to the NHS Reforms, 
rather than to any other co-existing change. The fieldwork, therefore, 
was scheduled to be carried out between 1992 and 1994. 
(4) It must also be acknowledged that the NHS was, at the time of the 
implementation of the policies outlined in the `Working for Patients' 
White Paper (DoH 1989a), already the subject of changes which either 
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pre-dated or were unrelated to the Reforms under consideration. Such 
changes included developments in health care practice and technology, 
waiting list initiatives and continued expansion of the model of general 
management. 
These methodological limitations, along with the theoretical framework within which 
the research developed, were the key influences on the research design and planning. 
Research design 
The design of this study had to fulfil a number of essential criteria above and beyond 
the central research question: 
(1) It had to be acceptable to both professionals and managers, in order 
for access to be ensured. 
(2) It needed to be flexible in terms of the schedule of fieldwork, for the 
NHS is a dynamic organisation and would inevitably undergo change 
and development during the period of the study which would impact 
on the availability of health care professionals to be involved in the 
study. 
(3) It had to take account of the demands of the environment in which 
professionals engage in practice, and not impinge unduly on the time 
available for doctors and nurses to spend with their patients. It also 
had to take account of the possible repercussions of the issues which 
arose during the course of the study. 
(4) It required a sensitive balance to be obtained in relation to the breadth 
and depth of the data which would be collected and subsequently 
analysed, in order for the central research question to be considered in 
i the social, political and professional context within which it exists. 
(5) It had to recognise the scope and limitations of a study of this nature, 
which would be viable, especially in relation to the time frame. 
A case study approach was elected to allow the depth of the research question to be 
explored, yet would also provide achievable limitations to the quantity of data which 
would be collected and subsequently analysed. A range of research strategies were 
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adopted in the formulation of the research design, all of which had clearly identified 
aims: 
(1) A Delphi study was chosen to formulate a structure for the survey 
(Linstone and Turoff 1975). 
(2) A survey of doctors and nurses within the two chosen NHS Hospital 
Trusts aimed to examine three main areas: 
(a) The extent of the effects of the NHS Reform. 
(b) The identification of any changes occurring in 
professional practice as a direct result of the NHS 
Reforms. 
(c) The identification of any changes in the quality of care 
delivered by professionals as a direct result of the NHS 
Reforms. 
(3) A review of the contemporary as well as the historical documents 
which related to the establishment of the NHS, and changes over the 
years, would allow the present changes to be seen in their historical 
context. 
(4) Interviews with key personnel in the Health Authority and the two 
hospitals who had been involved in the implementation of the Reforms 
aimed to both describe the process of implementation and to reveal any 
differences in the way in which the reforms were implemented in the 
two hospitals 
(5) Interviews with doctors and nurses in the two hospitals were used to 
expand and attempt to explain the issues which had emerged from the 
survey, and also to explore the professional experience of the 
implementation of the NHS Reforms. The value and belief systems 
which underpin professional practice were also examined during the 
interviews, and evidence sought as to whether those values had 
undergone any change during the time in which the NHS Reforms 
were implemented. 
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Rationale for chosen research approach 
Despite the difficulties inherent in such an approach, a combined quantitative and 
qualitative strategy appeared to offer the greatest scope for acquiring both breadth and 
depth of data, and thus opening up the possibilities for enriching the analysis both in 
terms of insight into what can often be seen as the closed world of professional 
practice, and comprehension of the complexity of organisational and policy influences 
on both health care professionals and patients. The use of a combined methodological 
approach has been argued to provide several general advantages in a number of 
academic disciplines: 
(1) Such an approach can be seen to increase the comprehensiveness of the 
phenomenon being explored (Goodwin and Goodwin 1984). 
(2) Combinations of different methodological approaches allow increased 
flexibility in the exploration of dynamic phenomenon, which may 
undergo change during the period of study (Huck, Cormier and Bounds 
1974). 
(3) Combining a qualitative with a quantitative approach enables multi- 
purpose research to be tackled in the most efficient and effective way 
(Reichardt and Cook 1979). 
(4) Utilising qualitative and quantitative methodologies in the same study 
allows data which is relevant to different types of questions to be 
explored (Silverman 1985). 
(5) Data obtained from the two different approaches can be used for 
purposes of cross validation (Goodwin and Goodwin 1984). 
The value of both quantitative and qualitative data is recognised in the research 
design, as are the limitations of both a single paradigm approach and a combined 
approach. Quantitative data, whilst providing valuable information as to the nature, 
location and extent of the impact of the NHS Reforms on professional practice, and 
the relation of this impact to the quality of care delivered by health care professionals 
to patients, is limited in the degree to which it can provide insights and explanations. 
In recent years it has become generally accepted that qualitative research does have 
a significant role to play in applied policy research: 
11 
What qualitative research can offer the policy maker is a theory of social 
action grounded on the experiences - the world view - of those likely to be 
affected by a policy decision or thought to be part of the problem. (Walker 
1985 p 19) 
There is no reason why those techniques which provide valuable insight to the policy 
maker cannot also be utilised by those who are engaging in the evaluation of policy 
implementation. Having already identified that it is the human element which is so 
far lacking in the attempts to evaluate the impact of the implementation of the NHS 
reforms, then the adoption of a qualitative approach afforded most scope for exploring 
that element. The benefits of incorporating a qualitative aspect to policy focused 
research has been well articulated: 
The last two decades have seen a notable growth in the use of qualitative 
methods for applied social policy research. Qualitative research is now used 
to explore and understand a diversity of social and public policy issues, either 
as an independent research strategy or in combination with some form of 
statistical inquiry. The wider use of qualitative methods has come about for 
a number of reasons but is underpinned by the persistent requirement in social 
policy fields to understand complex behaviours, needs, systems and cultures. 
(Ritchie and Spencer 1994 p 173) 
The role of a qualitative approach in the study of the impact of the implementation 
of the NHS Reforms, and in particular to the exploration of the experiences of the 
health care professionals involved in these changes, can be seen to be compatible with 
the primary role of qualitative research in general: 
The most fundamental characteristic of qualitative research is that it expresses 
commitment to viewing events, action, norms, values etc. from the perspective 
of the people who are being studied...... The strategy of taking the subject's 
perspective is often expressed in terms of seeing through the eyes of the people 
you are studying.... involves a preparedness to empathize (though not 
necessarily to sympathize) with those being studied... entails a capacity to 
penetrate the frames of meaning with which they operate. 
(Bryman 1988 p 61) 
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Whilst much of the literature relating to the combination of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to research have focused on the benefits of triangulation 
(Denzin 1978, Jick 1979), others have suggested alternative, specific, reasons for 
choosing such an approach (Greene, Caracelli and Graham 1979, Mathison 1988). 
The benefits for a combined approach for this study can be seen to be most evident 
in three main areas: 
(1) Data collection was developmental in itself, in that the qualitative data 
was used to formulate the framework for collecting the quantitative 
data, and conversely the quantitative data allowed the `mapping out' 
of the issues to be addressed during further qualitative stages of the 
study. The quantitative data was further explored through the use of 
a qualitative approach which allowed the analysis of the quantitative 
data to be enhanced. This approach could be seen to enhance the 
flexibility which was identified as being required of such a study. 
(2) The data collected, utilising the combined method, was interrelated and 
so could highlight different facets of the phenomena under study, and 
also allowed the identification of any overarching aspects which 
existed. It also provided the opportunity to extend the data collection 
in areas where deficiencies became evident. 
(3) The breadth and scope of the study was extended beyond that which 
could have been achieved by adherence to an approach of a single 
paradigm, and thus went some way to overcome some of the dilemmas 
previously discussed as being associated with evaluative studies of this 
nature. 
So whilst a model of research design based on a single paradigm was seen to be 
inappropriate, the combined approach did appear to meet the essential criteria 
identified for the study, and a range of research methodologies could be seen to be 
suitable for data collection. The problems which can be associated with such a 
combined approach have been identified (Mason 1993), and were considered at all 
stages of the study: 
(1) Quantitative and qualitative data cannot merely be combined, and the 
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relationships between the data collected needed to be clearly identified 
and articulated, otherwise the analysis would have been fragmented 
and lacking in clarity. 
(2) The possibility existed that different methods of data collection could 
have provided contradictory data, which could have contradicted the 
validity of either or both approaches. 
(3) Analysis of the data needed to take account of the context of the data 
collection method. 
During the process of data analysis, the method of integrating quantitative and 
qualitative data needed to be consistent, and the challenges of integrating data in this 
way have been well articulated: 
The challenge of integrating these two data sets involved two elements. First 
it involved dealing with the intellectual questions........ The second element 
involved dealing with the more technical questions about how to actually do 
the integrating, that is how to `glue together' data which has been produced 
by methods with different logical principles. This could only really be 
accomplished after the first element, the intellectual questions had been worked 
through. (Mason 1994 p 105) 
Several strategies for data integration evolved during the study and were adopted 
during data analysis: 
(1) Key areas, such as changing professional practice and quality of care, 
were explored using more than one methodology, and the data sets 
were examined both separately and together, and the qualitative data 
set was utilised to provide, in many cases, an explanatory framework 
for the quantitative data set. 
(2) Issues emerging as significant during the survey were followed up 
during the interviews, and as the focus of critical incident analyses, so 
whereas the quantitative data set could be seen to provide breadth of 
data, the qualitative data set could be seen to provide the depth. 
(3) Presenting the data sets alongside each other allowed the identification 
of relationships between the quantitative and qualitative data sets. 
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Although there has been a tradition to consider qualitative and quantitative research 
as distinct and discrete paradigms, it can also be argued that to create such a 
distinction is to do no more than to create `ideal types' against which reality can be 
judged, such approaches are perhaps best addressed by considering them as a 
continuum of research activity, with relatively few of such activities meeting the 
criteria of the ideal type of either qualitative or quantitative research: 
The tendency to talk about quantitative and qualitative research as though they 
are separate paradigms has produced ideal-type descriptions of each tradition 
with strong programmatic overtones, and consequently has obscured the areas 
of overlap, both actual and potential between them. (Bryman 1988 p 173) 
Case study 
A case study approach was adopted, focusing on two NHS Hospital Trusts who were 
the major providers for a North London Health Authority. These two hospitals 
provided an extensive range of health care services for a large North London area. 
Permission for access to carry out the study was sought and obtained from the Chief 
Executives of the hospitals, and also from the Chairman of the Health Authority. 
Clearance from the local ethics committee was also obtained. Pseudonyms have been 
used throughout to maintain confidentiality. 
The two hospitals in this study are both designated acute general hospitals of 
comparable size in terms of bed availability, staff, and patient throughput. They both 
provide a full range of accident and emergency, orthopaedic, general medical and 
surgical, and general paediatric services. In addition both hospitals provide some 
specialist services within both the medical and surgical area. The two hospitals share 
many of the same structural problems, having a mix of buildings from the turn of the 
century, and more recent additions over the last thirty years resulting in a rather 
disjointed formation, not best suited for the needs of a modern health care provider. 
Although geographically close and both situated within the same Local Authority 
area, each hospital is the main provider for different Local Authority areas and serves 
a very different population. Greenfield is situated on the border of a green belt area, 
in an affluent area of the borough serving a largely homogenous population. The 
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minority ethnic groups resident in this borough are amongst the more affluent of such 
groups, and are active both within the community and in local politics. Whilst the 
borough contains pockets of deprivation, on the whole it fares well across a range of 
social indicators. There are two private hospitals situated within a mile of Greenfield, 
and a thriving private community services sector. A very small minority of patients 
attending Greenfield are not registered with a local GP. 
Stockton, on the other hand, situated on the opposite border of the borough, mainly 
serves the population of the adjoining borough which is much more socially and 
culturally diverse. This area is one of relative deprivation, the population faring 
poorly across a wide range of social indicators. A high proportion of the population 
of this borough are members of more disadvantaged minority ethnic groups, and 
whilst great progress has been made at community level to integrate these groups into 
the community, divisions are still evident. Within this area there is little take-up of 
private health care, and a much larger minority of patients attending Stockton are not 
registered with a local GP than is the case at Greenfield. 
The cultures of the two hospitals also differ. Greenfield demonstrates an open culture 
which supports the expression of honest opinion from the professional staff. There 
is a recognition when differences exist. Alternative perspectives are discussed frankly 
between those involved, and although opposition from the professional staff may not 
always succeed in its aims, they are heard at all levels of the organisation. This has 
resulted in an organisation in which all staff articulate their concerns openly and 
coherently. In Stockton however, there is a different culture, which supports less 
open discussion of problems and differences. A much higher level of discussion goes 
on `behind closed doors'. Staff have not developed such a level of debate as have 
their colleagues at Greenfield. This has led to some problems, as a number of 
differences between professional staff and managers have escalated markedly, 
resulting in one instance in the Consultants issuing a vote of no confidence against the 
Chief Executive. Such a history has led to the development of an atmosphere of 
some distrust which has further impeded open discussion. 
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The use of a case study approach can be seen to have had several advantages: 
(1) Whilst geographically close the two hospitals cater for a very different 
client group, one being situated in a green belt location in a relatively 
affluent area, serving a largely homogenous population, the other 
situated in a relatively deprived area, serving a much more culturally 
and socially diverse population. There also appeared to have been 
differences in the ways in which the NHS Reforms had been 
implemented within the two hospitals. Thus the contextual limitations 
of such a study was, to a degree, curtailed, by a comparison of the two 
hospitals. 
(2) The researcher having both professional and educational links with the 
two hospitals facilitated a level of access to both the organisation and 
the professionals working within it, which would have been extremely 
difficult to obtain without some level of insider acceptance. Gaining 
entry through the organisations `gatekeepers' can be problematic in this 
type of research (Marshall and Rossman 1989), and so, whilst such a 
study requires external objectivity, acceptance was a key issue. 
Professional practice often remains a `closed world' to those outside 
the profession, what has been referred to as the `secret garden' : 
The `secret garden' is the private world of professionals, which 
is unknown, untouched and unaccountable to ordinary people. 
(Spiers 1995 pX 11) 
Therefore credibility of both the study and the researcher was essential 
because it was recognized that several sensitive issues existed: 
(a) The structure of the Reforms is such that the two 
hospitals are, essentially, in competition with each other 
in terms of the contracting process, and so the 
acknowledgement of the confidentiality of business 
information was of paramount importance 
(b) Issues which were explored in relation to the quality of 
care had both professional and personal implications 
for the practitioners, and if such issues were to be 
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explored in adequate depth, a trusting relationship 
between researcher and professional needed to be 
established. 
(c) Reliance on the certainty that the researcher was also 
bound by a professional Code of Conduct did, to a large 
degree overcome the problem of gaining access to the 
`closed world' of professional practice 
(d) The implementation of the NHS Reforms had 
transformed relationships within the NHS, and as a 
result of this transformation it was possible that the 
health care professionals studied might have feared that 
in revealing information, they were threatening their 
role within the organisation. 
(3) Whilst it would have been possible to obtain a greater quantity of data 
if the study extended across Health Authorities, or included a larger 
number of hospitals, this could only be achieved at the expense of the 
depth of data which was available. For the purpose of this study a 
case study approach allowed a greater range of methodologies to be 
utilised, which allowed the enhancement of both understanding and 
explanation. 
Having outlined the advantages of adopting the case study strategy, the limitations 
were also recognised: 
(1) It was accepted that it may not have been possible to identify whether 
any of the variables made these two hospitals unique, and thus the 
findings would not necessarily be generalisable across the NHS. 
(2) It was recognised that the use of a case study approach could have 
been viewed by the respondents as lacking in anonymity, and thus 
potentially could have limited the information that they were prepared 
to share. 
(3) The field work for this study needed to be completed within a fairly 
narrow time frame, for reasons previously detailed. Thus steps had to 
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be taken to avoid impinging too greatly on professional time in any 
one area of practice. 
Identifying the key players in the implementation process was aided by perusal of the 
public documents, and the main difficulty was seen to be that a significant number 
of these key players were found to have obtained new posts and/or have moved out 
of the area. However, initial approaches suggested that there were still individuals 
in post who had an in-depth knowledge of the ways in which implementation had been 
achieved in both of the hospitals. For the purposes of this study interviews were 
carried out with two senior managers from each hospital, and two Health Authority 
Officers. The data from these interviews was subsequently used to describe, compare 
and contrast the ways in which the NHS Reforms were implemented in the two 
hospitals. The managers' perceptions of the implementation process were also 
compared with the perceptions of the health care professionals. 
Delphi study 
The wide range of reported perceptions of the effects of the NHS Reforms on the 
professional practice of doctors and nurses is, like much of the evidence relating to 
the impact of the Reforms, mixed and unclear. In order to impose some structure 
and clarity on the range of effects which would be subject to detailed study, a Delphi 
study was carried out, the aim of which was for a group of experts to reach a 
consensus decision as to the most significant effects of the NHS Reforms. The 
Delphi technique (Linstone and Turoff 1975) is a technique which can be utilised to 
incorporate professional judgement into research instruments, and has been 
successfully utilised in a number of health care research studies (Reid and Boore 
1987). Introduced in California by the RAND corporation, the development of the 
Delphi technique was an attempt to curtail interpersonal interaction as the controlling 
variable in group decision making. Four key characteristics which distinguish this 
technique from other group decision making processes have been identified (Goodman 
1987) - anonymity, reiteration with controlled feedback, statistical group response and 
expert input. 
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Several distinct stages to this technique were carried out: 
(1) Stage 1- the researcher established a simple structure to the problem, 
which took the form of a list of possible effects of the NHS Reforms, 
which was derived from a review of the professional journals. 
(2) Stage 2-a Delphi panel was assembled, which consisted of four 
doctors and four nurses, from outside of the area in which the main 
study was to take place. 
(3) Stage 3- the list of the effects of the NHS Reforms which had been 
formulated in Stage 1 was circulated, by post, to the panel, along with 
instructions to: 
(a) Add any items considered important. 
(b) Delete any items considered unimportant. 
(c) Give a weighting to each item from 1 to 10,1 being of 
low importance, and 10 being of significant importance. 
(4) Stage 4- the items on which there was no consensus were identified, 
and returned to the panel along with a summary of the range of 
opinions expressed, and the instruction to reconsider the item and 
respond as before. This stage was repeated until complete consensus 
was achieved, and after two rounds the four key effects of the NHS 
Reforms on professionals were identified. The areas which had been 
viewed as significant in relation to the effect of the Reforms on 
professional practice were, firstly, workload, both in terms of level 
and balance, secondly, conflict with management, thirdly, experience 
of stress, and finally, changes in the nature, structure and organisation 
of professional practice. 
(5) Stage 5- the items about which there was consensus that they were of 
significant importance were included in the questionnaire to be used to 
collect survey data. 
Survey 
The purpose of the survey was twofold. First it set out to examine the level of the 
effects of the NHS Reforms on professional practice as had been identified by the 
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Delphi study and secondly it aimed to identify both specific changes in practice which 
have occurred and changes to the quality of care delivered by health care 
professionals to patients. The advantages of using a survey for this data collection 
included: 
(1) It allowed a detailed description of the extent of the impact of the NHS 
Reforms on professional practice in relation to the key areas identified 
by the Delphi study. 
(2) A large amount of data was accumulated, and in relation to the level 
of effects of the NHS Reforms, this was structured in a way that 
allowed regression analysis to identify the significance of a range of 
variables. 
(3) The questionnaire was designed to include open questions to allow 
respondents to identify ways in which their professional practice had 
changed as a result of the Reforms, and also to provide examples of 
improvements and deteriorations in the quality of care delivered to 
patients. 
(4) Anonymity of respondents overcame, to some extent, the potential 
difficulties of acquiring data of a sensitive nature. 
(5) Surveys, whilst not always providing results that can be applied 
universally, do have a role in the identification of shared attributes 
(Babbie 1990). Whilst no claims will be made that the results of this 
study can be used to generalise to all practitioners in every field of 
practice, it was able to identify common attributes between medicine 
and nursing, and also between clinical specialities. 
The survey which was carried out in the early stages of the study was cross-sectional. 
A postal questionnaire was used to survey hospital consultants and senior clinical 
nurses. Whilst 100% of consultants were studied, just 70% of nurses were 
respondents in order to avoid too extensive an effect on clinical workload. The 
nurses studied were selected by a process of proportionate stratification in relation to 
both place of work and clinical speciality. By ensuring that the correct proportion for 
each stratum was selected the sampling errors for the survey variables could be 
reduced (Hughes 1978). Omitted from the sample were those who had joint 
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appointments in both hospitals and those who worked less than 0.4 whole time 
equivalent (WTE) as it was possible that the results would not only reflect the 
professional practice within one hospital in the case study area. The first mailing was 
carried out in mid May, and the second in mid June, which aimed to avoid the most 
popular holiday periods, yet was not at a time when workload was likely to be 
unusually high, which may have reduced the response rate. Following the second 
mailing reminders to respond were posted onto notice boards. 
The instrument used for the collection of survey data was designed utilising the 
results of the Delphi study to ensure content validity, and was subject to a small pilot 
study of 10 doctors and 10 nurses working outside the area of study. This pilot was 
subject to test and re-test in a six week period, and the reliability of the data 
collection instrument was thus ascertained, and the r2 value was found to be 0.79 
which indicates good test re-test reliability (Fink 1995). For the first purpose of the 
survey, to establish the level of impact of the NHS Reforms on health care 
professionals, a Likert scale was used to determine the professionals judgement of the 
level of impact on their own practice in relation to the previous key impacts 
identified. For the second purpose of the survey an open question was posed, 
requesting examples of ways in which professional practice had changed. For the 
third purpose of the survey a closed question was asked requesting an overall 
evaluation of the effects of the NHS Reforms on the quality of care offered, and then 
two open ended questions requested examples of ways in which the quality of care 
had improved and/or deteriorated. Each respondent was also asked details of place 
of work, profession, clinical work area, length of service in the NHS, and length of 
service in current post. 
Data obtained from the survey was coded and then loaded onto Minitab. Profiles of 
respondents between hospitals, between professions and between clinical work areas, 
allowed comparison of responses. The open questions were coded and subject to 
regression analysis. The significance of differences between hospitals, professions and 
area of clinical speciality was determined by dividing each of the two samples into 
two categories determined by the value of the second variable and constructing a2 
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x2 contingency table. This involves collapsing the clinical speciality categories. A 
simple Chi-square calculation was then carried out using Yates' correction. A matrix 
framework was constructed utilising the components of quality identified by Maxwell 
(1984) - access, equity, acceptability, efficiency, effectiveness and appropriateness, 
and the elements of quality identified by Donabedian (1980) - structure, process and 
outcome. This framework was utilised to panel code the examples provided by the 
survey respondents, in order to obtain a mapping out of the areas of changing quality 
of care. The use of a panel to code the answers from the open ended questions was 
adopted in an attempt to minimise researcher bias from this stage of the data analysis. 
Confidentiality of the survey data was maintained by extracting the data utilised for 
panel coding from the completed questionnaires. In addition the comments from 
respondents provided material for qualitative analysis, and were used as a framework 
for the interviews with professionals. 
Depth interviews 
Two categories of interviews were undertaken during this study, the first category 
was the depth interviews with key players in the implementation process, which have 
already been outlined in the case study section. The second category, again using 
depth interviews, was to explore the experience of health care professionals in 
relation to the implementation of the NHS Reforms, and the ways in which such 
experiences have shaped the nature of their professional practice: 
The truth value of a qualitative investigation generally resides in the discovery 
of human phenomena or experiences as they are lived or perceived by 
subjects, rather than in the verification of a priori conceptions of those 
experiences. Significantly truth is subject-oriented rather than researcher- 
defined. (Sandelowski 1986 p 27) 
This research framework which can be seen to advance reflection on practice 
experience can be seen to be one of a range of qualitative research designs (Tesch 
1990), but one which can be seen to be particularly suited to health care 
professionals, reflection being a familiar component of their everyday practice (Schon 
1983). 
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Prior to undertaking the interviews in the case study area, two pilot interviews were 
carried out with health care professionals outside of the case study area. This allowed 
the researcher to estimate the time which should be allowed for each interview, to 
construct an interview schedule and also to develop an interview guide which could 
act as a cue for the case study interviews. Once this had been completed requests 
were made for interviews to doctors and nurses working in a range of clinical 
specialities at both hospitals within the case study area. The number of interviews 
carried out was not pre-determined and at completion of the field work 21 interviews 
had been carried out, 11 at Greenfield, and 10 at Stockton. Of those interviewed 9 
were doctors and 12 nurses, 5 worked in Medical areas, 5 in surgical, 3 in 
trauma/orthopaedic, 2 in intensive care, 2 in theatre/anaesthetics, 3 in paediatrics and 
1 in radiology (categorised as other clinical areas in the survey). All of the 
interviews carried out were recorded and later transcribed, permission having first 
been sought from the interviewee. Field notes were also made during the interviews, 
again with the permission of the interviewee. 
Cresswell (1994) has identified the major qualitative paradigm assumptions based on 
the work of Firestone (1987), Guba and Lincoln (1988) and McCracken (1988), the 
following being of particular importance for this stage of the study: 
(1) Ontological - reality is both subjective and multiple as viewed by the 
participants. One of the aims of this study was to explore the 
experiences of the health care professional in relation to the 
implementation of the NHS Reforms, and so it is the subjective 
experience of the individual which is the essence of the enquiry. 
(2) Epistemological - the researcher interacts with that being observed. 
The interaction between researcher and professional was a major tool 
of data collection during this study, the researcher exploring with the 
professional their experiences, and to prompt their reflection on 
practice situations which could be utilised to illuminate the issue under 
consideration, using a modified method of critical incident analysis, in 
which incidents considered significant by the interviewee are explored 
in order to determine the meaning of the incident in relation to the 
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study. 
(3) Axiological - the approach is value-laden and biased. It is the values 
which underpin professional practice, and the changes in those values 
that may have resulted from implementation of the Reforms, that were 
examined and used to construct the typology of professional response. 
Thus data analysis focused on value clarification, and the values of the 
researcher had to be recognised and distinguished from those of the 
health care professionals in order to minimise the potential effects of 
bias in analysis. 
(4) Rhetorical - the language of the research is taken to be informal, based 
on the personal voice and using accepted qualitative words. For this 
part of the study the data was structured not only in the personal, but 
also in the language of the health care professionals, the meaning of 
which was shared by the researcher. The analysis involved the 
construction of a typology which used the qualitative language of 
experience, meaning, values and professionalism. 
(5) Methodological - the process of the research involves an emerging 
design, patterns and theories developed for understanding, and 
accuracy and reliability is achieved through verification. The early 
stages of the study informed the areas to be explored during the 
interviews, further issues emerged during the early interviews, and 
were included in latter stage interviews, and the use of such techniques 
as critical incident analysis (Flanagan 1954) were used when 
appropriate. As patterns developed it was possible to construct a 
typology of professional response to the implementation of the NHS 
Reforms which then allowed real cases to be compared and contrasted 
with the ideal cases. 
For this part of the study the success of the interview was determined by both the 
quantity and the quality of the data obtained. Three concepts described by Canell and 
Kahn (1968) as necessary conditions for a successful interview are accessibility, 
cognition and motivation, and attempts to ensure these three conditions were an 
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important component of the research design. 
Access was requested by letter, detailing the nature of the research, and this was 
followed up by a telephone call to arrange a meeting. If the researcher was not 
known to the professional approached, the name of a fellow professional, known to 
both was offered if the professional wished to `check out' the credentials of the 
researcher prior to agreeing to an interview. It was recognised that the two factors 
which were most likely to improve access were firstly, support for the study by both 
hospital managers and health care professionals, and secondly credibility of the 
researcher, as previously discussed. 
Cognition, or understanding by the respondent, was strengthened by the inclusion of 
an outline of the areas to be discussed in the interview, being included in the letter 
which was sent to confirm the appointment for interview. Prompts also needed to be 
given on occasion, during the course of the interview, to reiterate its purpose in order 
to maintain relevancy of the information being obtained. 
Motivation for the respondent to provide interview data was largely determined by 
the initial decision to cooperate, which was influenced by the introductory approach. 
Both this introduction and the motivation of the respondent to provide accurate 
information was likely to be influenced by the alleviation of factors which tend to 
decrease the level of motivation, such as the desire to get on with work, 
unwillingness to appear unknowledgeable, dislike of the interview content, fear of the 
consequences and suspicion about the purpose of the study (Moser and Kalton 1971). 
This was taken into consideration in both the timing and the length of interviews. 
The workload of health care professionals is not fixed, and so a level of flexibility 
needed to be built into the planned interview schedule. The aims of the study were 
reiterated prior to the interview, any questions which arose were answered, and 
confidentiality of the interview data was assured. The confidentiality issue was 
addressed in four ways: 
(1) Guarantees were given that information gathered for the purpose of the 
study would be used only for that purpose and no other. 
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(2) Information that would reveal the identity of the interviewee would not 
be reproduced when the study was written up. 
(3) The recordings of interviews, and the transcripts made would be kept 
in secure conditions, accessible only to the researcher. 
(4) The interviews with key players in the implementation process were 
completed prior to the interviews with professionals, so that any fears 
that interview material may be revealed to the professional's managers 
could be allayed. 
The aims of this stage of the study required that the interview was both open and 
frank in order that the feelings and experiences of the health care professional could 
be explored and the values and beliefs which underpinned their professional practice 
could be identified and clarified. Four ways in which frank discussion can be 
impeded have been identified (Morton-Williams 1977): 
(1) Interviewees may attempt to rationalise, and seek to put forward only 
logical reasons for their behaviour, disregarding their feelings and 
beliefs. To attempt to overcome this potential impediment, attempts 
were made to personalise the interview, and to focus on the 
individual's experiences during the implementation of the NHS 
Reforms, prompts and questions were expressed in language which 
encouraged free expression. Many of those interviewed, however, had 
previous experience of reflecting on their professional practice, and so 
were perhaps more able to focus on feelings and attitudes than 
individuals, who were not familiar, and comfortable, with a structured 
process of reflection. 
(2) Interviewees may not be accustomed to putting their feelings into 
words, and indeed many health care professionals may have been 
accused of being emotive if they had used the language of feelings, 
values and beliefs in their discussions about the implementation of the 
NHS Reforms. In seeking to overcome this barrier the focus of the 
interview was clearly set out at the beginning, and it was emphasised 
in prompts and questions, that it was the experience of the individual 
which was the primary concern of the interview. 
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(3) Interviewees may fear being `shown up' and in particular, when 
discussing their interactions with patients, any degree of `professional 
pride' may have sought to conceal rather than reveal any deteriorations 
in the quality of care that the health care professional delivered to the 
patient. In trying to defeat this barrier to open communication, it was 
important that rapport was established between the researcher and the 
interviewee before any sensitive issues were discussed, and so this was 
an area which was addressed towards the end of the interview, and 
careful consideration was given to the introduction of the topic of 
quality of care. A non-judgemental, empathetic approach was found 
to be most helpful in obtaining information which might have been 
inconsistent with the health care professionals image of how it should 
be rather than how it was. The complexities which ensue in relation 
to the sensitive issues which arise during in-depth interviews, and the 
range of strategies appropriate for dealing with these complexities 
cannot be underestimated: 
As the techniques of questioning were refined it came to be 
taken almost for granted that some form of psychoanalytic 
penetration into the near unconscious was the proper method of 
handling such affect-laden topics. (Madge 1963 p 534) 
It was a common feature of the interviews that feelings and emotions 
were uncomfortable and intrusive, and this needed to be dealt with 
both before and during the interview. 
(4) Interviewees may tailor their answers to what they perceive the 
interviewer wants. Again, the attempt to limit this impediment relied 
on the purpose of the interview being made clear to the interviewee, 
and if necessary reiterating the purpose during the interview, as a 
prompt. It was, of course, important not to enter into social dialogue 
with the interviewee in an attempt to overcome any resistance to 
openness, as this would have increased the risk of introducing bias into 
the interview. 
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The interviews were analysed using frameworks which were constructed during 
repeated readings of the transcripts, which facilitated the identification of themes as 
they emerged. The interview data was then utilized to construct a typology of 
professional response to the NHS Reforms. The process of the study during this 
phase can perhaps be best examined by using Turner's (1981) nine sequential stages 
of theory development, of which the first eight were applicable: 
(1) During the early interviews six main categories of information 
emerged: 
(a) The emerging recognition of the values and beliefs 
which underpin professional practice, and their change 
over time. 
(b) The initial, and on-going response to the NHS Reforms. 
(c) The experience of changing professional practice. 
(d) The perception of the nature of the experience of the 
implementation of the NHS Reforms. 
(e) The nature of the professional relationships with 
patients and the organisation. 
(f) The nature of the focus on quality of care. 
(2) Further interviews were carried out until the categories were 
`saturated', and confidence in the range and relevance of categories 
was established. 
(3) Criteria for inclusion in the category were specified, and the categories 
themselves were more generally defined. 
(4) The general definitions of the categories acted as a guide in the 
development of the typology which was being constructed. 
(5) Connections were sought between the categories which had been 
established and other situations in which such categories may be 
relevant. 
(6) Awareness developed of the relationship of the categories to each 
other, and to the meaning of the links which were identified. 
(7) Conditions under which the links between categories existed were 
explored. 
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(8) As the theoretical framework of this part of the study was established, 
so the implications of this in relation to relevant existing theoretical 
frameworks was considered. 
Difficulties encountered during the study 
Several problematic issues arose during the study which needed to be addressed, the 
first being the level of mistrust that there appeared to be among health care 
professionals. A number of contacts, seventeen in all, were made to the researcher 
following the first mailing of the questionnaire, to clarify information included in the 
covering letter, in particular requesting further information about the purpose of the 
study. For the purpose of the second mailing, a more detailed letter accompanied the 
questionnaire, which appeared to have met the needs of the respondents more fully, 
as there were only two further requests for information following the second mailing, 
both seeking details of the research funding. An awareness of the feelings of 
uncertainty that the health care professionals were experiencing allowed the researcher 
to provide additional information and reassurance during the interview stage. Several 
of the health care professionals interviewed verbalised their fears that the information 
that they were sharing, could possibly be used to their disadvantage, and needed to 
be reassured about the confidentiality of the study. It is of course possible that those 
health care professionals who did not openly raise this issue, may have also felt 
constrained about the amount of information which was revealed, and so in all 
interviews reassurance as to confidentiality was offered, even if not sought. 
The second difficulty encountered was that there did appear to be a high level of 
acceptance of the Reforms as resistant to challenge or change, and so to an extent it 
proved demanding to encourage the health care professionals interviewed to focus on 
the effects of the implementation of the NHS Reforms, without `selecting out' that 
which they perceived as being outside of the area of meaningful exploration because 
of its inevitability. However, to a degree this difficulty was overcome as trust was 
established, and the personalised meaning of the experience of the changes was 
explored. As the interviews progressed it was a frequent occurrence that issues which 
had been discarded at an early stage of the interview as insignificant re-emerged later 
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in the interview as something which was meaningful to the individual. 
It became evident during the early interviews, that despite the use of pilot interviews 
to provide a guide for the interview schedule, adequate time had not been allocated 
for this stage of the study. Several factors can account for this: 
(1) Despite appointments being arranged to suit the health care 
professionals, there were frequent delays in commencing the 
interviews, often up to 90 minutes, and on occasion interviews had to 
be rescheduled, when it was not possible to obtain adequate time for 
the interview to be carried out. It was not, therefore, feasible to plan 
to carry out more than one interview in a day, and it proved to be less 
problematic if appointments were made in the short term rather than 
the long term. 
(2) Following the interview there was a need for the interviewee to debrief 
prior to returning to their practice area, which had not been recognised 
in the planning of the interview schedule. In some instances the time 
required was limited to a few minutes, in others up to 30 minutes. 
(3) A number of interviews were cancelled at short notice, and had to be 
re-arranged, and so within a very short space of time the interview 
schedule had been almost totally disrupted. Despite the difficulties, 
the health care professionals remained keen to participate, and in most 
cases the delays were due to circumstances beyond their control. 
The time factor became increasingly important as the study progressed, and the 
interviews which took place towards the latter stage proved to be more difficult to 
focus solely on the changes created by the implementation of the Reforms, than did 
the earlier interviews. It became more necessary for the researcher to probe and 
clarify the nature of the changes which were discussed by the health care 
professional, and it became evident that as time advanced, so there appeared to be 
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increasing difficulty in being able to differentiate the changes resulting directly from 
the Reforms from the changes due to other factors. This required a modification of 
the interview guide to include more clarification prompts, and a recognition that there 
would be a point at which the validity of the data would be compromised, and so this 
stage of the research needed to be compacted into a shorter time span than had 
originally been planned. 
The final problem which was encountered was that of the amount of unsolicited data 
which was acquired. Many of the health care professionals inadvertently revealed 
confidential information during the course of the interviews, such information relating 
to either patient details or management operations. Such data was excluded from the 
analysis stage for both ethical and professional reasons, although during the 
interviews it was used to seek clarification of the information being shared. A certain 
level of unsolicited confidential data was also deliberately, albeit anonymously 
revealed, which although pertinent to the study could not be used, because to reveal 
such information could compromise the position of individuals. Such information was 
securely destroyed by shredding, and the sole use which was made of this material 
during the analysis was a consideration of the ways and meanings of its acquisition. 
In retrospect some of these problems should have been envisaged, and planned for. 
However the flexibility built into the research design ensured that problems which 
were encountered could be resolved, and none proved to be insurmountable nor to 
curtail the acquisition of data. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE BACKGROUND TO NHS CARE IN BRITAIN 
Early systems of health care 
Ill health and accidents have always been both accepted as part of the human 
condition, and feared for their consequences. In contemporary British society the 
well organised facilities for enabling individuals to cope with the impact and after 
effects of these misfortunes are so much part of everyday life, that they are often 
viewed as natural and inevitable components of the lives of those living in Britain, 
yet such facilities are a relatively recent development in the history of humankind, 
coming far later than developments in the management of ill health. The first 
documented evidence of hospitals in Britain appears during the tenth and eleventh 
century. Prior to this what health care was available remained the province of the 
family, and in particular the women of the family. In medieval Britain four classes 
of hospitals can be seen to have been in existence (Carlin 1989), the leper hospital, 
almshouses, the refuges for travellers provided by monasteries, and those hospitals 
which were designated to care for the non-leprous sick poor, again most often 
provided by religious orders. As the church became involved in the provision of 
health care within the monasteries and refuges, so did the concept of health care leave 
the private domain to enter the public one. However, it was not until the seventeenth 
century, with the emergence of the scientific bio-medical approach to ill health, that 
organised medical care became the main mediating social force in the fight against 
disease, and the restoration of health. 
When hospitals escaped from the stranglehold of organised religious practice around 
the time of the Renaissance, so they became established around the scientific concepts 
inherent in the rapidly developing practice of medicine. What was seen to be a 
powerful and predictive approach to medicine allowed the doctors to develop greater 
control within society, and to a large extent this shaped the pattern of the 
development of hospitals for over two hundred years. It could be argued to be one 
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that remained largely unplanned, and left to the control of a variety of both 
individuals and organisations whose motivations varied, as did their levels of 
expertise. The Medical Registration Act of 1858, added to this power by enabling 
doctors to take control of both medical education and specialist services (Jones 1994). 
This wholesale adoption of the bio-medical model also had a secondary effect in that 
it effectively marginalised women from their long held traditional role of caring for 
the sick and needy, within both the family and the community setting. For, as the 
medical profession gained status and power, so the role of women became 
increasingly subordinate, and until the middle of the nineteenth century the nurse was 
untrained, and the antecedents of the modern nursing profession could be seen to be 
the domestic servants (Abel-Smith 1968). It was not until the reform of hospital 
nursing in the latter half of the nineteenth century that training of nurses was 
introduced, and following the setting up of the Florence Nightingale Training School, 
nursing gradually came to be viewed as a suitable occupation for gentlewomen, and 
thus the move towards registration and recognition began along with what was to be 
the relatively slow progress of the process of professionalisation of nursing (Dingwall, 
Rafferty and Webster 1988). 
In the twentieth century an increasing awareness developed of the necessity for the 
State to assume a greater level of responsibility for the health and welfare of the 
people of Britain. For whilst the achievement of significant progress in the field of 
public health, and legislation to support this area of expanding knowledge had resulted 
in an improved environment, and therefore improvements in the health status of the 
population, there was still serious concern over both the level of disease, and the 
availability of effective health care. Indeed there was generalised surprise, and 
indeed alarm, at the poor physical condition of many of the men called to fight in the 
Boer War (1899-1901) which triggered a call for the State to address the issues which 
had led to this apparently poor standard of health within the sector of society that 
was, arguably, the most essential for the economical survival and the defence of the 
country - the working class men of working age (Gilbert 1966). 
By 1903 it became obvious that the Conservative government needed to act, as they 
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came under pressure both within and outside parliament. The situation was one that 
quite clearly would remain unsatisfactory unless they could reverse the decline in the 
health of the nation in general, and the working class in particular, which had 
gradually become apparent alongside the process of industrialisation. The 
Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration presented their report (1904) 
which confirmed the findings of earlier, small-scale social investigations (Rowntree 
1901, Booth 1902) that there was widespread malnutrition and disease amongst 
Britain's working class, which was aligned with serious and widespread poverty, and 
the issue of whether the government should act, was replaced by how the government 
should respond to these clearly articulated accounts of the wretched health status of 
the working class. 
At this time health care was variable, in terms of both quality and quantity. Those 
who could not afford to purchase health care were reliant on that provided by the 
charitable hospitals, clinics and public dispensaries. Those who were seriously ill, 
and unable to seek help and advice actively, could, in certain circumstances, be 
visited at their home by the Medical Officer of the Board of Governors, who was 
responsible for administering the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act. However, as this 
service was only provided on the prevailing principles of both deterrence and 
economy, such help was often lacking in terms of adequacy and expediency. Those 
who existed at the higher levels of the social strata were able to avail themselves of 
the services of those distinguished medical practitioners who were currently in vogue. 
Although, at this time, there was a growth in both medical and surgical specialities 
within the University hospitals, the private practice of these specialist doctors was 
often more in the nature of general practice, as would be recognised today. 
Those in society who were neither rich nor destitute usually obtained their medical 
advice and care from general practitioners for a pre-determined fee. Patients were 
free to choose any doctor whose fee they could afford, whilst doctors were free to 
charge their patients what they wished. However, whatever the level of the fee, this 
was frequently hard to find if the breadwinner was prevented from working and 
earning to meet his medical bills as well as meeting his everyday expenses. Also, 
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whilst women were not, on the whole, the main wage-earners, their contribution as 
a secondary wage-earner, primary homemaker and source of childcare, was often 
essential for the well-being and survival of the family. Whilst wages were generally 
low, each family was put in the position of having to weigh up the necessity of 
medical care with other pressing needs, such as food and shelter, and generally 
expectations regarding health status were low (Lewis 1984). Particularly amongst the 
working class, a significant level of ill health was not considered to be outside of the 
norm, and there was little if any concept of work related disease. Many diseases 
could be seen to be related to the working conditions which prevailed, with a high 
incidence of respiratory disorders, and a virtual epidemic of tuberculosis. Women, 
too, were often fated to be almost continually pregnant or nursing an infant, and were 
subject to many problems associated with repeated childbirth under conditions of 
both minimal peri-natal care and poor nutrition, such as anaemia, uterine prolapse and 
urinary incontinence. 
In an attempt to prevent the onset of illness precipitating the onset of destitution, 
many workers associations started the so-called `sick clubs', where, for a small 
weekly payment the worker could draw on the club's funds in time of need. Some 
general practitioners too, concerned by the health experiences of the working classes, 
set up `penny clubs' where (for the payment of a penny a week for each family 
member), the doctor would agree to supply medical care and treatment. However, 
these attempts to ensure the provision of health care to the needy working classes, 
were not universally approved by the medical establishment, and there were several 
organised attempts to impose a wage limit on those who participated in such schemes 
in an endeavour to preserve the income of those doctors choosing not to take part in 
such programmes (Green 1985). Another strategy for increasing the availability of 
health care services to the poor, which also centred around the concept of self-help, 
was the development of the self-supporting dispensaries, which were often quite 
closely linked to the `medical' or `penny clubs'. Subscribers to these dispensaries 
consisted of four types (Hodgkinson 1967) - the donors, the honourary subscribers, 
the benefitting subscribers and the subscribing parishes - and the main difference 
between these self-supporting dispensaries and the `medical' or `penny clubs' can be 
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seen to be the input from the parishes to the dispensaries. 
Even though those individuals, associations and societies which were responsible for 
the organisation and administration of these early varieties of sickness assurance 
were, on the whole, able to hold their own against the opposition of those medical 
practitioners who were hostile towards them, this did not result in them being able 
to meet the health care needs of the whole working population, indeed they could 
often be seen to exclude those who could be said to be in most need, the very 
poorest, as Hodgkinson (1967) highlights: `The indigence of the poor proved in some 
instances an insurmountable barrier. ' The piecemeal provision of health care services 
which existed in Britain at this time remained a cause for concern amongst those who 
abhorred the inequalities which could be seen to exist in relation to both health status 
and access to health care. 
Laying the foundations for the NHS 
The NHS, whilst often viewed as the product of post World War 2 Britain, can 
actually be seen to have its foundations constructed much earlier in history. 
Health services at public cost were...... of venerable origin, having their 
source in the mechanisms evolved for poor relief in the sixteenth century . 
(Webster 1982 p 2) 
However, the earliest legislation which demonstrated the State's growing commitment 
to the provision of private health care, in addition to public health responsibilities, 
was the National Insurance Act of 1911 which, is generally recognised as being 
strongly influenced by the Bismarck reforms in Germany during the 1880's. It was 
after a visit to Germany in 1908, that David Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and key player of the National Insurance Acts, formulated his plans for 
a system in Britain which was broadly similar to that which existed in Germany. The 
impetus for this act can be found in the report of the Royal Commission on the Poor 
Laws and Relief of Distress which was presented in 1909, and which demanded a 
rapid response from government. The National Insurance Act provided state funded 
medical care from General Practitioners for those individuals whose income was 
below £160 per annum, and also ensured that a certain level of income was 
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maintained during periods of sickness and unemployment. 
Yet despite the obvious importance of this policy development, health care in Britain 
during the early part of the twentieth century remained an inadequate, partial, 
patchwork type of provision (Klein 1989), which still failed to ensure minimum 
provision of medical services to the entire population. It is also apparent that the 
assumptions regarding the benefits that would accrue from this new system of 
National Insurance were more aligned to the perceived benefits for the State rather 
than for the individual, provision being focused on workers rather than any other 
group. 
Profitable from the point of view of productivity...... The workers' physical 
strength and good will had become important assets. Social insurance became 
one of the means of investing in human capital. (Rimlinger 1971 pp 9-10) 
The acceptance of responsibility for the provision of health care by the State was 
strongly opposed by the medical establishment, who feared both the financial 
implications of State control of their working practices, and loss of professional 
autonomy. This was a finding not reflected in the case of the nursing profession, 
with whom there was a long history of involvement with state provision of services 
through the Poor law establishments (Dean and Bolton 1980, Dingwall, Rafferty and 
Webster 1988). It could be argued that the role of nurses within the health care 
system resulted in them having little to lose from any increase in state involvement 
in health care as it made little if any difference to their working practices whether 
their employers were private citizens, voluntary organisations or the State. It could 
also be argued that, as health care became more easily accessible, then demand for 
such services would increase as more individuals sought health care, having had some 
of the economic burden relieved, and so more health work would become available, 
which would improve the possibilities for nurses to access employment opportunities. 
To some extent the fears of the medical establishment were only assuaged by both a 
generous level of payments, and the exclusion of higher income individuals from the 
scheme (Leathard 1990) which, in effect preserved not only the General Practitioners 
private practices, but also the inequalities which had existed within the system of 
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voluntary organisation of sickness insurance schemes. Rather than being administered 
by the Local Authorities, the National Insurance scheme was controlled by Approved 
Societies, and there was free choice on the part of doctors as to whether or not they 
participated in the scheme. Thus medical practitioners were able to retain their 
professional freedom in the face of the threat of a state controlled system of health 
care. 
The National Insurance Act which was implemented in July 1913 was a radical and 
significant step towards State involvement in personal as well as public health care, 
but it was never intended to function as a comprehensive health care system. It took 
into account not only the health care needs of the population, but also the competing 
interests of the medical establishment, and therefore was a system which was 
rendered acceptable enough to all concerned, to become a workable piece of 
legislation. Because of this history of compromise, which to some extent can be seen 
to have set a precedent for future negotiations between the State and the medical 
establishment, and despite the obvious benefits of the National Insurance scheme, it 
did not overcome all of the problems of the British health care system, in relation to 
either the availability or the standard of health care. In the period between the First 
and Second World Wars, the system could be seen to continue to evolve in a rather 
piecemeal fashion, with subsequent social and geographic variations in both the 
quantity and quality of health care which was available. From its inception in 1911, 
and subsequent implementation in 1913, the National Insurance scheme only covered 
one in three of the population of Britain, and even as late as the 1940's this cover had 
only been extended to cover half of the population. However, despite its limitations, 
the 1911 National Insurance Act remains an important landmark in the history of state 
health care in that it provided a vital part of the policy milieu in which the National 
Health Service developed (Leichter 1979). Indeed it is difficult to envisage how the 
development of a nationalised system of health care could have progressed without 
this intermediate stage, and certainly had it done so, is likely to have emerged in a 
very different form. 
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The vision of a nationalised health service 
The period between the two World Wars was one during which health care came 
under increasing pressure, and doubts began to be expressed about the basic viability 
of the existing system. This could be seen to be a mix, some would argue a 
mismatch, of primary care provided to a proportion of the population under the 
National Insurance Act, with a fee-for-service or charitable provision of primary 
health care for the remaining sector of the population. This was combined with a 
limited amount of hospital care which was to a large extent provided by voluntary 
funding, with a much smaller fee-for-service private sector. However, despite the 
recognition of the difficulties of health care provision during this inter-war period, 
progress in terms of any fundamental changes, was slow. In an interim report by a 
committee headed by Lord Dawson and set up by the newly formulated Ministry of 
Health (Ministry of Health 1920), proposals were presented for what in essence could 
be seen as a nationalised health service, and it was this report that was to outline the 
principles and identify the main issues which were to become the focus of discussion 
for the next thirty years. The model of health care provision suggested in the 
Dawson report highlighted five key areas for development. First were the domiciliary 
services which included communal or preventive services such as maternal and child 
welfare services and school health. Secondly, the primary health centres in which the 
domiciliary and communal services would be based, and from which general 
practitioners may choose to work. The third mode of provision, the secondary health 
centres were basically wider hospital services staffed by consultants and specialists 
to whom general practitioners could refer patients. Fourthly were those services 
which were considered as `supplementary' - that is those requiring separate 
institutions such as convalescent homes, tuberculosis sanatoria and fever hospitals. 
Teaching hospitals, it was envisaged would function as centres of excellence for the 
treatment of those with difficult or highly specialised medical problems, although it 
was proposed that teaching would also take place in communal services no less than 
in hospital services. However, despite the comprehensive, farsighted, albeit 
somewhat radical nature of the Dawson recommendations, the proposals were not 
implemented as hoped. They were curtailed by the economic and social disruptions 
during the early 1920's which could be seen to replace the previous post-war 
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euphoria. 
In many ways it could be argued that the story of the evolution of the NHS is in a 
sense also the story of the long delayed implementation of the Dawson Report (Pater 
1981), because, as during previous wars, the experience of World War 2 again 
focused attention on the problems associated with the health care services in Britain. 
For, despite the addition of the war-time emergency hospital scheme to the existing 
voluntary and municipal services, there remained serious shortfalls in the level of 
services available to both civilians and the armed forces. Throughout the war the 
Ministry of Health commissioned various regional surveys in order to assemble an 
overview of health care services throughout the country (Nuffield Provincial Hospitals 
Trust 1946). These surveys revealed a picture which had largely remained hidden in 
the patchwork of health care provision of the first half of the twentieth century, 
clearly demonstrating a shortfall in the required number of beds which was 
exacerbated by what appeared to be a serious maldistribution of resources. The 
inequalities which resulted from the inequitable distribution of both material and 
human resources was evident not only between, but within regions. These problems 
were seen to be worsened by the disorganised state of both the hospital and the 
specialist services (Ham 1981). The two different forms of hospital ownership, 
public and private, were seen to impede the comprehensive planning that was 
necessary to ensure that the needs of patients could be met effectively. It has been 
suggested that possibly the most serious fault of the health care system that existed 
before the NHS was in the seemingly erratic, irrational mode of organisation 
(Eckstein 1958). The specific drawbacks of the pre-war system of health care have 
been categorised by Leathard (1990) under five headings: 
(1) The shortages of both facilities and trained manpower. 
(2) The functional and geographical inequalities of service distribution. 
(3) Inefficient use of resources as a direct result of irrational organization. 
(4) Lack of adequate capital funds for service expansion. 
(5) The persistence of several unsatisfactory clinical conditions. 
The growing acceptance that there needed to be some form of national health care 
system in order to overcome the perceived shortcomings of the existing system, was 
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one which prompted an unprecedented alliance between the British Medical 
Association (BMA) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC). Although arising, in the 
first instance, from the issue of the intransigency of the commercial companies which 
administered the National Health Insurance, in relation to industrial injury 
compensation claims, this alliance developed into a call for a reconstruction of the 
nation's health services. The BMA entered into this alliance with the TUC as a result 
of pressure for reforms from radical groups within the medical profession, especially 
notable being the Medical Practitioners Union (MPU) and the Socialist Medical 
Association (SMA). The issue compelling this unlikely and unprecedented alliance 
was the growing influence of both the MPU and the SMA in relation to the provision 
of municipal services (Iliffe 1983). Although these unlikely allies did hold compatible 
aims, their focus was very different, for whilst the TUC highlighted the need for 
adequate provision of specialist medical attention for the working population, the 
BMA was more concerned with the belief that quality medical care was reliant upon 
doctor's autonomy, and that any degree of control from local government was 
unacceptable. So whilst their beliefs converged on the central idea of a national 
system of health care, they diverged on their beliefs about the way such a system 
should be structured and organised. 
Thus there developed conflicting views within the medical profession, and indeed 
within the government, in relation to the structure and organisation of the proposed 
nationalised health service. Those towards the left of the political spectrum could be 
seen to be represented by the views of the SMA who had argued for over a decade 
for municipalization (SMA 1933). Those on the right aligned with the BMA who 
similarly over recent years had fought vigorously against the loss of autonomy, which 
they saw as a result of municipalization, and who favoured an extension of the health 
insurance scheme (BMA 1929; revised 1938). 
However, taking into consideration not only the aforementioned reports but also a 
number of papers issued by various bodies during the inter-war years (Ministry of 
Health 1920, Royal Commission of National Insurance Service 1928) a convergence 
of views became apparent on the necessity of devising some form of national health 
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service as opposed to a national health insurance scheme (Klein 1989). 
The creation of the National Health Service 
The concerns relating to the provision of health care were closely aligned to those 
which were being expressed about other areas of welfare such as housing, education, 
income maintenance and employment. The Second World War added impetus to the 
development of state involvement in both health and welfare services as a consensus 
evolved through both an increasing awareness of the concept of citizenship and a 
decline in the power of the British class system. The Beveridge Report (1942) 
identified what he termed as the `five giants' which needed to be overcome during the 
period of reconstruction - Disease, Ignorance, Squalor, Idleness and Want - all of 
which he presented proposals for tackling. The means for tackling disease had a 
particular history which had created its own motivating force; it also needs to be 
viewed as part of the wider process of social change initiated by Beveridge. As 
pointed out by Pater (1981) the whole structure of the proposed welfare state could 
be seen to rest firmly on three assumptions: 
(1) That individual allowances would be paid out of taxation for the 
support of dependent children. 
(2) That an inclusive health service would be provided, free at the point 
of delivery, and dissociated from any contributory conditions. 
(3) That policy would be focused towards the maintenance of full 
employment and the circumvention of mass unemployment. 
It was this second assumption which could be seen as the first evidence of the 
government's commitment to a nationalised health service as opposed to an extension 
of the national insurance scheme. It can be seen that whilst the Beveridge Report 
(1942) was concerned with dealing primarily with the principles underpinning the 
envisioned welfare state especially in relation to income maintenance, it also 
highlighted the importance of a national system of health services. There were three 
main reasons why Beveridge viewed the provision of nationalised health care as 
fundamental to the proposed new welfare system. Firstly, only by enabling people 
to overcome ill health, could every effort be made to reduce the level of benefits paid 
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out in terms of sickness benefits. Secondly, it would facilitate early diagnosis and 
treatment, again reducing expenditure on sickness benefits. Finally, the planned new 
health service would act as a control agent for the regulation of benefit payments. 
Beveridge summed up his call for a nationalised system of health care services thus: 
a comprehensive national health service (which) will ensure that for every 
citizen there is available whatever medical treatment he requires, in whatever 
form he requires it, domiciliary, institutional, general, specialist or consultant 
and will ensure also the provision of dental, ophthalmic and surgical 
appliances, nursing and midwifery and rehabilitation after 
accidents...... provided where needed without contribution conditions (ie the 
ability to pay) in any individual case. (Beveridge 1942 Cmnd 6404) 
As in many other areas of social policy the nation's experience of war added social 
momentum to the political plan. Following a draft plan in 1943, the Ministry of 
Health (1944) issued a White Paper -A National Health Service - the following year. 
This paper outlined the policy proposals for a comprehensive, universal medical 
service which would be free at the point of delivery. It has been noted that whilst 
other countries were, at this time beginning to explore the feasibility of some system 
of state provision of health care, Britain was the first democracy in the post-war 
period to go ahead and challenge the medical establishment, and impose a degree of 
state control over its professional practice (Owen 1988). It was envisaged, at this 
time, that control of this service would be both central, through Parliament, and local, 
through the elected local authorities, although it was anticipated that the views of the 
medical profession would need to be considered carefully, and taken into account in 
the way in which this service would be structured and organised. Not entirely 
without surprise, despite the consensus among doctors that a change in the way in 
which medical services were organised and provided was necessary, the White Paper 
was faced with much opposition from the medical profession who, it was argued, 
feared municipalization more than nationalization (Leathard 1990). The BMA 
engaged in much debate both within the medical profession and with government, and 
this debate resulted in the publication of the fourteen principles which they believed 
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should underpin the provision of health care services within Britain (BMA 1943, cited 
in Pater 1981). 
(1) Reorganisation of medical services must be preceded, or at least 
accompanied by an improvement in social and environmental 
conditions. 
(2) Both the quantity and the quality of staff and resources must be 
guaranteed, medical research should be developed and medical 
education preserved at a high standard, whilst the economic barriers 
to medical services should be eliminated. 
(3) The State whilst acting as a coordinator and augmenting resources, 
must not impinge on the freedom of either the patient or the doctor. 
(4) A salaried service was deemed to be contrary to the public interest, 
and local authority control was firmly rejected. 
(5) The health service, as any other public service must both preserve and 
encourage freedom of choice. 
(6) There should be no state intervention in the doctor-patient relationship. 
(7) The concept of freedom of choice should be reinforced by 
remuneration being related to work done, or patients accepted by the 
doctor. 
(8) The freedom of the patient to consult the doctor within the health 
service or privately should be upheld. 
(9) Consultants should be hospital-based, and must retain the right to 
private practice. 
(10) The structure for central administration should have a medical advisory 
committee, containing representatives of the profession and free to 
publish any findings. Locally, representative structures should be set 
up, including medical advisory committees. 
(11) All areas of medical practice should be viewed as one service, and the 
schemes proposed for general practitioners should not precede other 
reforms to the service. 
(12) Whilst awaiting the implementation of the new administrative 
structures, the National Health Insurance scheme should be extended 
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to dependents and others of such economic status. Those individuals 
who were above the income limitations could become voluntary 
contributors. 
(13) The government and the medical profession should agree to the setting 
up of experimental schemes in group practices and health centres, and 
any further development should be based upon the findings of these 
experiments. 
(14) Whilst a comprehensive health service should be available for all, there 
was no necessity to provide it for those both willing and able to 
provide it for themselves. 
It finally became the lot of Aneurin Bevan, when he published the National Health 
Service Bill in 1946, to bear the brunt of the doctor's wrath. 
The nursing profession also held some doubts about these proposals for a nationalised 
system of health care. For, whilst there is no clear evidence to suggest that they 
opposed the concept itself, they did express disappointment over the lack of any 
indication of a commitment to any solid role for nurses within the proposed system 
(Masson 1985). A draft memorandum drawn up by the Royal College of Nursing 
(1944) framed the outline for discussion at the annual conference later that year. This 
stressed the need to develop all branches of nursing in relation to the proposed 
nationalised health service. Further proposals which were supported at this 
conference included those to expand the home nursing services, to co-ordinate public 
health and institutional nursing policy and to create health centres with more 
comprehensive functions than those which had been outlined for the planned group 
medical practices drafted in the White Paper. It can be seen therefore, that whilst the 
medical profession, as a body, took a mainly reactive stance in relation to the 
proposed nationalised health service, the nursing profession, though with less power, 
adopted a much more pro-active, even visionary approach to state provided health 
care, (through their professional organisation). In retrospect it could be argued that 
they held a clearer view as to the possibilities of both benefits and disadvantages of 
the proposals, which were possibly less clouded by personal economic considerations. 
46 
It can be seen that this proposed major change in the mode of delivery of health care 
services in Britain was, to some extent, stimulated by a similar situation to that which 
had existed prior to the 1911 National Insurance Act (Leichter 1979). First, there 
was a growing dissatisfaction with the existing system for the delivery of health care, 
which was shared by the politicians, the professional providers and the consumers of 
health care. Secondly, this increasing awareness of the inadequacies of the existing 
system was exacerbated by the public scrutiny of the health of those who were joining 
the armed forces at a time when Britain was at war. Thirdly, whilst the 1911 National 
Insurance Act was formulated, in part, as a response to the Report of the Commission 
on the Poor laws and Relief of Distress (1909), so the Beveridge Report (1942) raised 
the issue of health care reform on the policy agenda. Fourthly, adoption of new 
health care legislation could be seen to follow a significant change in party control, 
as the Liberals came to power in 1906, and the Labour party in 1945. Fifthly, the 
promotion and passage of these important pieces of new health legislation fell in both 
cases to highly competent, articulate, assertive and often abrasive politicians, Lloyd 
George and Aneurin Bevan. Finally, both the content and the implementation of the 
two acts were affected by the last minute threat of non-participation by the medical 
profession. 
However, as in 1911 with the National Insurance Act, The National Health Service 
Act was passed in 1946 despite the problems and opposition that it faced. Last 
minute negotiations and compromises could be seen to have rescued the Act from the 
possibility of defeat although as with most compromises, some factions felt 
themselves to be losers in the debates. For whilst the medical profession had been 
to a large extent appeased, and were successful in achieving many of its aims, the 
local authorities and voluntary bodies were less successful when considering the 
outcomes of these last ditch negotiations. The medical profession was able to retain 
the option of private practice and access to pay beds was available for consultants, 
within the new NHS hospitals. Distinction awards, which could be seen to give a 
considerable financial incentive, and independent contracts for GPs were agreed 
upon, and doctors were assured of a major administrative role in the service at the 
expense of local government and the voluntary bodies who lost all control over their 
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hospitals. Abel-Smith (1964 p 480) recounts Bevan's comment that, in relation to 
the medical profession he had 'stuffed their mouths with gold'. 
As numerous health policy analysts have highlighted (Willcocks 1967, Klein 1989, 
Leathard 1990) those who were viewed as holding the monopoly of health care skills 
and thus could be argued to also hold the power to block change, were those who 
came out best in the negotiations which were to shape the final form of the new NHS, 
despite the fact that this could be seen to compromise certain policy objectives. In 
essence the structure and organisation of the NHS can be viewed as representative of 
a political compromise between the political aspiration for a national, comprehensive 
and equitable service free at the point of use and the desire of the medical 
establishment to maintain or even enhance its control, autonomy and income (Allsop 
1984). These compromises which were made to ensure the co-operation of the 
medical profession can be seen to lay down some of the fundamental contradictions 
which were to become apparent in the NHS. It has been argued that, whilst some of 
these contradictions reflected political concessions, others could be seen to reflect a 
certain level of incompatibility of particular policy objectives which were only to 
become apparent at a later date. However the effect of such compromise was that the 
power relations and hierarchy which had long existed in health care services remained 
unchallenged and the organisational features which supported it were left in place 
when the NHS was established. Nevertheless, even though perhaps the changes were 
not as radical as once proposed, the task of implementing the 1946 NHS Act was a 
formidable one, as administrative structures had to be established and guidelines for 
the new service were prepared and published. A number of peripheral bodies had 
also to be established, both executive such as the Dental Estimates Board and 
advisory such as the Central Health Services Council. 
The birth of the NHS 
Following the trials and tribulations of both the legislative and the extra-legislative 
processes, the NHS came into being on July 5th 1948. It was, and remains, a major 
element of the post-war British welfare state. Although often attributed as a success 
of the post-war socialist government, it must be recognised that the NHS was a 
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product of wartime coalition government and of the consensus that existed at that 
time, about the role of the state in the re-building of post-war Britain. This unity 
was, in turn, a product of the social experience of war, the developing economic 
prosperity that could be seen to accompany peace, and the establishment of a coalition 
government which ensured that policy decisions were expedited without the delays 
usually generated by party disputes. The major effect of the transition from the 
wartime coalition government to the postwar Labour government, in relation to health 
legislation, was that Bevan replaced Beveridge's concept of a decentralised, pluralistic 
system with a centralised unitary system based on the hospital sector. It could be 
argued that Bevan replaced Beveridge's ideas for a National Health service with his 
own ideas for a National Hospital service. The pursuit of a unified service, can be 
seen to relate to the overall policy aims of this Labour government, and reflected a 
concern with inequalities in both health care services and access to these services. 
Although the structure of the new NHS was shaped and refined during the 
negotiations following the publication of the government's plans for a nationalised 
health service, many of the original principles remained true to the original vision. 
The foundation of health care within the NHS was that it was comprehensive in 
provision, universal in terms of population coverage and free at the point of delivery. 
This can be seen to align closely with the aims of the image presented by the Ministry 
of Health (1944) : 
To ensure that everyone in the country - irrespective of means, age, sex or 
occupation - shall have equal opportunity to benefit f rom the best and most up- 
to-date medical and allied services available...... To divorce the care of health 
from questions of personal means or other factors irrelevant to it, to provide 
the service free of charge (apart from certain possible charges in respect of 
appliances) and to encourage a new attitude to health - the easier obtaining 
of advice earlier. The promotion of good health rather than bad. (Ministry 
of Health Cmnd 6502) 
This service was to be funded mainly through general taxation, only a small 
proportion of the financing being raised through 
insurance contributions. It can be 
clearly identified that the NHS, at its 
inception, had three main operational objectives 
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sufficient and sound public financing of health care services, equitable and rational 
distribution of those services and planning and co-ordination of all health care 
activities. 
Pater (1981) has identified five features of the new system which were both 
characteristic and at the same time controversial: 
(1) Three separate administrative channels - hospital bodies, local 
authorities and executive councils. 
(2) The nationalisation of all hospitals within the scheme. 
(3) The utilisation of appointed voluntary bodies in the administration of 
the NHS. 
(4) Free delegation of power from the centre. 
(5) Co-operative general practice - although it was to be at least two 
decades before this idea really got off the ground. 
At the outset the structure of the NHS was a tripartite one which was, to a large 
extent, shaped by the historical legacy of the institutions involved in health care in 
Britain: 
Although widely portrayed as a revolutionary departure, the National Health 
Service was in most respects evolutionary, or even traditional. For instance 
although originally conceived as a unified structure, the service was effectively 
split into three distinct component parts coinciding with the three nuclei 
around which health care institutions had aggregated in the course of the 
previous century. '(Webster 1988 p 2) 
The hospitals were to be administered by the fourteen new Regional Hospital Boards, 
who along with the Board of Governors of the associated teaching hospitals and 
university medical schools would be responsible for the planning, provision and 
supervision of health care services in its own region. Executive councils took on 
responsibility for the family practitioner services, which encompassed not only GPs 
but also dental, ophthalmic and pharmaceutical services. These services were 
provided by individual practitioners who were paid on a contract basis directly from 
the Ministry of Health, payment being determined on a capitation basis. The local 
authorities became responsible for a range of personal and environmental health care 
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services which included maternity and child welfare, school health services, 
immunization and vaccination, health visitors, health education, home helps, the 
ambulance services and home nursing. These were funded both by central 
government grants and through local authority rates. The Ministry of Health 
provided the central control of the new health care system, passing funding down to 
the Regional Hospital Boards for distribution to the Hospital Management 
Committees, the Board of Governors of teaching hospitals, the Executive Councils 
for administration of family practitioner services, and finally to the local authorities 
in the form of grants. 
The first three decades of the NHS 
From the very beginning there were controversies and conflicts over state funded and 
state provided health care services. Many of the problems that emerged in the early 
days could be traced to two fundamental difficulties - financing and organisation. The 
problem of financing was perhaps the first to be recognised, and to cause serious 
concern, as it rapidly became apparent that it was to prove to be a formidable task 
to either predict or control. One of the major assumptions on which the NHS was 
founded was that there was a finite amount of ill health within the community, 
Beveridge (1942) used the term `an untreated pool of sickness'. The provision of 
health care free at the point of delivery would improve the overall health of the 
population and result in a reduced demand for health care as the total load of ill 
health was diminished. Bevan did not share this view and had a clearer vision of the 
financial implications of the NHS: 
We will never have all we need. &pectation will always exceed capacity. 
This service must always be changing, growing and improving, it must always 
appear inadequate. (cited in Foot 1975 pp 209-210) 
Time was to show Bevan to be right, as the cost of the NHS was proven to be greatly 
underestimated, and the level of demand was unpredicted and uncontrolled. 
Consequently the cost of the NHS in the first year greatly exceeded the estimates, and 
at an early stage a supplementary estimate of £59 million for the first year appeared, 
soon followed by a further supplementary estimate of £98 million for the second year. 
This was a pattern which could be seen to be established over years whirl 
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Although some of the unexpected expenditure could be accounted for by an under- 
allowance for dealing with the backlog of demand for dentures and spectacles, this 
could not explain the extent of the under-estimation of the costs. These rose from 
£433 million in 1949 to £499 million in 1951 to £521 million in 1953, as it became 
ever more obvious that there would be no curtailment of demand, indeed it began to 
appear that it was probable that demand would continue to grow. 
There was a growing concern for the ever-increasing costs involved in the new state 
system of health care. By 1951, just three years after the NHS was set up, one of 
the guiding principles of the service - that it should be free at the point of delivery - 
began to weaken as prescription charges were introduced by the Labour government. 
They have since remained a feature of NHS provision (Holliday 1995). The financial 
situation of the NHS was viewed with great concern, and led to the appointment of 
the Guillebard Committee of Enquiry in 1953. It was the remit of this committee to 
examine the prevailing and future cost of the NHS, and to suggest the means by 
which the most effective and efficient use of funds could be achieved, whilst at the 
same time attempting to suggest strategies for avoiding the continually increasing 
costs. The Guillebard Report (1956) utilised the research which had been carried out 
by Abel-Smith and Titmuss (1956) and drew the conclusion that there was no 
evidence of inefficiency or waste in the NHS, and that in fact the cost of the NHS 
relative to the proportion of the Gross National Product , 
had fallen from 3.75 % in 
1949/50 to 3.25 % in 1953/54. The main critique of the committee was on the nature 
of NHS spending rather than the increase (Hayward and Alaszewski 1980). They 
argued that whilst spending was mainly on revenue items, there had been a failure to 
plan capital expenditure to deal with the fact that most of the hospital buildings were 
requiring extensive repair and renovation. The recommendation of the committee 
was that what was required was additional funding to provide for the necessary capital 
costs of providing the service, taking into account the fact that around 45 % of all 
hospitals were over sixty years old and needing investment to control deterioration. 
This call for extra resources was one which was to be repeated both by individuals 
(Eckstein 1958, Abel and Lewin 1959) and by organisations (Acton Society Trust 
1955-1959). However, despite this call for increased capital spending the 1950s 
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remained a time during which many services were offered in an environment which 
could be seen to characterise a culture of `make do and mend' (Ham 1992). Yet, 
regardless of the continuing effort to attempt to control and curtail costs they 
continued, inexorably, to rise and thus remained a cause for both public and political 
concern. However, at the latter end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s this 
focus on financing as the key problem of the NHS began to weaken, and there were 
the beginnings of an acceptance of the need for a degree of capital development, 
which coincided with an escalating focus on the administrative difficulties of the 
service. 
It was not until the appointment of Enoch Powell as the Minister of Health in 1960, 
that the political strength of leadership which had brought the NHS into being, re- 
emerged, and his 1962 Hospital Plan demonstrated a government commitment to 
expansion in the hospital building programmes. At Powell's instigation the Regional 
Hospital Boards were required to produce development plans for their region, which 
were coordinated into a comprehensive Hospital Plan. This was collated alongside 
the local authorities' proposals for development of their health and welfare services 
and eventually presented by the Ministry of Health as - Health and Welfare: The 
Development of Community Care (1963). 
Whilst during the 1960s the first evidence of strategic planning emerged, and there 
appeared to be a strengthening commitment to the NHS, demonstrated by the plans 
for capital development and the level of long-term planning which was being 
undertaken, a critique of the NHS developed in which could be discerned three 
distinct strands (Ham 1981). First, some health policy analysts began to question the 
whole concept of state funded, state provided health care. Perhaps the most coherent 
argument was developed by Lees (1961) who argued for health care to be considered 
in the same way as any other consumer good, to be bought and sold through the 
mechanism of the market, by means of a system of private insurance. The second 
challenge to the NHS came from the newly developed pressure groups which were 
organised by the users of the health care services. These groups which included 
among their numbers the Patients' Association, the Association for Improvements in 
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Maternity Services and the National Association for the Welfare of Children in 
Hospital, expressed a growing dissatisfaction with the way that health care services 
were managed. The third way in which the NHS was questioned could be seen in the 
report of the Medical Services Committee (1962) which concluded that while the 
essential concept was sound, the structure of the service was so unsound that it 
required a radical review. The challenge to the NHS at this time can therefore be 
seen to have been on three levels, philosophical, political and pragmatic, and can be 
seen to have provided the basis for the more direct challenge which was to follow in 
the next decades. 
This growing discontent with the way in which the NHS was functioning was 
exacerbated during the latter half of the 1960s when increasing evidence of poor 
standards of care provided to certain client groups began to be revealed (Robb 1967, 
Ely Report 1969). Many of the problems which had begun to surface were blamed 
on the system of administrative control within the NHS. A fundamental difficulty in 
implementing central policies at local level was identified, and increasingly the 
solution to this problem was viewed as being a radical reorganisation of the 
administrative structures and processes of the NHS. 
Two Green Papers (Ministry of Health 1968, DHSS 1970) were published to guide 
the consultation and debate over the form which the proposed new administrative 
structure was to take, once the decision to reorganise had been made. The second of 
these Green papers identified a clear policy objective for the reorganisation which 
related to one of the guiding principles of the NHS, that is the promotion of a more 
equitable distribution of health care resources: 
Further levelling up of resources..... is needed to provide the same high quality 
of service all over England. There are also unjustifiable differences between 
the average standards of care provided for long-stay hospital patients - the 
elderly, the mentally ill and the handicapped - and the standards of care of the 
short-stay hospital patients. In the services paid for partly from local rates, 
standards of services also differ (DHSS 1970 p 1) 
The proposals for an improved administrative structure and enhanced managerial 
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efficiency were presented as propositions from the DHSS and enshrined in the 
operational plans outlined in the Grey Book (DHSS 1972), later to be embodied in 
the 1973 National Health Service Act. The vision which gave impetus to the act was 
that the tripartite structure of the NHS which, it could be argued, had created and 
also perpetuated many of the problems which had beset the organisation, would be 
disbanded and replaced by a unified system of administration. Although there was 
a consensus that the easiest way to achieve this unification would be to transfer health 
care services to local government, it was also generally agreed that such an option 
was not feasible taking into account the political climate of the day, and the best 
available option was seen to be the alignment of the boundaries of health and local 
authorities. At the same time a more efficient and more effective system of 
management was to be promoted through a change in central/local relations, which, 
it was argued, would allow the delivery of health care services which would be more 
closely attuned to local needs. Three distinct policy aims can be identified in this 
proposed reorganisation. First was the unification of all services by the creation of 
Area Health Authorities. The second is to achieve closer coordination between health 
and local authority services and thirdly, to improve the managerial efficiency of the 
health service. 
In 1974 the policy decisions enshrined in the 1973 National Health Service Act were 
implemented, and a reformed NHS emerged. But, not only did these times of change 
demonstrate a faith in the force of organisational change to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness in all spheres of government, but also an increasing frustration within 
the NHS at the seeming inability of central government to implement their policy 
decisions (Klein 1989). So the NHS underwent the first major change in its structure 
and organisation since its inception. Regional Health Authorities became the 
executive agency, mediating between the Department of Health and Social Security 
and the Area Health Authorities. The larger Area Health Authorities were then 
divided into smaller districts which were managed by a team of officers operating 
through a system of consensus management. Family Practitioner Committees were 
created to manage the activities of primary health care services, which were directly 
accountable to the Area Health Authority. An innovation was seen in the 
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development of the Community Health Councils which were viewed as having a 
consultative relationship with the District Health Authorities, representing the users 
of the health care services. All tiers of the service, Region, Area and District were 
advised by professional advisory committees which, it was envisaged, would improve 
the quality of decision making by improving the level of knowledge and expert 
opinion made available to the officers. For perhaps the first time within the NHS, 
this new concept of consensus management which had been introduced, gave the 
nursing profession as well as the medical profession, a fundamental part to play in 
the management of the delivery of health care services. It was noted by some policy 
analysts that the reforms which were implemented in 1974 marked a substantial 
extension of nursing power within the health service (Strong and Robinson 1990). 
Although the major change during the early 1970s focused on the administrative 
difficulties of the NHS, this was also a time during which economic growth could be 
seen to slow down, and the relationship between the government and the NHS began 
to alter as government control over expenditure began to tighten (Gray 1993) and cash 
limits began to be introduced as the attempts to control public expenditure became 
dominant on the political agenda. 
However, despite these attempts to divert the evolving sentiment that perhaps the 
NHS was an edifice which was fundamentally unsound in terms of administration and 
not viable in terms of the ability of the country to afford the increasing level of 
expenditure, these changes did not bring a solution to the two central problems of 
financing and organisation. Although structurally the NHS looked to be a new-style 
organisation, the functioning and therefore the existing problems remained relatively 
static. The overall intentions of the 1974 reforms can be summed-up in the slogan 
that was frequently used within the organisation `maximum delegation downwards, 
maximum accountability upwards'. Regarding the financial position, this remained 
problematic and a source of constant controversy, and even if the essence of the 
problems which persisted to beset the NHS had been accurately pinpointed, the 
solution remained elusive and perhaps the attempt to satisfy everyone could be seen 
to lead, almost inevitably, to the dissatisfaction of all (Klein 1989). 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE CHALLENGE TO THE NHS 
The growing critique of the NHS 
During the latter half of the 1970s, a growing discontent with the NHS could be 
discerned, across both the professionals and the politicians, whilst at the same time 
a number of controversial health issues entered onto the political agenda. Some of 
these were perceived by professionals within the NHS as a sign of a breakdown in the 
contract which had held between government and the health care providers, and in 
particular the doctors, since the inauguration of the NHS in 1948. Noticeable among 
these was the Labour government's attempt to phase out private practice within health 
service facilities, because it was a privilege which had been held by the medical 
profession since the NHS was established (a proposal which not surprisingly met with 
some considerable opposition). Perhaps the most significant of the government's 
responses to the discontent and disillusionment of the doctors could be seen in the 
setting up of a Royal Commission to examine the state of the NHS and present 
proposals for the future operation of the service. However, towards the end of the 
1970s, and with the increasing likelihood of a change of government (which came 
about in 1979), a thorough overhaul of health care within the NHS could be seen as 
inevitable whatever the report of the Royal Commission. 
This growing dissatisfaction with the NHS, and the subsequent attack on state 
provision of health care could be seen to stem from the increasing discontent over 
welfare provision in general, which ultimately led to a breakdown in the consensus 
which had held since the war (Loney et al 1987). Several reasons have been cited 
as being responsible for this break. First, the forced and severe cutback in public 
expenditure due to the 1976 IMF loan compelled a radical review of the level of 
public service provision, aligned with a growing recognition of the need to control 
if not reduce the level of public expenditure. Secondly, the general 
decline in the 
acceptability of Keynesian economics coincided with rapidly escalating 
inflation and 
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facilitated the acceptance of monetarist economic policies. Thirdly, there was a 
universal erosion of faith in the welfare professionals, a decline in popularity which 
could be seen to be accelerated by a number of revelations in the media which 
appeared to demonstrate incompetence, inefficiency or outright failure of the 
professionals to meet the needs of the service users (Kavanagh 1991). So began a 
radical review of the ways in which health and welfare services were provided. 
Finally, and possibly most telling, a coherent and articulate critique of the concept 
of state welfare provision developed from the New Right. At the heart of this 
critique was the notion that the collective provision of health care, as of other welfare 
services, led to the development of the so-called `nanny state' which, it was argued, 
fostered dependency and stifled individual initiative. The New Right claimed that 
through the imposition of uniformity and bureaucracy the NHS, as other welfare 
institutions, was anti-individualistic and functioned in a way which could only curtail 
the freedom of individuals. 
This critique was particularly telling in that it developed during a time when there 
was an unprecedented escalation in demand for health care services which it was 
impossible to meet within existing, restricted resources. A number of factors exerted 
an influence on the level of demand at this time, and indeed have continued to do so 
(Kavanagh 1991). Demographic changes greatly affected the pattern of demand for 
health care. The continuing fall in both the birth and the death rate created an ageing 
population with a greater likelihood of living out their latter years with some level of 
ill health or disability (Palmore 1977). Aligned to this, there was a decrease in 
family size over recent decades, and increased geographical mobility. Both these 
factors have considerably lessened the availability of family to take on the caring role 
for its older and disabled members. Other social changes, such as the increasing 
inclusion of women in the workforce can also be seen to have had an impact on the 
patterns of family provided health care (Ungerson 1990). 
Continued, rapid developments in medical technology, particularly in the fields of 
pharmacology, medical diagnostics, transplant surgery and neo-natal care had 
increased the areas of ill health which were now amenable to medical intervention. 
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Not only were the research and development costs of these advances high, but this 
was reflected when the new technology was applied to patient care, and it was, and 
continues to be the case that not only are the capital costs high, but also the recurrent 
running costs. Such developments also required advanced education and training for 
the health care professionals and technical support staff. Also, the NHS, whilst a 
public service, relied on the acquisition of a vast array of resources from the private 
sector much of which could be seen to comprise of monopoly suppliers. This 
severely limited the ability of the NHS to control let alone curb costs. 
Whilst the NHS was constructed around an essentially low paid workforce, with the 
exception of the powerful, but relatively small number of medical staff, there was 
continued pressure for improved pay and conditions for NHS employees. This 
escalated during the 1970s, and was generally supported by the general public. 
Finally, it was argued by some that, as the population became more accustomed to 
receiving state services, the fact that health care was free at the point of delivery 
meant that there was no effective curb to demand and thus health care demand, in the 
context of the NHS, was destined to be infinite, and thus demand for health care 
would inevitably be at odds with the resource limitations with which the NHS was 
faced (Wicks 1987). 
The critique of the New Right was founded on one vital belief - that private 
possession of health and welfare goods and services was always better than public 
provision (Wilding 1987). Private ownership, it was argued, was better in three 
ways, socially, politically and economically. Socially it was viewed as superior 
because it did not encourage dependency or suppress initiative, and offered individual 
freedom of choice. Politically, private ownership was preferred because it prevented 
the government from becoming the agents of any particular interest which would 
prevent it from acting in the best interests of the country as a whole. Economically 
it was seen to be better in that it was not so damaging to the economy by being a 
drain on the public purse, whilst at the same time 
being both more efficient and more 
effective, motivated by the competition of the market. It can 
be seen therefore, that 
when the Conservative government took over power 
from the Labour government in 
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1979, it also took over responsibility for administering a system of health care to 
which, fired by the ideology of the New Right, it no longer held any ideological 
commitment, although of course political expediency required that they sought 
reformation rather than destruction. 
From 1979 four distinct themes can be recognised in relation to welfare services in 
general and health services in particular (Mahon 1995). Firstly, the intensifying of 
the critique of bureaucracy, and the evolving belief in the inefficiency of the public 
sector. Secondly, the attacks on union and professional power and thirdly the focus 
which centred on the concept of `value for money' aligned with efficiency and 
effectiveness. Finally can be discerned the continued attempts to withdraw the state 
from a number of welfare responsibilities through a refocusing away from the state 
and onto the market, the community and the family as the major providers of care for 
those in need. 
The impact of the economic crisis of the 1980s on the NHS 
The economic crisis of the 1970s worsened as Britain entered the 1980s, and so the 
competition for scarce public resources became an increasing struggle to avoid budget 
cuts rather than a contest to secure extra resources, and the government's commitment 
to the market system for the provision of health and welfare services became more 
resolute. However, despite the necessity of stringent cuts in public expenditure, the 
NHS did appear to enjoy a level of protection from cuts not afforded to other welfare 
services, for although the level of investment spending fell, the budget for services 
was not reduced. The total cost of the NHS rose from £9282 million in 1979 to 
£19801 million in 1986, an increase of the share of Gross National Product from 
5.4%to6.1%. 
The focus of the government on the system of social security, which it was believed 
held the greatest potential for reduction in public expenditure at minimum political 
costs, and the significant reduction made in relation to 
housing, resulted in the NHS 
being able to avoid, to a large extent, the fall of the financial axe, 
if only for a 
limited period. However, the threat remained, because despite this 
increase in 
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expenditure at a time when it was being cut back in almost all other areas, this was 
not a reflection of any government belief that the NHS was functioning successfully. 
Indeed, as the Reforms of 1974 seemed to have satisfied no-one and failed to have 
achieved the improvements which had been targeted, so there was a continued drive 
for administrative and managerial efficiency and effectiveness. The report of the 
Royal Commission on the NHS which had been set up by the Labour party just prior 
to its electoral defeat was awaited with some impatience, as it became ever more 
obvious that the NHS was out of control in terms of spending, and in a state of 
disorganisation in terms of administration. What was, perhaps, to prove to be 
somewhat of a surprise was the level of support given to the NHS: 
We are all too conscious that our report will be disappointing to those who 
have been looking to us for some blinding revelation which would transform 
the NHS. Leaving to one side our own capacity for revelation of this kind, we 
must say as clearly as we can that the NHS is not suffering from a mortal 
disease susceptible only to heroic surgery. Already the NHS has achieved a 
great deal and embodies aspirations and ideals of great value (Merrison 
Report 1979 p 355 ) 
However, despite this support from the Royal Commission, the fundamental problem 
facing the NHS, and indeed a problem which had been evident for thirty years, 
clearly outlined and clearly articulated, was the fact that no longer could health care 
services maintain the principle of comprehensiveness: 
The demand for health care is always likely to outstrip supply and.... the 
capacity of health services to absorb resources is almost unlimited. Choices 
have therefore to be made about the use of available funds and priorities have 
to be set. (Merrison Report 1979 p 51) 
The Health Services Act of 1980, in response to the Merrison Report, created the 
legislative framework that resulted in the abolition of one tier of administration, that 
of the Area Health Authority, which had featured so prominently in the 1974 
reorganisation. This new reorganisation was completed in 1982 with the creation of 
201 new District Health Authorities, which took on the responsibilities of the Area 
Health Authorities, and were advised by, and accountable to the Regional Health 
Authorities. The only other major structural change in this reorganisation was in the 
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creation of the Special Health Authorities. Two major changes to the financing of 
health care services were also introduced. Firstly Health Authority cash limits 
became legally binding and secondly Health Authorities were empowered to set up 
charitable appeals for funds, the cost of which could be recouped from the proceeds 
of the appeal. It was also in 1982 that a Central Policy Review Staff report was 
leaked, revealing that serious consideration had been given to replacing some welfare 
programmes with private alternatives, including the possibility of an insurance system 
for health care. However, following an unfavourable public reaction, this was 
speedily disowned by the government, who recognised the impact of the message of 
public support for the current system of health care provision. 
The introduction of general management into the NHS 
The time during which the model of administration embodied in the 1982 
reorganisation took shape remained a time of both dissatisfaction and disruption. The 
government had to convince the electorate of their commitment to the NHS which had 
been stressed during their 1979 election campaign, for there remained strong public 
support for the NHS, and a continuing level of popularity which was not reflected in 
public opinion of other welfare services (Taylor-Gooby 1985). It was perhaps 
political astuteness rather than any other factor which kept at bay any further major 
changes to the NHS until after the 1983 general election in which the Conservative 
government gained an overwhelming majority. 
The government had not, however, dispelled their doubts about the efficiency of the 
NHS and continued to challenge the ability of NHS management to provide health 
care which was at the same time effective and economically viable. Roy Griffiths 
(later to become Sir Roy Griffiths) who was at that time managing director of the 
Sainsbury's supermarket chain, was asked to head an inquiry into the management of 
the NHS. The Griffiths Report (1983) can be seen to be an example of streamlining 
the extra-legislative process by being published after having completed the task set 
in only six months, and involving only four people. The government justified its 
approach in a press release: 
Four leading businessmen are to conduct an independent management Inquiry 
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into the effective use and management of manpower and related resources in 
the National Health Service.... we are setting the Inquiry two main tasks; to 
examine the way in which resources are used and controlled inside the health 
service, so as to secure the best possible services for patients.... to identify 
what further management issues need pursuing for these important 
purposes..... we have gone straight for management action, with the minimum 
of fuss or formality. (DHSS 1983a) 
The report highlighted four main findings which were to shape the next major 
reorganisation of the NHS. First, the Griffiths Report was highly critical of NHS 
management at all levels, viewing it as inefficient, ineffective and poorly focused on 
the job in hand. It argued that the lack of drive was largely because at each level of 
management there was no one person responsible for action. Secondly, it concluded 
that the Department of Health did not provide effective leadership, and so had failed 
to initiate solutions to long-term problems within the service. Thirdly, it was argued 
that the pattern of consensus management which had evolved through the 1974 
reorganisation was failing to deliver the motivation which was necessary in such a 
large and complex organisation, and that delays were caused by the slow pace of 
decision-making. Finally, it said that hospital doctors, whilst accepted as a powerful 
force in the provision of health care, were playing too small a part in the management 
of the service. Recommendations included the reinforcement and streamlining of 
central as well as local management, through the establishment of both a Health 
Services Supervisory Board and an NHS Management Board within the Department 
of Health and Social Security, with the Chairman of the Management Board being 
drawn from outside the sphere of the NHS or Civil Service. The Griffiths Report 
made quite clear the underpinning assumption that the NHS, despite its complexity, 
should be treated as similar to any other organisation, and that a business model of 
management was pertinent for the proposed reorganization: 
The clear similarities between NHS management and business management are 
much more important (than their differences). In many organizations in the 
private sector, profit does not immediately impinge on large numbers of 
managers below Board level. They are concerned with levels of service, 
quality of product, meeting budgets, cost improvement, productivity, 
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motivating and rewarding staff, research and development, and the long-term 
viability of the undertaking. All things that Parliament is urging on the NHS. 
(Griffiths 1983 p 10) 
The debate which was to follow the publication of the Griffiths Report developed 
several strands which can be discerned in the professional journals at that time. 
First, there appeared to be a strong defence of consensus management, as the vehicle 
by which all professional groups could be represented in the management of service 
provision. Secondly, although there was a substantial agreement with the diagnosis 
of the Griffiths Report in relation to the shortage of managerial strength in the NHS, 
no such agreement emerged as to how this should be addressed. Finally, there was 
much opposition to the concept of general management, but as has been highlighted, 
much of this opposition was poorly focused in that it centred `inordinate attention on 
the role and personage of the general manager rather than on the function of general 
manager. ' (Parston 1988 p 22) and to a certain extent articulate debate was replaced 
by individual professional organisations laying claim to general management for its 
own members. 
However, despite the on-going debate, the government's response to the Griffiths 
Report was as rapid as its preparation, and by June 1984 Health Authorities were 
instructed to establish a general management function and to employ general managers 
(DHSS 1984). As Leathard states: 
The overall significance of the Griffiths model was the intention to promote 
and control change in a much more positive and centralized manner. It was 
about transferring the NHS into a managed service rather than merely an 
administrative service. (Leathard 1990 p 85) 
Indeed the move towards general management could be seen to embrace the ideology 
of the New Right: 
That new philosophy in many ways embodies the very essence of Thatcherism. 
The notion that professionals should be subject to the same kinds of 
accountability and control as are found in contemporary business 
hierarchies 
is central to modern Conservative doctrine. (Holliday 1995 p 15) 
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These new style general managers of the NHS would, it was argued, lead to a more 
purposeful management style facilitated by appointments being made on short term 
contracts and the introduction of structured performance appraisal and performance 
related pay (Best 1987). The providers of health care services had, yet again, to 
come to terms with a radical reorganisation during which resources had to be diverted 
from the direct provision of care to the structural reorganisation which was demanded 
of them. Perhaps to a greater extent than in previous reorganisations, the effects 
were quickly felt at the `grass root' level, as the new general managers made their 
presence felt within the organisation. As these new managers were on short-term 
contracts, and their pay was performance related, there was no time for a 
`honeymoon' period. Changes were made swiftly, and the relatively slow pace of 
change which had been dictated by the consensus management process was swept 
away. For many health care professionals the introduction of budgetary controls and, 
in 1986, the introduction of resource management, initiated many changes in 
professional practice. The devolution of elements of budgetary responsibility to 
clearly designated unit teams gave both doctors and nurses a more significant role in 
the management of both human and material resources. The impact of general 
management, and the importance which the general manager would assume was well 
recognised: 
General management was founded on a new type of health service trade, the 
professional manager; a manager who was dedicated solely to the interests of 
the entire organization, not just to one of its parts. (Strong and Robinson 1990 
p 24) 
The reaction to the introduction of general management into the NHS was ambivalent, 
as can be seen in the transcripts of the interviews carried out by Strong and Robinson 
(1990) in the course of their research into the changing style of management in the 
NHS. Some were very impressed with the changes like the Regional Nursing Officer 
who declared: 
Griffiths is the best thing since sliced bread! It (NHS management) was a lot 
of bloody nonsense before! Nobody put their head over the parapet. It was 
just a talkshop, a devilish waste of money. Nobody took on the clinicians. 
(Strong and Robinson 1990 p 66) 
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Others, however, were more critical of what they saw to be a growing 
bureaucratization, which it was argued, hindered the delivery of health care services, 
like the Director of Nursing who stated: 
I can't say that I enjoyed having a UGM (Unit General Manager) The 
individual is fine. If I have to have one he's as good as I'll get. But for the 
first time I'm responsible to a non-nurse and I have to put the case for things 
to an executive board - which irritates me. There's less freedom.... now I have 
to explain things to non-nurses and that takes longer and they may see things 
differently. (Strong and Robinson 1990 p 76) 
The mixed response to the implementation of the proposals put forward in the 
Griffiths Report was perhaps, understandable, for whilst the management structure 
was new, many of the managers were the former hospital administrators with a new 
title. In response to a question raised in the House of Commons it was revealed that 
of 744 general managers at Regional, District and Unit level, only 84 came from 
outside the NHS (Hansard 1986). This can perhaps be seen as a reflection of the 
doubts which existed as to the belief that a general manager without direct experience 
of the complexity of the NHS could achieve the success which was expected of the 
reorganisation. Despite the attempts to strengthen leadership at central level, the 
changes which were introduced as a response to the Griffiths Report appeared to have 
little effect, for the Supervisory Board met rarely , and could not be seen to provide 
the level of strategic leadership which had been envisaged by Griffiths (Ham 1992). 
Whilst the Management Board was apparently more successful in providing the 
necessary management leadership, the fact that they were largely divorced from the 
policy process which still rested with the Department of Health Policy Group, could 
be seen to create difficulties in achieving a coherent approach which embodied both 
policy decision making and policy implementation. It has been suggested that this 
could be viewed as a reflection of the success of established civil service interests in 
preserving for themselves a major role in the formulation of health policy (Ham 
1988). 
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The growth of managerialism in the NHS 
Despite the persistence of existing problems, and the emergence of several new 
problems following the implementation of the proposals put forward in the Griffiths 
Report, the belief that a strong, effective and efficient management structure was the 
only viable solution to the troubles which beset the NHS endured, certainly within the 
government. Throughout the 1980s new management structures, programmes and 
technology swept through the NHS. The report of the Korner Steering Group (1982) 
which examined the use of information systems within the NHS played an important 
part in the rapid progress of the new mode of managerialism, in that the complexity 
of the NHS necessitated the collection, dissemination and utilization of vast amounts 
of health services activity data. It has been suggested that one major impact of these 
changes was that more overt rationing, based on objective economic principles and 
data technology, replaced what had been the more covert style of rationing of scarce 
resources by health care professionals on more subjective clinical data (Leathard 
1990). Further evidence of the developing managerialism can be seen in several other 
initiatives during this time (Harrison 1988): 
(1) Efficiency savings were decreed by the Secretary of State which were 
to rise from 0.2 % of the budget in the 1981/82, to 0.5 % of the budget 
in 1983/84. 
(2) An annual review process was instituted in 1982 which would monitor 
and review the operation of the NHS. 
(3) The Rayner scrutinies which had been introduced to the Civil Service 
in 1979 were extended to the NHS in 1982. This entailed rapid 
reviews of efficiency along with recommendations to secure added 
value for money. 
(4) Centralized manpower control was established in January 1983. 
(5) The first list of health service performance indicators was published in 
the latter half of 1983, which outlined the measures by which 
performances would be measured and compared in over seventy areas 
of clinical activity, support services, finance, estate management and 
manpower. 
(6) Forced disposal of property which was deemed to be surplus to the 
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requirements of the service emerged as an important concern of the 
government during the mid 1980s. 
This pattern of managerial control can be seen to be consistent with the government's 
belief in the potency of competition as a driving force of the organisation, because 
many of the new initiatives provided a framework for comparison between both 
Health Authorities and hospitals: 
Enable comparisons to be made between districts and so help Ministers and 
the Regional chairmen.... to assess the performance of their 
constituent..... authorities in using manpower and resources. 
(DHSS 1982 p 2). 
This was an overt part of government strategy, and possibly the significance of this 
approach did not become apparent to the health care providers for some time. 
For many medical staff, the implementation of the Griffiths model of general 
management and the rise in managerialism was viewed as being the beginning of the 
end of clinical freedom, for no longer did clinical decisions remain unquestioned and 
unchallenged. The creation of clinical performance indicators made it possible for 
the work of hospital consultants to become both visible and measurable for the first 
time, whilst at the same time general managers could be seen to challenge the long 
held assumption that only doctors could legitimately speak on behalf of their patients, 
or to assess their needs. Operationalisation of the systems of management budgets 
could also be seen to create the potential for general managers to impose management 
priorities on individual clinicians. Whilst, on the one hand, the medical establishment 
expressed a wish to see doctors taking on the role of general managers, which to an 
extent could be seen to overcome the potential loss of clinical autonomy, on the other 
hand doctors who became general managers often found that much of their clinical 
activity became subsumed by the demands of management, a situation which was 
many disliked (Petchy 1986). 
Although in some ways Griffiths can be seen to have posed a threat to the long 
established power of the medical profession, the degree of power which had more 
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recently been acquired by the nursing profession was under an even greater threat. 
For, although nurses had acquired a significant position in the management structures 
following the reorganisation of 1974, this would be unlikely to be retained unless they 
were able to secure position and prestige within the general management structure, 
or at least be able to secure adequate representation. The degree of their success, or 
rather lack of success in securing these objectives can be seen reflected in the fact that 
only 2.8 % of general management posts had been filled by nurses in 1985, although 
this had risen to 11 % by 1987 (Leathard 1990), and there is much evidence to suggest 
that nurses, and especially female nurses, were at a distinct disadvantage in the battle 
to procure senior posts within the general management structure (Glennerster et al 
1988, Millar 1989a), and thus became to a large extent marginalised from decision 
making at a senior level within the organisation both at central and local level. Not 
only was this recognised by the two main professional groups within the NHS, 
doctors and nurses, (and the Royal College of Nursing mounted a memorable 
campaign of opposition), but also by the managers: 
There was, then, an extraordinary contrast in managers' eyes between the 
individual power of doctors and the collective feebleness of nurses; between 
medicine's influence at the highest levels and nursing's notional 
representation; between doctors' fierce syndicalism and nursing's massive 
internal hierarchy. (Strong and Robinson 1990 p 39) 
The new style of general managers could be seen to be beginning to construct a 
stereotypical belief in the reluctance of doctors to manage and the lack of ability of 
nurses to manage, which could be seen to leave a clear path for these new managers 
to procure and preserve control within health care provision services. In many ways, 
the professional perspective was viewed as an essential component to service delivery. 
It was also seen as a threat to the organization. The new style managers perceived 
the professionals as holding a parochial rather than the global perspective which was 
viewed as being the pre-requisite of a healthy organisation. At a very early stage 
in 
the implementation process it became obvious that professional individualism and in 
particular, medical individualism would no longer 
be supported, or even tolerated by 
the new regime. However, possibly the degree of cultural change which would 
be 
necessary for professional health care staff to 
develop the required corporate approach 
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to the organisation was underestimated, and thus the extent of the change was perhaps 
less complete than was initially envisaged: 
The prime determinant of the pattern of the health services is still, just as 
before Griffiths, what doctors choose to do. (Harrison 1988 p 123) 
As the government pressed on with the changes initiated by Griffiths, it also 
continued to develop those ideas relating to a pluralistic approach to the provision of 
health care services, and the ideology which formed the foundation of the health 
policy of the New Right viewed the private sector as having an important role to play 
in the health care system in Britain. Many could be seen to regard the private sector 
as enhancing the care which could be provided within the NHS in three main ways 
(LeGrand and Robinson 1984). Firstly, it was argued that the private sector, by 
expanding the overall level of health care facilities available in Britain, would ease 
the pressure of ever increasing demand. Secondly, it was claimed that the existence 
of a flourishing private sector increased consumer choice and thus enhanced 
individual freedom. Finally, it was maintained that only with a significant private 
health care sector could the risks of the NHS as a monopoly supplier of health care 
services be reduced. During 1983 the private health care sector received a significant 
impetus to expand as the government actively encouraged the furtherance of 
partnership deals between the public and the private sector. It was also during 1983 
that a directive was issued which charged that domestic, catering and laundry services 
within the NHS should be subject to tendering to private contractors in an attempt to 
secure more cost effective services. The growing commitment to the development 
of competition in health care between the public and the private sectors, and indeed 
the expansion of the private sector in health care, was highlighted in a speech by Lord 
Wigoder in a debate on the NHS in the House of Lords: 
The existence of the two sectors stimulates competition, competition in the 
design and building of hospitals, competition in the use of day surgery, 
developments in preventive medicine and so forth. (Hansard 1983 Col 974) 
The introduction of what could be seen to be a modified business model into the 
NHS, whilst fulfilling some of the policy aims of the Conservative government, was 
not an unqualified success. For although some research suggests that better health 
care could be provided under the leadership of a new style general manager (Strong 
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and Robinson 1990), it has also been implied that this apparent improvement was only 
achieved within the hospital sector at the expense of the community sector which, it 
has been argued, suffered from neglect (Carrier and Kendall 1986). A study by 
Harrison (1994) revealed that general managers have been relatively lacking in 
influence over doctors, and that only `modest changes in this relationship have taken 
place as a result of the introduction of general management. '(Harrison 1994 p 122). 
However, in relation to non-doctors the influence was seen to have been enhanced 
and more far-reaching. Respondents in this study were largely affirmative in their 
response to general managers, legitimising their role as preferable to consensus 
management. An issue that came to gradually draw more attention was the possibility 
that implementation of the Griffiths recommendations, rather than ensuring 
managerial control over the professional groups within the NHS, actually created 
another group, that consisting of general managers, a point which was recognised by 
Griffiths himself: 
Whilst my name at the time was primarily connected with general 
management, I personally took this as shorthand for the introduction of an 
effective management process. I did not intend that the result should be yet 
another profession in the National Health Service. (Griffiths 1992 p 65) 
What is certain is that the implementation of the recommendations of the Griffiths 
Report, whilst dealing in many respects with the perceived faults of the management 
system, failed to achieve any real success in terms of the ever increasing cost of 
running the service. NHS expenditure continued to rise from £17,241 million in 1984 
to £23,627 million in 1988. Notwithstanding that the impact of inflation had a severe 
effect on the NHS, as of any other organisation, this level of increase was not one 
which the government was willing to sustain. 
Despite intensive, and sometimes harsh, cost improvement drives, managers within 
the NHS appeared to have little if any control over the level of expenditure and the 
escalating costs. Although in some respects, the cost improvement programmes can 
be seen to represent a remarkable record of activity (Robinson 1988), saving as they 
did around 1.5 % of total expenditure, this did cause some reservations, particularly 
among the professional groups working in the NHS, who began to voice their 
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concerns that the continued drive for efficiency and savings was beginning to have 
a detrimental effect on both the level of service provision and the quality of care that 
was being offered within the NHS. Despite this cautionary note cost improvement 
drives were pursued with increasing vigour as during the latter half of the 1980s 
funding assumed an ever greater importance, as there developed a widening gap 
between the funding provided from government and the funding which was required 
to expand the service to meet the growing demand for health care services. 
The strengthening of the New Right ideology 
Re-election of the Thatcher government in 1987 was to have far reaching implications 
for the NHS, for as the government majority increased so did the ideology of the 
New Right strengthen and consolidate, and as it did so the welfare state came under 
an increasingly determined challenge. The Conservative Party manifesto in 1987 had 
made it quite clear that the thinking on the key principles which should underpin the 
welfare state had moved on during the previous four years in power. Several strands 
which would prove to be important to the NHS can be identified: 
(1) The belief in privatization was consolidated and epitomised in the 
encouragement which was to be given to private pension plans. Subtly 
but significantly, the reliance on the welfare state was being eroded as 
stringent targeting was to encourage individual responsibility and 
independence. 
(2) The move towards centralization which could be identified in the 
diminishing powers of local government embodied in the shift allowing 
tenants to transfer from local authority to private housing provision, 
and higher education institutions and schools being allowed to opt out 
of local government control. 
(3) The standards by which health and welfare services would be evaluated 
were to reflect the value placed on efficiency and cost effectiveness, 
rather then the traditional values on which they had previously been 
judged. 
(4) Reduction of income tax at the cost of reduced public expenditure, 
embraced the values of individualism over collectivism, whilst 
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attempting to curtail dependency. 
However, despite evidence that the government was steadily enshrining the values and 
beliefs of the New Right into the welfare state, it faced particular problems in relation 
to the health service. One of the major difficulties arose from the problem of 
legitimising the existence of inequalities in relation to health care, which was to prove 
to be far harder than legitimising inequalities in other areas of welfare provision and 
many of the arguments of those who opposed government management of the NHS 
focused on the unjustness of rationing and curtailment of services. Whilst it was true 
to say that the government was challenging the NHS during the latter half of the 
1980s, it could also be seen that the NHS was constructing its own challenge to the 
government, and it was this challenge, surprising in its ferocity which provoked the 
Thatcher government into undertaking an in-depth internal review of the operation of 
the NHS (Butler 1992). 
In 1987 when the funding problems in the NHS reached a critical situation, a 
National Association of Health Authorities Report (1987) detailed an apparent crisis 
in service delivery, citing evidence of closed wards, cancelled operations and a freeze 
on staff vacancies. As outlined in a Kings Fund Report (Ham, Robinson and 
Benzeval 1990) this dilemma prompted the Royal Colleges of Physicians, Surgeons, 
and Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, in a singular move, to issue a joint statement 
claiming that the NHS had almost reached breaking point and that unless additional 
funding was forthcoming, then collapse was imminent. The Labour party, during this 
time, maintained a sustained attack on the government which focused on the 
`underfunding' of the NHS (Waine 1991), and the failure of government to face up 
to the worsening crisis in health care. Although the government responded vigorously 
to this attack, in the main by focusing on improvements in outputs rather than by 
concerning themselves with perceived deficiencies in inputs, a stalemate was reached. 
As Klein (1995) highlighted, the debate over the provision of health care at this time 
could be likened to a `dialogue of the deaf as opponents utilised their own 
explanatory frameworks, their own language, and their own ideological positions to 
construct their arguments, and so in the final analysis there could be no consensus as 
to the parameters of the debate, and therefore no possibility of resolution. 
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The situation was quite obviously untenable for the government, as it was seen that 
despite all their efforts to reverse the situation, the NHS continued to fail to show 
improvements in relation to either the control of expenditure or the meeting of health 
care demand. In fact, in many respects it could be argued that the situation was 
worsening as the gap between funding and demand for health care services continued 
to widen, despite the attempts to curb this increase, added to which the increasing 
political, professional and public pressure which was being exerted was making itself 
felt. The government response to this political crisis was two-tailed, firstly a further 
£101 million was allocated to deal with the most pressing needs, and secondly the 
Prime Minister initiated a broad review of the future of the NHS, the results of which 
were promised to be available within the year, and which was to prove to be the 
initiator of the most far reaching reforms into health care provision within the NHS 
yet seen. 
One of the effects of the financial squeeze of the early 1980s was that Health 
Authorities had become noticeably more efficient, but two strategies had become 
increasingly commonplace, which were somewhat harmful, or at least held the 
potential to be harmful to the government (Timmins 1995). The first of these was 
a development of a tendency to close beds and even wards in the last quarter of the 
financial year, and the second was the growing inclination to delay the payment of 
bills falling due during this last quarter of the year until the beginning of the new 
financial year. Of course this led to increasing amounts of debt being carried forward 
each year as spending continued to increase and budgets became stretched to their 
limits. A situation which exacerbated the worsening financial situation in the NHS 
was that the government, in a pattern that was to become the norm, had failed to fully 
fund the pre-election pay increases so leaving the Health Authorities with a significant 
increase in their wage bills to be met out of already over committed budgets. There 
began to be talk of `inevitable rationing' (Independent June 12th 1987 cited in 
Timmins 1995) and hospital bankruptcies. As the financial crisis deepened the 
political situation worsened, and in what may be viewed as a last-ditch attempt to 
recoup some degree of command over their predicament the government made some 
decisions which were to be to their political disadvantage at very little benefit to the 
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financial crisis. The discontinuation of free eye and dental check ups was to be seen 
to have virtually no effect on the overall budget of the NHS, but was to prove to be 
exceptionally unpopular with the electorate, and whilst this may not have been 
reflected in the polling stations, it made it increasingly difficult for the government 
to maintain their position of commitment to the principles which underpinned the 
NHS, and thus a significant degree of support for their position on the NHS was lost 
(Timmins 1995). 
Paving the way for health care reform 
Disregarding the government's view of the performance of the NHS, it had always 
to consider the views of the electorate, who had traditionally responded negatively to 
any suggestion that the provision of NHS health care should undergo any radical 
change. In 1986 the British Social Attitudes Survey demonstrated strong public 
support for NHS spending, and 84% of those surveyed considered the provision of 
health care services as a legitimate responsibility of the government, whilst almost 
50% chose the NHS as their top priority for additional spending, which represented 
an increase of 13 % since 1983. This growth of support for more spending on health 
extended across all political parties (Taylor-Gooby 1987). An opinion poll 
commissioned jointly by the National Association of Health Authorities and the Health 
Service Journal in April 1988 demonstrated this strength of feeling (Davies 1988a). 
This survey showed that in all social classes and in all age groups there was 
unanimous agreement that the NHS should receive more funding, and that of all 
respondents who had used the NHS, or whose families had, 87% were fairly or very 
satisfied with their treatment. So although the government's political philosophy did 
not rest comfortably with the existing system of health care provision in Britain, it 
was generally accepted that any attempt to disband the NHS would be tantamount to 
political suicide, and the difficulties involved in taking on the NHS, in terms both of 
public support and professional power were well recognised and articulated: 
The National Health Service is the closest thing the English have to a religion, 
with those who practice in it regarding themselves as a priesthood. This made 
it quite extraordinarily difficult cult to reform. (Lawson 1992 p 613) 
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Thus whilst they earnestly sought a solution to this situation, they continued to 
pronounce a strong commitment to the NHS, and it was, perhaps, this apparently 
paradoxical situation which prompted the most sweeping reforms that the NHS had 
yet experienced. The government was left with no viable option but to set up an 
NHS review, notwithstanding the problems that this posed: 
It was the review that nobody wanted: NHS professionals for fear of what it 
would bring, the government because it had no clear idea about what it 
wanted to do to the NHS, and the public who still did not trust the government 
with the service. (Timmins 1995 p 458) 
The announcement of the NHS review, which in an unprecedented move was 
announced by the Prime Minister during a television interview, led to widespread 
speculation that the government would utilise this to promote a radical alternative to 
the funding and provision of health care services. However alternative modes of 
financing had already been rejected in 1982, following the report, which remained 
unpublished, of a working party which had been set up by the Prime Minister, to 
examine possible options. The government were left with no alternative at this time 
other than to reject major changes to the system of funding health care largely from 
general taxation when they considered the findings of the working party: 
In many ways our centrally run, centrally f unded system was the most effective 
in controlling costs. There was no inherent cost advantage in moving over to 
an entirely new financing system and it was also clear that whatever system 
was chosen, taxation would still have to finance a giant share of the system. 
The unemployed, the poor, the chronically sick and disabled and of course 
children would need to be covered by public money. (Fowler 1991 p 184) 
Possibly the speculation was enhanced by the nature and process of the review. It 
was noticeable that this major review of the NHS was very much an `insider job' and 
thus could be seen to be bordering on the secretive. The business of conducting the 
review was left to five ministers - John Moore and Tony Newton from Health, Nigel 
Lawson and John Major from the Treasury and the Prime Minister herself. Roy 
Griffiths acted as the Prime Minister's personal advisor, but otherwise the review 
team's support was strictly limited to a select group of deputy secretaries and policy 
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advisors. However, whilst the review was conducted in private, that it was being 
undertaken at all prompted a large number of both organisations and individuals to 
proclaim their own views on the direction that the review should take ( Ham 1992). 
Indeed, it could be seen that this open debate was actively encouraged, as the review 
team advocated public participation in the discussions on the possibilities for NHS 
reform (Holliday 1995). 
Despite the government's ideological commitment to the idea of a market in health 
and welfare services it is noticeable that the internal review panel had been given a 
remarkably free hand in the development of proposals for NHS reforms and were not 
constrained as to the forms that these could take: 
Far from steering a pre-set course, the Review tacked rather erratically 
between different options, only settling down to developing something 
approaching a coherent package towards the end of its existence. There was 
certainly an ideological bias among many of those taking part, in that they 
tended to share a belief in the merits of markets and competition. But there 
was nothing like an ideological programme.... There were lots of problems in 
the NHS; there was a long list of possible solutions. (Klein 1995 p 188) 
However, as may be expected, there is evidence that the review team were more 
influenced by the proposals for reform suggested by the New Right think tanks such 
as the Centre for Policy Studies, and the Adam Smith Institute than by the suggestions 
from other individuals and organisations less sympathetic to the prevailing political 
ideology. This ideology was strongly represented in the two publications which 
arrived at similar conclusions, and recommended parallel proposals for the creation 
of an internal market in health care without changing the fundamental system of 
financing from general taxation (Goldsmith and Willetts 1988, Pine and Butler 1988), 
despite such a proposal having been discussed and rejected by the NHS Management 
Board just two years previously (DHSS 1986a). This concept of the internal market 
can be seen to have strongly influenced the review team when they prepared their 
proposals for reform. Although, again there was much interest in alternative 
methods of financing (Green 1988), no proposals were made which could overturn 
the findings of the 1982 working party, and the subsequent support for taxation as the 
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principal means of funding the NHS; indeed support for the current mode of financing 
was again sustained: `there was surprisingly little we could learn, from other systems' 
(Lawson 1993 p 616). At the conclusion of the review again the focus returned to 
ways by which scarce health care resources could be used more efficiently and 
effectively, and so the argument pertaining to the perceived `underfunding' of the 
NHS by those opposed to government policy on the NHS was effectively dismissed 
as irrelevant. The importance that the government attributed to bringing the NHS 
under control, and their commitment to a radical solution was perhaps reflected in the 
way in which the Department of Health was separated from the Department of Social 
Security during the time at which the NHS review was being undertaken, thus paving 
the way for Kenneth Clarke as the new Secretary of State for Health, replacing John 
Moore, to be able to give his entire attention to the NHS at a time which was one 
of both critical change and political consolidation. It can be noted that whilst the 
review was underway the picture of an NHS on the verge of collapse began to recede, 
indeed the BMA could be seen to withdraw from a call for a radical review of health 
care services and reconfirmed the medical profession's belief in the NHS, and at the 
same time their opposition to any form of rationing in relation to health care services: 
The principles on which the NHS is based represent the most efficient way of 
providing a truly comprehensive health service, while at the same time 
ensuring the best value for money in terms of the quality of health care. 
(BMA 1988 p 1411) 
It could be argued that as a radical overhaul of the NHS appeared to be inevitable, 
then even those who had strongly criticised the way in which health care was being 
provided began to `take fright' (Klein 1989) at what might be to come. It was as if 
the realisation had become apparent that the break-up of the all-party consensus which 
had emerged since 1979 was going to create a new style NHS which would have to 
align with the political ideology dominating the Thatcher government. It was not the 
radical nature of the changes that had already taken place, nor the threat of those to 
come, but the strength of the political will to change and the opportunistic way in 
which this was pursued which was to become the focus of concern: 
It is not the case that most of the changes have been particularly remarkable, 
or that a consistent strategy lies behind them. While one could no doubt 
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construct with hindsight quite a convincing account of such a strategy, it seems 
more consistent with the facts that the administration has been strongly 
influenced by opportunities as they have presented themselves, and even by the 
individual views of Ministers, Sir Roy Griffiths and senior civil servants, so 
long as they were compatible with the government's broad philosophy. 
(Maxwell 1988 p 188) 
Throughout the time leading up to and during the review of the NHS it became 
increasingly evident that the government's preferred option, to keep the NHS out of 
the political and ideological spotlight was not a viable option in view of the growing 
public debate, and electoral concern. So it was that the proposals for a radical reform 
of the NHS were to be revealed `centre stage', and were to remain prominent on the 
political, professional and public agenda for some considerable time. 
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CHAPTER 5 
REFORMING THE NHS 
The proposals for reform 
Following the deliberations of the internal review panel on the future of the NHS, 
plans for the most sweeping reforms yet experienced were introduced in a White 
Paper, Working for Patients (DoH 1989a). These proposals along with those which 
had been introduced in two other White Papers, Promoting Better Health (DoH 
1987) and Caring for People (DoH 1989b) were to create the framework for a 
transformation of the NHS. Promoting Better Health was published after a long 
period of consultation following a government consultative document, Primary Care: 
An agenda for discussion (DHSS 1986b). The central aims of the proposals contained 
in the White Paper were the improvement in the standards of both health and health 
care, a greater emphasis to be put on health promotion and disease prevention as 
opposed to a service centred around the concept of treating existing disease, and the 
improved choice and information available to NHS patients. The strengthening of the 
primary health care system was to be achieved in part through changes imposed on 
the contracts of GPs and dentists. 
Caring for People represents the government's response to the second Griffiths 
Report, Community Care: Agenda for Action (DoH 1988). Whilst the call for 
community care on humanitarian grounds had a long history (Ministry of Health 
1954, Robb 1967, Martin 1984), it has also been suggested that an important driving 
force in the 1980s was the need to reduce public expenditure on health and social care 
(Baggott 1994). An emphasis was placed on the development of a pluralist system 
of provision utilising the voluntary and private sectors to a far greater extent than had 
previously been the case (Ham 1991a). A new system of 
funding was proposed 
which would remove the incentive to admit people to private and voluntary residential 
care, where they could receive a higher 
level of state support than if they had stayed 
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in their own homes. The proposed new funding system would not discriminate 
against those who stayed in their own home, for the level of state support would be 
the same in either circumstance. Despite the recognised benefits of non-institutional 
care, it was nevertheless difficult to visualise the community care component of the 
1990 Act as driven by such altruistic motives: 
`They (the government) were not driven by a desire to improve the relations 
between the various statutory authorities, or to improve services for elderly 
people, or to help those emerging from mental hospital. They were driven by 
the need to stop the haemorrhage from the social security budget and to do so 
in a way that would minimise public outcry and not give additional resources 
to the local authorities themselves. ' (Lewis and Glennerster 1996 p 8) 
Whilst community care is not the focus of this study, it is relevant to acknowledge 
its interplay with the changes implemented in the hospital sector. Community care 
policy brought implications for the work of NHS professionals practising within 
hospitals. Similarly the reduction in hospital beds discussed in Chapter 4 was to 
impact on those working in health and social care in the community. 
The most radical of the government's proposed reforms, and those with which this 
study is concerned, were contained in `Working for Patients'. Policy aims attempted 
both to overcome the problems which had beset the NHS, whilst at the same time be 
seen to be compatible with the government's commitment to the belief in the market 
as being the best way in which to provide services, they had to allay the public fears 
which had increasingly developed, as there appeared a growing divergence between 
the public's and the government's views on health care provision (Cain 1988). The 
White Paper stressed that the founding principles of the NHS would be preserved and 
built on, and that the changes would be to the way in which the services were 
organised and delivered. The level of the government's determination to forge ahead 
with these reforms is perhaps reflected in the decision to spend £1.4 million on the 
launch and publication of the document. Indeed it has been suggested that this 
demonstrated that they planned to leave nothing to chance in their plans for radical 
reformation (Levitt and Wall 1992). The exact nature of the proposals was identified 
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both in the White Paper itself, and also in the eight working papers which 
accompanied it (DoH 1989 c -j). Four main policy aims can be identified in these 
documents: the introduction of a new system of contractual funding; the development 
of measures to enable clinical activity to be managed more effectively; the 
presentation of new arrangements for the allocation of resources; and the 
strengthening of management at all levels. 
At the very heart of the NHS Reforms was the notion that it should operate on a 
contractual basis, thus introducing the perceived benefits of the market system into 
the public service. It was proposed that this would be achieved through the 
development of an `internal market' which would entail the separation of the 
purchasing of health care services from provision. It was planned that the Health 
Authorities would become responsible both for assessing the health needs of the 
population within their boundaries and the purchasing of health care services to meet 
those identified needs from a range of providers of health care. The relationship 
between the purchasers and the providers of hospital based health care services within 
the internal market was to be based on three types of agreements (Ham 1991a): 
(1) Contracts within the NHS, but in which there was no management 
relationship between purchaser and provider. 
(2) Management budgets which operated between a health authority 
hospital and its managing authority. 
(3) Private sector contracts in which the purchaser would contract for 
services with voluntary and independent providers. 
Within these agreements there were to be three distinct types of contract (Ham 
1991a): 
(1) Block contracts in which access to specified services is purchased, 
without specification of the exact number of cases to be treated. 
(2) Cost and volume contracts in which a price is agreed for a specified 
number of cases. 
(3) Cost per case contracts, in which a price is agreed for each individual 
case. 
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To facilitate the development of this internal market it was proposed that certain 
provider units could apply to become NHS Trusts which would allow them a more 
substantial degree of freedom and responsibility than in the managerial relationship 
with the Health Authority. In order to be eligible for NHS Hospital Trust status the 
hospital would have to prove that it was financially viable and would continue to be 
so for the foreseeable future. Becoming a Trust meant opting out of Health Authority 
control, and becoming directly accountable to the Health Secretary. Although still 
bound by the constraints set by government, those hospitals who acquired Trust status 
would also acquire freedom in several key areas: 
(1) The mix of staff and their pay levels could be determined locally. 
(2) Greater flexibility in managing assets, and utilising resources. 
(3) Whilst no `profits' could be removed from the Trust, they could be 
used to improve facilities or services. 
It was also planned that GP practices that had more than 11,000 patients registered 
could apply to become fundholders which would free them to make their own 
contracts with provider units to secure services for their patients. However, the 
extent of services for which the GP could contract were to be limited to certain 
standard treatments. Those GPs who became fundholders would receive their 
practice budgets directly, the amount being deducted from the Health Authority 
allocation, and these budgets would be calculated on the three main expenditures 
faced by GPs - hospital and other secondary care services, pharmaceuticals and 
practice staffing. Three key areas of autonomy would exist for those GPs who opted 
to become fundholders (Holliday 1995): 
(1) The freedom of budget flexibility between their three areas of main 
expenditure. 
(2) The choice to `shop around' between hospitals in order to secure 
contracts on the most favourable terms. 
(3) The ability to carry forward savings from one financial year to the 
next, and whilst these savings could not be taken out of the practice as 
`profit' by the GP they could be utilised to up-grade practice premises, 
or to provide education programmes for practice staff. 
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Several proposals aimed at the more effective management of clinical activity can be 
identified in the White Paper. The resource management programme introduced 
following the Griffiths Report (1983) was to be rapidly extended outside of the six 
pilot districts currently operating the system, and it was expected that all large acute 
hospitals would be part of the management resource programme by March 1992. It 
was also proposed to extend the range of information technology available to support 
GPs, and this included access to prescription analysis and cost data (PACT) which 
was viewed as a powerful tool for the monitoring and control of expenditure. A 
further strategy for managing clinical activity was through the extension of the 
programme of medical audit, both in hospital and primary care sector. An attempt 
to curtail the power of senior medical staff can be seen in the plans which related to 
greater involvement of general managers in the appointment of consultants, the 
agreement of consultant's job plans, and decisions relating to distinction awards. The 
commitment that it was proposed that consultants would show to the management of 
services was to be reflected in the inclusion of management criteria amongst the 
criteria used to determine distinction awards. 
The proposals aimed to strengthen management at both central and local level, and 
in the new Department of Health a structural overhaul was to replace the Supervisory 
Board with a Policy Board, which would become responsible for the overall policy 
and strategy of the NHS, and a Management Executive in place of the Management 
Board which would take on the responsibility of implementing the policy and strategy 
decisions of the Policy Board. It was planned that at the local level the composition 
of both the Regional Health Authorities and the District Health Authorities would be 
reconstituted on more business-like lines and managers would sit on Health 
Authorities for the first time. Each Regional Health Authority would be regulated by 
a Board composed of chairman and five non-executive members appointed by the 
Secretary of State, one of whom must be the chairman of one of the Family Health 
Service Authorities within the Region; and five executive members to include the 
general manager and the finance officer. The District Health Authority was to be 
accountable to the Regional Health Authority which would be accountable 
for 
monitoring their performance. At this level the chairperson only was to 
be appointed 
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by the Secretary of State, and the Board would also include five non-executive 
members appointed by the Regional Health Authority, and five executive members 
who would again include the general manager and the finance officer. If the District 
Health Authority included within its area a teaching hospital, then one of the non- 
executive members would be selected from the medical school. At a primary care 
level the Family Practitioner Committees were to be replaced by the Family Health 
Service Authorities who again would be responsible to and monitored by the Regional 
Health Authority, which would also be required to appoint general managers who 
would sit alongside a chairman, five non-executive members and four non-executive 
members drawn from the health professions. It was argued that the creation of non- 
executive members would allow individuals to be appointed because of their personal 
qualities rather than because of the organizations that they represented. 
The new arrangement for allocating resources can be seen to support the other 
proposals in the White Paper. All regions would, it was stated, by 1992/3 receive 
their main allocations on the basis of population, adjustments being made for age, 
morbidity and the relative costs of service provision. Arrangements for adjustments 
of cross-boundary flows would cease in 1990/1, to be replaced by direct payments to 
be agreed between regions. It was planned that districts would be funded on the same 
basis after a slightly longer period of transition. GPs who were eligible to become 
fundholders would have their budgets determined on the number of patients on their 
list weighted for age and other significant factors, structured to ensure that there 
would be no financial incentive to refuse to treat any particular category of patient. 
In exceptional circumstances adjustments to budgets could be made in respect of 
individual patients requiring especially costly treatment. A ceiling on hospital costs 
for any individual patient within one year was also planned, the excess costs to be 
met by the Health Authority. Regions would all receive, from central government, 
an annual block allocation to cover the cost of all prescriptions dispensed within their 
Family Practitioner Committees, and region would devolve this budget to the 
individual Family Practitioner Committees for allocation of indicative drug budgets 
to non-fundholding GP practices within their area. In an attempt to increase 
managerial awareness of the cost of capital, and to create the incentive to utilise 
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capital effectively it was proposed that capital charges would be introduced when 
budgets were being allocated. This was to be made up of two components, cost of 
depreciation of capital and interest on capital. Those provider units which applied to 
become NHS Trusts were required to take account of their capital assets, and to begin 
their corporate life as a Trust with an existing debt equivalent to those assets. 
The programme set out in the White paper to implement the NHS reforms can be 
seen to fall into three distinct phases. The first phase of this staged implementation 
was planned for 1989/90, and there were eight clear aims to be achieved which would 
create the organisational environment for the creation of the internal market: 
(1) The NHS Policy Board would be set up. 
(2) The Management Board was to be reconstituted as the Management 
Executive. 
(3) The extension of the resource management programme would begin. 
(4) The review of the functions of Regional Health Authorities would 
begin with the planning for devolution of operational responsibilities 
to an individual unit level. 
(5) Regions would identify those acute hospitals which would become the 
first wave of self-governing NHS Trusts. 
(6) The first phase of the planned additional consultant posts would be 
created. 
(7) There would be an amendment of regulations which would render it 
easier for patients to change their GP. 
(8) The Audit Commission would begin work within the NHS. 
The second phase of implementation of the Reforms, planned for the year 
1990/91, 
demonstrated the accelerating pace of change with the seven key objectives planned: 
(1) The devolution of operational responsibilities to unit level would be 
completed. 
(2) The introduction of new management structures and financial and 
information systems into hospitals would be expedited. 
(3) `Shadow' Boards for the first wave of NHS Hospital Trusts would be 
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set up and would begin to develop plans for the transition from Health 
Authority management. 
(4) Regions would be restructured to take over responsibilities from 
Family Practitioner Committees, and to oversee the establishment of 
the first NHS Hospital Trusts. 
(5) Districts would be restructured to take on the responsibility for the 
assessment of health care needs and the purchasing of health care 
services for their resident populations. 
(6) Family Practitioner Committees would be restructured with an 
emphasis on stronger executive management. 
(7) The new budget scheme for GP drug prescribing would be developed 
in preparation for full implementation in phase three. 
The third phase of the implementation process which was to occur in 1991/2 would 
see the full impact of the proposals in the White Paper, with the achievement of two 
main objectives: 
(1) The establishment of the first wave of NHS Hospital Trusts. 
(2) The first of the GP fundholders would begin to exercise their new 
powers. 
It was evident from this timetable of implementation that the government were going 
to press ahead with a rapid pace of change, and in effect the new NHS was going to 
be manifest almost immediately. 
The philosophy underpinning the NHS Reforms 
The proposals for the introduction of an internal market into the NHS can be seen to 
have developed from the ideas which had been generated by a number of analysts of 
health care systems (Enthoven 1985, Goldsmith and Willetts 1988). It was argued 
that the resulting competition between the providers of health care would lead to 
improved efficiency in both service and economic terms. Many of those who had 
been involved in the critical analysis of the NHS system of care, had looked to the 
health care systems of other countries to generate ideas about the ways in which the 
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existing service could be improved (Maxwell 1981, McLachlan and Maynard 1982, 
OECD 1987, Robinson 1988). Certainly Enthoven, in what was the first structured 
proposal for the functioning of an internal market, underpinned his ideas on his 
experience of the United States Health Maintenance Organisations, which base their 
delivery of health care on the basis of a set pre-payment rather than the more usual 
American system of a fee-for-service. It was Enthoven's concept which provided 
much of the impetus for the government's plans for the future of the NHS, aligning 
as it did with the prevailing political ideology: 
HMOs are competing with each other to provide a quality product at a 
reasonable price. This is shown in the emphasis which they place on 
achieving consumer satisfaction; in the high quality of the information made 
available to prospective patients; in the accent on good management; and in 
the resources given to setting standards and to quality control. (DHSS 1986b 
p 55) 
This adoption of American ideas may be considered with some amazement when 
taking into account that the USA was at that time attempting to deal, unsuccessfully, 
with the effects of a cost explosion in health care, the very thing feared by the British 
government, and not clearly related to the contemporaneous debate on underfunding: 
This import of American ideas was, in many ways, surprising: it was very much 
a case of experts on obesity advising a patient suffering from anorexia. (Klein 
1995 p 186) 
However, what was evident was that Enthoven's belief in the power of the market 
model to improve both efficiency and quality harmonized with the government's view 
that public services should become more accountable for their actions. It should be 
recognised, and perhaps this could be argued to have been disregarded by the 
government, that this belief in the success of the American model was not universal, 
and when examining health care outcomes, significant problems were revealed. One 
analyst of the American system went as far as to call the competitive health care 
system in the USA as presenting: `an opulent facade which masks the growing divide 
between the haves and the have-nots. ' (Rayner 1988 p 385). Other commentators 
supported the belief that a health care system run on the lines of a Health 
Maintenance Organisation would be likely to lead to a two tier system which would 
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lead to inequalities in care (Davies 1988b). The focus of the debate about the system 
of health care, in highlighting the way health care should be delivered, rather than 
the outcomes of health care, can be seen to have more to do with the prevailing 
political ideology than any other factor. It has been argued that the Prime Minister's 
review of the NHS was initiated through ideological commitment and transformed 
through the mediation of bureaucrats into something which was essentially 
unworkable (Paton 1992). 
In the analysis of the values, beliefs and principles which underlie the differing 
systems of health care major differences can be identified. It has been suggested that 
these differences can be located on a continuum (Beauchamp 1976). At one end of 
the continuum can be positioned the values of public health justice and the principles 
which guide such a system are those of distribution of health care according to need, 
equality of access to health care services, a collective approach to public health 
problems and above all, humane, compassionate care within the system. At the 
opposite end of the continuum can be seen the values of market justice, and the 
principles which guide such a system are those of personal liberty, self-reliance, free 
enterprise and economic efficiency. It has been suggested that the proposals for 
change which followed the NHS review can be seen to represent a move away from 
the values of public health justice towards market justice (Caldwell and Francome 
1993). Whilst the government attempted to allay anxieties by emphasising their 
commitment to the principles on which the NHS was founded, they perhaps 
underestimated professional and public commitment to the `public service ethos' of 
the NHS. Although this ethos had perhaps been weakened in other areas of public 
service provision it appeared to be alive, well and kicking in the health service arena, 
and underpinned much of the confrontation which was to follow publication of the 
government's plans for reform. 
It can be seen that this shift towards a market system of health care, albeit within a 
state funded service, was just part of the overall move towards a market led society, 
and compatible with the re-emergence of the political ideology of possessive 
individualism which was pursued by the New Right. Those who embraced this 
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political ideology argued that it was only the competition which would be engendered 
by the machinations of the market, that could lead to the necessary improvements to 
the NHS (Taylor-Gooby 1985). Yet it must be noted that some commentators have 
argued that the conditions which should exist for `perfect competition' - homogeneity 
of service, plentiful producers and consumers with no collusion between them, a 
market price that is known with certainty, and external factors which are able to be 
accounted for - could never be achieved within the proposed internal market, and so 
the argument for such a market was essentially flawed (Prowle 1988). 
Although the proposals for reform of the NHS were, in the main, structured on the 
work of Enthoven, his only claim to be on the right of the political spectrum is his 
firm belief in the competitive market as a positive driving force. In the United 
States, Enthoven is better known for his support for a fairer system of access to 
health care for the poor, and certainly in his reflections on the health care system of 
Britain, he was more concerned that workload was fairly rewarded rather than that 
competition be artificially generated to meet the needs of a market model of health 
care. In attempting to provide a political interpretation, the significance of the White 
Paper has been examined from a variety of perspectives. Some have put forward the 
view that it was merely a clever exercise to divert public attention from what, it was 
argued, was a chronic underfunding of the NHS (BMA 1988,1989), whilst others 
have considered the possibility that the Reforms were signs of the political 
machinations aimed at disbanding the concept of a nationalised health service (NHS 
Support Federation, NHS Consultants Association 1991), and thus view it as being 
more related to political ideology than to an attempt to improve the health care 
system. This viewpoint has been supported by those who suggest that competition 
cannot be regarded as the primary agent for reduction in costs or improvement in 
efficiency (Francome 1992). Also highlighted has been that the cost of managing the 
NHS at the time of the Prime Minister's review, was significantly less than the cost 
of managing the health care systems in other countries (Timmins 1988, Francome 
1992). It could be suggested therefore, that the review with its strong emphasis on 
creating more effective management, failed to appreciate the strengths of the existing 
system; and that the proposals, in turn, failed to build on these strengths. The review 
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of the NHS and the subsequent White Paper were far from being unanimously 
accepted as being aimed at improving the existing health care service. Although the 
stated aims of the review team focused on the enhancement of services within the 
NHS, the proposals which were put forward could be seen not only to further the 
political goals of the government, but also to create a service environment which was 
more in line with the prevailing political ideology. 
The response to the White Paper proposals 
The initial response to the government's proposals were, in the main, extremely 
negative, although a significant portion of the medical establishment supported the 
proposals wholeheartedly. Those who did support the proposed changes aligned 
themselves with the government's argument that the proposed changes would result 
in better value for money by a more efficient use of available health care resources. 
This improved cost effectiveness was believed to be achievable through the 
introduction of free market principles of consumer sovereignty into the NHS which 
would, in itself, lead to increased consumer choice as services diversified (Fordham 
and Newham 1989). Other members of the medical profession however, abhorred 
this talk of `trade' in relation to medical services, and took the view that such market 
changes would inevitably lead to a deterioration in the quality of NHS services. 
Doubts were expressed both by health care professionals and policy analysts that, 
disregarding any foreseeable problems, the Reforms could ever hope to achieve the 
stated aims of the White Paper. It was argued that the proposals, if implemented as 
they stood, would restrict rather than enhance patient choice, and that the 
development of a highly managed market would inevitably disadvantage some patients 
(CHE 1990, Nicon 1990). Some doctors pointed out that as the White Paper 
proposals transferred responsibility for obtaining or providing services onto the 
shoulders of GPs, at the same time it could be argued to be absolving central 
government from such responsibility, and it was suggested that this move would 
ensure that any further public outcry about underfunding could be focused away from 
the government (Harris 1989). It was highlighted that the year 1989/90 was one in 
which a number of health authorities had accrued a significant overspend, and the 
issues relating to underfunding had become increasingly prominent on the opposition 
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agenda (Appleby 1990). A survey which had been carried out in March 1990 
revealed that over 83 % (of a 68 % sample) of Health Authorities believed that 
1989/90 would prove to be a difficult or very difficult year financially, and that just 
under 40% of the respondents expected to experience problems relating to the 
implementation of the White Paper proposals (NAHA 1990). 
Also questioned was the way in which it would be possible to evaluate the effect of 
implementing the NHS Reforms in certain areas. It was pointed out that if the 
criteria in relation to drug expenditure was to be one of improved cost effectiveness, 
then the monitoring of this alone would be meaningless, but that it would be virtually 
impossible to collect the data which related to the quality of care and treatment 
outcomes on a scale great enough to evaluate the success or failure of the changes 
(O'Brien 1989). It increasingly became a matter of professional debate whether 
economic criteria could, or should, be aligned to the outcomes of health care 
delivery, and if so could this prove to be an effective way of evaluating the NHS 
Reforms. However, decisions relating to the way in which the changes could be 
evaluated remained largely absent from the government's deliberations. 
The opposition to the proposals continued unabated in the months that were to follow 
publication of the White Paper. There was a general consensus outside political 
circles that the proposed timetable for implementation of the Reforms was all but 
impossible to achieve, and serious concern developed over the failure to allow time 
for demonstration projects or for evaluation for those projects, such as the resource 
management programme, which were already underway. Many doctors took the view 
that the government's insistence on such a rapid pace of Reform was unnecessarily 
abrasive and confrontational. Enthoven, whose ideas had influenced many of the 
ideas reflected in the White Paper had also admitted to concerns about the pace of 
implementation, admitting that he was `troubled and concerned (at both) the speed 
and the manner' with which the government was planning to implement the 
proposals. He was particularly uneasy over the lack of pilot projects which could 
have been used to evaluate the scheme before it was implemented nationwide (May 
1989 p 1150). In fact the speed with which the government was pushing forward 
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with the implementation of the proposed changes was something which was causing 
anxiety to many. The government was accused of pre-empting legislation by forging 
ahead with the recommendations of the White Paper before they had been debated in 
parliament (Millar 1989b). Despite Professor Harry Keen's attempt to stop this 
`jumping the gun' on implementing the Reforms, money continued to be spent prior 
to the passage of necessary legislation. Judges failed to support Professor Keen's 
challenge, basing their judgement on the interpretation of a section of the 1977 
National Health Service Act. The vagueness of many of the proposals was another 
area which was heavily criticised, and the apparent inability of the Department of 
Health to provide clarification did not encourage the belief that the consequences of 
such proposals had been carefully anticipated and approved. In many respects the 
White Paper was viewed as being more of a political statement than a planning 
document (Butler 1989). Many GPs were vehemently opposed to the proposed NHS 
Reforms, and national representatives of GPs condemned the NHS review as ignoring 
the critical matter of the level of funding, which in itself was argued to endanger the 
comprehensive nature of the health service, adversely affecting the quality of patient 
care and almost inevitably destined to result in the development of a two tier health 
care system (MacPherson 1989). 
The formal response of the medical profession to the White Paper was not made until 
May 1989, and despite the earlier outcry against the Reforms, was not entirely 
negative. At a special representative meeting of the BMA, the medical establishment 
endorsed several aims of the White Paper: 
(1) Needs of patients should be paramount. 
(2) The NHS should be available to all, regardless of income, and funded 
mainly from general taxation. 
(3) Patient choice should be extended. 
(4) Those who provide the service should be responsible for day-to-day 
decisions about operational matters. 
(5) Health Authorities should ensure that the health needs of the population 
are met and that efficient services for preventing and controlling 
disease and promoting health should exist. 
93 
In many ways the response of nurses to the White Paper reflected that of the doctors 
in that there was a general condemnation, and this led to the suggestion that the 
government was intent on implementing the proposals in the face of unanimous 
opposition, natural justice and common sense, and the implication was made that the 
principles on which the proposals were made were inhumane, and the content of the 
proposals was unworkable (Gooch 1989). There was also criticism that the White 
Paper in outlining the face of the new style NHS failed to clarify the role of nurses 
within the transformed system, and it was in fact left to the Nursing Division of the 
Department of Health to issue a paper to clarify and complement the White Paper 
(DoH 1989). Although generally there was agreement from the profession about the 
government's view of the way forward for nursing, many dismissed the paper as 
being idealistic, and almost certainly unachievable in the prevailing politico-economic 
climate (Turner 1989). It must also be noted that there was evidence of an increasing 
marginalisation of nurses from the policy process, and serious disquiet was expressed 
about decisions regarding the future of the NHS being made without any reference 
to the largest professional group, when the NHS Policy Board was structured without 
a nurse on the Board (Naish 1989). At the Royal College of Nursing Congress in 
May 1989, Congress was issued a mandate to launch a campaign to protect the NHS 
in the light of the Proposals for change. The RCN found little to praise in the vision 
for a new NHS, attacked government for failing to address the nation's true health 
needs, and stated its belief that the recommendations if fully implemented would force 
a growth in both administrative and medical costs. It was also suggested that the 
proposals threatened both the principles and effectiveness of the NHS. 
This concerted opposition to the government's plans for the NHS was one which, not 
surprisingly, drew the attention of Kenneth Clarke the Minister of Health, and in an 
interview he announced that to win over the hearts and minds of the NHS staff : `to 
revolutionize the culture as well as the framework (was the) single most important 
thing' in relation to the realisation of the proposals (Moore 1989 p 1300 - 1301). 
It was also around this time that patient and consumer organizations began to step up 
their campaign against the proposed NHS Reforms (Gaze 1989), and opposition could 
then be seen to be attacking the government from all sides. However, there was 
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never any evidence to suggest that the government viewed such opposition as anything 
other than a reaction to proposed change, combined with a lack of understanding, 
rather than a genuine conflict of values, beliefs and ideas. In response to a question 
in the House, Kenneth Clarke revealed that he had received more than 2,000 
representations on the White Paper proposals, expressing a wide range of views. He 
also added that he regretted that a proportion of these opinions were based on 
inaccuracies, one source of which he cited as being the BMA, the other, the Labour 
party (Hansard 1989). It was reported, however, that not only did Kenneth Clarke 
have to deal with opposition from health care professionals and health services users, 
but he also had to fend off attacks on the proposed changes from fellow Conservatives 
(Davies 1990). Many MPs who held a slim majority were seriously worried about the 
political wisdom of what was perceived by many of the electorate to be an attack on 
the NHS. 
The issue of spending on the implementation of the Reforms prior to their debate in 
parliament, was one which continued to be the subject of much attention from many 
opponents of the Reforms. Special concern was expressed about the funding and 
development of the information technology which was a pre-requisite of the Reforms. 
Although the government gave a cash injection of £134 million, after spending on 
resource management and medical audit, only £25 million remained to be spent on 
general hospital information technology and support systems. The true cost of the 
complete information technology system had been estimated at £101.8 million in 
capital expenditure and a further £35.3 million yearly in revenue costs. It was 
alleged that this level of spending could neither be achieved nor sustained without cuts 
to direct patient services (McFarlane 1990). In the House of Lords Baroness Hooper 
admitted that funding in 1990/1 for the NHS Reforms was expected to be £300 
million (Hansard 1990a). It was also established, in response to a question posed in 
the House of Commons, that the cost of a booklet explaining the Reforms had been 
£2.2 million, with an additional £2.75 million set aside for copies to be produced in 
minority languages (Hansard 1990b). In addition, it was revealed that, by 1993, the 
Department of Health's press office employed fifteen staff (Hansard 1993a). Both 
health care professionals and users of health care services challenged this use of 
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public money for government publicity, but to little avail. 
One year after the publication of the White Paper, health service managers and 
clinicians continued to express their concerns that so many questions remained 
unanswered (Adam and Beck 1990), and it was around this time that reports began 
to surface of patients being struck off GPs lists for being over-demanding or 
financially unviable (Glasman 1990). Commentators began to suggest that this would 
become more commonplace as GPs began to `prune' their lists in preparation for 
achieving fundholding status. Yet despite the enduring opposition and the problems 
that were already beginning to emerge, the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act 
travelled virtually unscathed through the legislative process, and the recommendations 
contained within the White Paper became enshrined in statutory law. However, there 
was some evidence that as William Waldegrave replaced Kenneth Clarke at the 
Department of Health, and John Major replaced Margaret Thatcher as Prime 
Minister, so there began to be seen a small but significant deceleration in the pace 
of the NHS Reforms as the timetable for full implementation was extended (Ham 
1991b). 
The effects of the NHS Reforms 
On April 1st 1991, the recommendations for the reform of the NHS contained in the 
White Paper were implemented, and the impact of these changes was soon to become 
apparent. Whilst the administrative changes were massive, and the impact almost 
instantaneous, the impact on the actual delivery of services was slower to reveal 
itself. Whilst the managerial and professional staff within the NHS experienced great 
change in the way in which they worked, for patients, at least in the early stages, 
there was little real evidence of change, and so to an extent, public fears about the 
new situation may have been temporarily allayed. However, despite the government's 
desire to depoliticise the issue of health care, it has remained prominent on both the 
political and the public agenda, and looks destined to continue to do so, and debate 
continued to be fierce in support or opposition of the NHS Reforms, as individuals 
and organisations attempted to assess the effects of the changes as they occurred. 
However, there was little, if any, consensus on the nature of the effects of the 
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Reforms, and to a great extent they were viewed from the prior perspective of the 
observer according to whether they supported or opposed the Reforms. Whilst the 
supporters of the new regime praised the improvements which they viewed as being 
a direct result of the Reforms, so those who opposed the changes tended to focus on 
the perceived deterioration of the service, which they too viewed as a direct effect of 
the Reforms. Benefits were discussed in terms of improvements in the quantity of 
health care delivered and an increase in the awareness of quality issues, whilst 
disadvantages were discussed in terms of worsening inequalities in health care and 
increasing bureaucratisation. Although some GPs supported the Reforms 
wholeheartedly, and approved of the improved services that they had been able to 
secure for their patients (Johansson 1991), others argued that the improvements 
enjoyed by some patients were only achieved to the detriment of services to others, 
and that the result of this was that a two tier system was emerging (Lewis 1991). 
As early as six weeks into the new financial year concern was being expressed over 
anticipated redundancies in NHS Trust Hospitals, and the consequent reduction in 
support services. It was claimed that this led to an increase of non-clinical duties for 
junior medical staff (Ind et al 1991). Yet despite these reported redundancies in the 
early days of the new system, it soon became apparent that the increasing 
administrative workload generated by the Reforms necessitated an increase in those 
staff employed to carry out administrative duties. In response to a question in the 
House of Commons Virginia Bottomley the Health Secretary revealed that in 
September 1990 15.1 % of the NHS workforce was made up of those in administrative 
grades which represents an increase from 13.3 % in September 1979 (Hansard 
1992a). 
It also emerged that the number of nurses and midwives employed in the NHS 
fell 
from 395,360 in September 1990 to 392,000 in September 1991. In the same period 
of time administrative and clerical staff numbers rose from 120,040 to 
127,370, and 
the number of general and senior managers rose from 9,680 to 
13,340 (Hansard 
1993b). 
Whilst one of the major aims of the NHS Reforms was to 
improve patient choice, 
claims soon began to be made that this was not 
happening, and particular attention 
was paid to the issue of extra-contractual referrals, whereby patients 
could be treated 
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on an individual basis at a hospital with which the GP or Health Authority did not 
have a contract, but who would agree to meet the costs. One study concluded that 
the management of extra-contractual requests was both complex and time consuming 
for clinicians and managers alike. Patient choice was clearly being limited to some 
extent, but this may well have been necessary if the number of requests was not to 
exceed the levels at which funding was based (Williamson 1991). Another study 
drew similar conclusions, that the price for a relatively limited choice for GPs and 
patients was a `considerable administrative workload' (Ghodse and Rawuf 1991 p 
409). Various hospitals obviously had different experiences in the early days of the 
Reforms, and it was reported that there was evidence that some hospitals were 
demonstrating a growing sensitivity to patient focused care as opposed to service 
focused care, despite worrying financial problems (Laurance 1991) . Other hospitals 
were reporting that whilst progress in service development was virtually nil, activity 
was frenetic (Delamothe 1991). As the different provider units began to experience 
the reality of being in a competitive relationship with others, so disquiet began to be 
expressed about the development of what appeared to be a climate of confidentiality 
sweeping the NHS Trusts, and confidentiality clauses began to be included in staff 
contracts. For not only were the Trusts keen to protect their business plans from 
rivals, but they also became increasingly aware of the damage that any evidence of 
failure in service provision could inflict on their bargaining power. This issue was 
one which received much adverse publicity in the media and prompted questions in 
the House. In May 1992 the Health Minister Dr Brian Mawhinney denied that 
confidentiality clauses in staff contracts set out to inhibit professionals from 
expressing their opinions, stating that they were aimed at safeguarding sensitive data 
(Hansard 1992b). 
It became obvious that despite massive injections of cash into the provision of 
sophisticated information technology systems there were widespread problems relating 
to the management of financial contracts and workloads. Further delays to the move 
towards basing health spending on population size had become evident by the end of 
1991, as it became apparent that the reductions in allocations which would occur as 
a result of this would inevitably force some hospitals to close (Sheldon 1991b). It 
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was also reported that: 
Massive discrepancies in the estimates of capital charges...... have forced the 
Department of Health effectively to write off the first year as a paper exercise. 
(Moore 1991 p 3) 
As projections about the level of expected overspends began to be expressed, so could 
a growing number of provider units be seen to develop a range of strategies for 
income generation. These ranged from the sale of high technology diagnostic services 
to the private sector, to pay-roll processing for the growing number of multi-agency 
consortia that were being established (Pollard 1991), whilst other more contentious 
ideas such as the introduction of car park charges for staff, patients and visitors, also 
became commonplace. 
A concern began to emerge at the end of 1991 about the way in which activity within 
provider units continued to rise despite the fact that these provider units were likely 
to reach their contract targets ahead of time. Some health policy analysts argued that 
this inability of the internal market to control demand by prioritising and rationing 
was due to a basic flaw in the logic on which the internal market was based (Salter 
1991). Other commentators suggested that prioritisation of services was approached 
in a somewhat haphazard manner, and in many instances could be seen to be reactive 
rather than proactive. The Kings Fund Institute worked to clarify the task of 
prioritisation and concluded that Health Authorities needed to take account of four 
major inputs as part of the decision making process - top-down priorities, bottom-up 
consultation, professional opinion and research-based evidence (Robinson 1993). 
Questions began to be asked about the limits of the NHS responsibilities for the 
provision of free health care, and cases were made public in which it was difficult to 
determine who would finance the care required (Davies 1991). The issue of 
lengthening waiting lists was one which occupied both the politicians and the public 
during the first years of the Reforms. One report highlighted the notion of waiting 
lists as an approach to rationing health care resources, and compared this approach 
to others such as rationing by delay, dilution, 
deterrence, ignorance or termination 
(Ruddle 1991). It has been argued that whilst waiting lists, or at least lengthening 
waiting lists, might be neither politically nor publicly acceptable, 
the alternatives may 
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be even less so (Higgins 1991). A study of the 1992/3 purchasing plans revealed that 
Health Authorities appeared to be very reluctant to be seen to be rationing resources, 
and were attempting to deal with the problem of insufficient resources to meet the 
totality of health care demand by spreading their money around ever more thinly 
(Klein and Redmayne 1992). However, it was suggested that the reduction of 
resources allocated to some Health Authorities which would follow the 
implementation of plans to move towards allocation by weighted capitation, would 
almost certainly push them into making some attempts to ration health care services 
in 1993/4 (Redmayne 1992). As the debate about rationing became more overt some 
commentators emphasised the benefits of health care rationing in terms of the 
availability of additional health care resources for priority services. Suggestions for 
rationing have included the exclusion of non-medical conditions, unproven treatments, 
expensive procedures with no demonstrable advantages, and self-inflicted injuries 
(Byrne 1992). Some Health Authorities have made overt decisions about which 
services would be funded, and which would not, and some of these decisions have 
drawn media attention, but it is likely that in many cases such decisions remain 
concealed, and not subject to open debate (Klein 1995). Although, in theory, the 
system of purchasing and providing within the internal market should have brought 
priority setting and subsequent rationing decisions into the open, in reality this has 
not happened, and such decisions remain behind closed doors (Redmayne, Klein and 
Day 1993). 
The first report of the Commons Health Select Committee (CHSC 1991) reflected the 
government's commitment to maintain the waiting list initiative, at least until it 
became evident that the Reforms, in themselves, were capable of replacing the 
waiting list initiative in reducing waiting times. Although both financial and 
managerial resources were diverted towards bringing down waiting times, the 
effectiveness of this was challenged. Although government statistics appeared to 
suggest that the waiting list initiative was succeeding, doubts were expressed about 
the veracity of such statistics. In response to a question 
in the House, Virginia 
Bottomley stated that more than 10% of patients were removed from waiting lists 
without receiving their treatment 
between September 1990 and March 1991. Whilst 
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during this time 1.38 million patients left the waiting list following treatment, 168,000 
were removed from the waiting list without having been admitted for the treatment 
for which they were waiting (Hansard 1992c), and this led to the claim being made 
that the improvements claimed by the government to have been achieved by the 
Reforms, were in reality no more than the massaging of statistics. This was not the 
only time that government statistics were seen to be reflecting a rather optimistic view 
of the Reforms in terms of patient outcomes. Whilst it was stated that in 1991/2, 
500,000 more patients were treated than in the previous year, representing an increase 
of 7%, this was hotly disputed. It was argued that the new method of recording 
health care service data was responsible for this apparent improvement. It was 
claimed that the way of measuring patient treatments - the Finished Consultant 
Episode (FCE) - was both inaccurate and misleading. It was pointed out that 
transferring patients between consultants during any one period of hospital treatment, 
a not uncommon occurrence, now appeared as two or even more, FCEs whereas as 
before it would have been recorded as one episode of treatment, and this change 
would indicate increased activity without any real increase in patient throughput 
(Clarke and McKee 1992, Seng, Lessof and McKee 1993). As attempts to evaluate 
the effects of the Reforms continue, so does the inadequacy of available health service 
data become more apparent. The simplistic measures which are accessible do not 
depict the complexity of health care provision, and may, in fact, obscure that which 
would enable judgements about the success or failure of the Reforms to be made. 
Even to examine a relatively straightforward measure, that of health service activity, 
is problematic, for whilst at first sight it would appear that activity has continued to 
rise each year, day cases have almost doubled whilst in-patient hospital admissions 
have almost halved (DoH and OPCS 1994 Table 18). 
What was unarguable was that the Reforms, whatever their effect, had revolutionized 
health care organisation and the extent of the transformation can be seen in several 
key areas: 
(1) The number of GP fundholders has risen from 306 in 1991, when 7% 
of the population was registered with a GP who was a fundholder, to 
10,410 in 1995 when 42 % of the population were on the list of a GP 
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fundholder. Increasingly smaller GP practices were encouraged to 
become fundholders as the number of patients at which GPs were 
eligible to become fundholders fell from 11,000 in 1991 to 9,000 in 
1992, to 7,000 in 1993 and finally to 5,000 in 1995. 
(2) In 1991 57 of the 66 hospitals which had applied became NHS 
Hospital Trusts, in 1995 98 % of all acute hospitals were NHS Hospital 
Trusts, and by 1996 it was envisaged that no acute hospitals would 
remain as units directly managed by the Health Authority. 
(3) The complexity of Trust applications increased, and whilst the first 
wave of NHS Trusts were confined to acute hospitals, since then 
different forms have emerged, as district wide providers have 
developed, as well as combined community and hospital providers. 
Specialist hospitals and ambulance services have also become NHS 
Trusts. 
(4) Waiting lists have continued to rise, exceeding 1 million for the first 
time in 1994, but waiting times have fallen sharply. 
When considering the NHS Reforms implemented in 1991, it becomes apparent that 
frequently the commentators strongly held views concerning the nature and provision 
of health care services to some extent lead to a subjective rather than objective 
evaluation of both the process and outcomes of the most radical remodelling that the 
NHS had experienced in its history. To distinguish rhetoric from reality is often 
difficult in a situation where there appears to be little common ground or even, it 
could be suggested, little common language, between those who support and those 
who oppose, and there is no evidence of any consensus as to what criteria should be 
used to evaluate either the efficiency or effectiveness of health care services. The 
evaluation of such a complex policy change cannot be achieved in a simplistic way, 
nor can the process of change be divorced from the outcomes, and in the final 
analysis, as health care is something which is not only delivered in quantitative terms, 
but also experienced in a qualitative way by patients, the quality of the individual 
experience needs to be evaluated alongside the measure of health care services 
purchased and provided within the transformed health care system. Whilst the aims 
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of health service reforms focused on improvements for the patient, who was 
linguistically transformed into a consumer in the new style NHS, little attempt has 
been made to evaluate the effect of the Reforms on the quality of health care services 
available to and accessed by the patient, indeed it could be argued that little attempt 
has even been made to determine the nature of health care quality. Although the 
internal market has been integrated into the NHS, and the language of the market has 
entered into professional discourse, the patient has never accrued the power of the 
true consumer to bestow or withdraw custom as a response to the quality of service 
delivered, or to influence the determination of quality standards. 
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CHAPTER 6 
TIE QUALITY OF CARE IN THE NiS 
Problems in determining health care quality 
Although the pursuit of quality improvement and quality assurance has been a key 
feature of both service and manufacturing industries since the 1950s, the introduction 
of a focus on quality into the NHS was, in comparison, relatively late. Enthoven 
(1985), the guru of the NHS Reforms highlighted the lack of a quality drive during 
his early deliberations when he pointed out that, whilst the NHS ran on the ability and 
education of its workers, its structure contained no incentives to improve quality at 
a reduced cost. As in other welfare services the focus was on provision rather than 
receipt of services for many years, and the need to attract, satisfy and retain 
customers did not arise as an issue. However, as the patient of the NHS was 
transformed during the latter half of the 1980s into the customer of the health care 
provider, so the issue of quality of care became more prominent on the managerial 
and professional agenda. Whilst this does not indicate that those engaged in the 
delivery of health care services were unaware of quality, it does perhaps signify that 
there existed a somewhat subjective, unstructured notion of quality which had largely 
remained unarticulated, and this may go some way to explaining the difficulties that 
have arisen in relation to determining the nature of health care quality. These 
problems are at the same time philosophical, political and practical, and until the 
difficulties can be resolved, it is difficult to see how any consensus over either the 
recognition or the pursuit of quality within the NHS can advance. At the same time 
this lack of consensus adds to the difficulties of evaluating the impact of change 
within the NHS, in relation to the quality of care. 
Philosophical difficulties in determining health care quality 
From a philosophical perspective, it has been identified that the understanding of the 
term quality differs from within and outside the NHS (Seedhouse 1994). The gradual 
evolution of a definition of quality within the NHS, which may well not be recognised 
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outside of the organisation, has negated many of the benefits which can undoubtedly 
be obtained from focusing on the attainment of quality in service delivery. Whereas 
in organisations outside the NHS the customer is viewed as `king', within the NHS 
the patient's position is less clear cut. Within the post-Reforms NHS the split 
established between purchasers and providers in the creation of the internal market 
has resulted in a split between `purchaser' and `consumer', a quasi-market feature that 
cannot exist within the commercial market. There is a fundamental problem in 
adopting any quality framework devised for the commercial market, into a quasi- 
market organisation, as the struggle emerges to ascertain whether the needs of both 
purchasers and consumers can be met by the provider. As purchasers, Health 
Authorities and GPs inevitably utilise different criteria for determining the quality of 
health care than do patients - the users or customers of the service - so in a real sense 
the NHS is required to attempt to reconcile these differing criteria in the attempt to 
deliver a quality service: 
The significance of the separation of the users and the customers of the NHS 
is that quality can be perceived in many different ways. To provide an 
example of the kinds of positions that might be adopted, we can imagine 
providers to whom quality could mean providing the best possible solution for 
each client, no matter what', purchasers to whom it could mean `meeting 
specification' at the lowest possible price; and users to whom it could mean 
`having the largest amount of choice in health care options, regardless of cost. 
(Gregory and Walsh 1993 p 173). 
Obviously, it can become difficult both to identify differing perceptions of quality, 
and also to meet the quality requirements of the key players in the provision of health 
care services -the purchaser, the provider and the user. An issue which is likely to 
engender increasing debate is the purchaser's involvement in the quality process 
because of their input to clinical audit. The Department of Health has directed 
provider units to incorporate purchasers' views into the further development of multi- 
disciplinary audit (DoH 1993a, DoH 1993b), and funds for audit have been allocated 
to purchasers, which will inevitably lead to them exerting greater influence on both 
the development of clinical audit and the content of such audit schemes. A recent 
study revealed that there existed important differences in attitudes and expectations 
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in relation to clinical audit, between the purchasers and the providers (Thomson, 
Elcoat and Pugh 1996), and these differences are likely to express themselves in both 
the definition of quality, and the processes adopted to monitor the quality of health 
care provision: 
Quality..... is a highly personalised concept and the important message for 
health and care services is to begin to ask questions about whose =lily ought 
to be controlled or appraised (Phillips, Palfrey and Thomas 1994 p 17) 
Another study that compared the criteria of patients with the criteria of government 
for evaluating GP services revealed very few similarities, which led the researchers 
to argue that there appear to be limits to both consumer sovereignty and professional 
authority in good practice (Smith and Armstrong 1989). 
A further reason why quality is such a contentious issue, within the NHS, and so 
difficult to conform to a commercial quality framework is that determining the quality 
of health care is a fundamentally different problem from that of determining the 
quality of a product. Whilst the quality of a product such as a car may be measured 
by assessing its performance in a given range of areas, the measurement of the quality 
of health care can be seen as much more subjective, and the desired outcomes for 
patients of the NHS are likely to be considerably more diverse than the desired 
outcomes of the purchasers of cars. Although many who use health care services will 
aspire to the eventual return of full health, it has to be recognised that, for many, this 
is not an achievable goal, and even if it were, the construction of viable outcome 
measures for this would necessarily be subjective, as health is a concept which is 
difficult to define in measurable terms. For those individuals who are unlikely to 
return to what they perceive as full health, the problem of determining health care 
quality is most marked, for the assumption cannot be made that the only benefit of 
health care is an improvement in health status, and a range of sources of benefit need 
to be recognised in order to capture the quality of health care services (Ryan and 
Shackley 1995). Such benefits may include comfort, reassurance, information, and 
autonomy as well as other non-medical benefits such as access to alternative means 
of support. The important issue which arises in identifying the variety of sources of 
benefit gained from receipt of health care services is that it can only be the direct 
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consumer who can determine the comparative importance of these various sources of 
benefit, because it is only the individual in receipt of health care who can evaluate the 
effect of the received health care on their utility or wellbeing. This question of 
subjective quality evaluation highlights the difficulties which occur when trying to 
adopt the commercial definition of quality to act as a framework for evaluating care. 
However, any attempt to redefine the notion of quality needs to incorporate open 
debate in order to be able to achieve a consensus over the nature of quality within 
health care. Nevertheless, this is a debate which has largely taken place behind 
closed doors, and thus the philosophical foundation of the concept of quality within 
the NHS is at best unclear, and at worst manipulative. 
Political perspectives in determining health care quality 
Examining health care quality within a political framework is an issue which has been 
at the forefront of policy developments in recent years, and a key aim in the 
implementation of the NHS Reforms, however it has been highlighted that there has 
been a significant lack of appreciation for the complex area of quality assurance in 
the NHS (McClachlen 1976,1990). It is not the case that quality had been an issue 
which was neglected or disregarded, but that it had remained largely unarticulated in 
comparison with the commercial sector. 
From the political perspective health care quality has taken on a very specific 
meaning, and is largely viewed as `value for money', and as there is general 
agreement that the measurement of health care outcomes is an area which remains 
underdeveloped quality measurements have been, to date, related to efficiency rather 
than effectiveness. Although there is a drive to develop appropriate measures for 
health care outcomes which could be used to determine the benefit accrued from 
health care intervention in terms of health status, the current lack of consensus over 
the definition of quality in relation to health care has led to the adoption of certain 
performance indicators as measures of service quality, at least within the political 
arena. The level of activity has been a traditional measure of NHS performance, and 
prior to the NHS Reforms the level of activity was evaluated in relation to the length 
of waiting lists, the underlying belief being that any failure in performance would 
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reveal itself in lengthening of the waiting lists, hardly a sensitive measure as waiting 
lists have continued to increase since centralised record keeping was established. 
However, since the NHS Reforms, this traditional benchmark of performance has 
been replaced by a focus on the length of wait, rather than the length of lists. It is 
argued that it is irrelevant how many people are on the waiting list, what matters is 
how long those on the list have to wait for their treatment. However, this change is 
not without its problems, and whilst the data is easily accessible it is neither reliable 
as a quality measure, nor easy to interpret (Frostick, Radford and Wallace 1993). 
Whilst waiting times may provide evidence on which the government may claim 
success in the implementation of the NHS Reforms there are three main difficulties 
which arise in utilising waiting times as a measure of NHS quality (Sheldon 1994): 
(1) There is a fundamental problem in that it is impossible to distinguish 
between inefficiency and excess legitimate demand. A serious 
epidemic would result in an inevitable increase in waiting times, yet 
it would obviously be wrong to interpret this as a sign of inefficiency, 
which highlights the limitations of waiting times as an appropriate 
efficiency measure. 
(2) A difficulty also arises in the inability to consider the relative benefits 
to different client groups, and so in order to avoid the claim of 
inefficiency it would appear to be appropriate to prioritise the needs of 
those who have been waiting longest over those who may have greater 
clinical need of health care services. Conversely, a more acceptable 
view of efficiency would accord higher priority to patient need than to 
waiting time. 
(3) To use waiting times as a benchmark of quality performance opens up 
the possibility for the production of a range of unintended 
consequences which could result from manipulation of the data by 
health care service providers, and attempts to play the system by both 
service providers and users. Indeed, there appears to be much 
anecdotal, but little objective evidence that some of the waiting list 
management strategies are aimed at massaging the statistics on which 
they will be judged (Dean 1991). 
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Practical issues in determining health care quality 
From a practical perspective, determining quality in health care is complex, and 
whilst clinical audit is well established, and patient satisfaction surveys commonplace, 
there remains little, if any, consensus as to the nature of what is being measured by 
such programmes. Although the importance of the views of patients on the quality 
of health care services has been well recognised, the incorporation of their views into 
service planning has remained problematic. For over three decades attempts have 
been made to obtain patients' views about their medical and nursing care (McGhee 
1961, Cartwright 1964). Although two national studies have been carried out 
(Raphael 1977, Gregory 1978) most studies have remained on a local scale since then, 
and much of the work in relation to service provider surveys of patient satisfaction 
remains unpublished. What is significant in such work, is that the one issue which 
consistently emerges as being viewed as unsatisfactory is the area of communication 
between NHS staff and patients. This can be seen to illustrate the importance which 
patients place on the one to one interaction between themselves and the health care 
professionals, and which, it could be argued, is an area which is poorly reflected in 
the existing quality measures in the NHS. The ways in which such process oriented 
measures could be developed, however, remains unclear, and marginalised in the 
current drive towards evidence based medicine and health status outcome measures. 
Despite the introduction of a broad spectrum of quality initiatives in the NHS, quality 
is not a concept which has a shared meaning between, and even within, groups of 
health care staff, and a survey has revealed that there is inconsistency in the way that 
quality related terms are utilised (Dailey 1989). It can be seen, therefore, that from 
the practical perspective difficulties arise in two main areas, firstly in determining 
what it is that needs to be measured and developing appropriate measures, and 
secondly, in accessing the required information. 
Quality in the NHS 
Amongst professional staff there was a fear that the focus on quality would develop 
into a preoccupation with cost effectiveness at the expense of the traditional concern 
with the quality of care (Redfern and Norman 1990). There was a 
degree of 
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consensus in the recognition that the wholesale adoption of a commercial framework 
for quality was inappropriate, and that quality within the health care context had to 
be greater than a consequence of consumer satisfaction, but needed also to incorporate 
concepts such as those of access, equity, acceptability, efficiency, effectiveness and 
appropriateness (Maxwell 1984, Shaw 1986). 
In relation to the difficulties which exist in defining health care quality, it has been 
suggested that two essential components need to be recognised (Donabedian 1980). 
The first of these is the technical element, which relates to how health care science 
and technology are applied with the aim of maximising patient benefit without any 
corresponding increased risk to the patient's health. The second component identified 
by Donabedian relates to the interpersonal aspect of health care, and involves the 
management of the psycho-social interaction between patient and health care 
professional in a manner which meets socially defined values and norms. 
Bank (1992) has identified twelve core concepts of quality management, some of 
which have been incorporated into the NHS quality framework, but others of which 
are noticeably absent: 
(1) Quality for profit, efficiency and the elimination of waste within an 
organization. This has indeed been a major focus of the NHS quality 
drive, and very often the driving motivational force behind the 
introduction of quality assurance programmes into NHS units. 
(2) The `Right First Time' concept, which focuses on preventing problems 
before they have a chance to occur. It could be argued that the NHS 
works more on a concept of 'Right Most Times' as the idea of 
foreseeing and eliminating all problems from what is, at best, an 
imprecise science, appears to daunt even the most ardent supporters 
and promoters of quality health care services. 
(3) The notion of a `Zero Defect' product or service, by eliminating the 
idea of an acceptable failure rate. It is noticeable that the quality 
standards commonly set within the NHS include an accepted failure 
rate, albeit often significantly lower than perhaps had been achieved 
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prior to the introduction of the quality standard. However, Bank 
highlights the fact that even if the acceptable quality level is 99 %, then 
there could be at least 200,000 wrongly issued prescriptions each year. 
(4) Recognition of the costs involved in the drive to improve quality 
within an organization related to: 
(a) Prevention of problems 
(b) Appraisal schemes 
(c) Internal and external failure 
(d) Exceeding the level of required service 
(e) Lost opportunities 
This is an area which has been accorded a relatively low profile in the 
NHS, as with such a major focus on cost containment, there has been 
little evidence that the necessary costs of quality have been recognised, 
calculated or budgeted for (Joss and Kogan 1995). Although 
programmes such as appraisal schemes have been almost universally 
introduced there is little to suggest that inclusion of these quality costs 
as a universal feature of NHS budgets: 
The trade off between quality and cost should not be avoided 
but rather confronted at an early stage. Many quality 
improvements may be available at low or no cost, but this 
should be shown by careful analysis, not assumed. (Pollitt 
1996 p 108) 
(5) The idea of competitive benchmarking introduced as part of the drive 
towards the attempt to be better than the best competitor. The 
publishing of hospital `league tables' can be seen to provide such 
benchmarks by which individual provider units can be compared, and 
thus may be argued to promote competition between NHS provider 
units. However the value of issuing such tables has been hotly 
disputed both from within and outside of the NHS. Several problems 
have been identified with the attempts to introduce benchmarking into 
the NHS (Pollitt 1996): 
(a) Inappropriate processes may be chosen to benchmark 
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(b) When monitoring has revealed room for improvement, 
there may be a failure to implement change. 
(c) There have been occasions when inadequate time, 
resources and support have been invested by senior 
management. 
(d) Attempts may have been made to benchmark too many 
processes at once. 
(e) Data may prove to be inaccurate or meaningless. 
(6) The involvement of all staff in the drive for quality. Although many 
quality assurance programmes in the NHS may be seen to be driven 
from the top, there has also been the development of a wide range of 
quality initiatives, and schemes such as Quality Circles and Quality 
Improvement Drives (QUIDS) have aimed to involve staff at all levels 
of the organization. 
(7) The move towards facilitation of synergy in teamwork. Within the 
NHS reorganization of the management structure below Board level, 
the subsequent introduction of clinical directorates and practice 
management teams, has been viewed as a mechanism by which quality 
may be improved through more effective teamwork. 
(8) The cultivation of a sense of ownership, and the introduction of 
elements of self-management. Again this area has not been a major 
focus of quality initiatives within the NHS, but has been partially 
addressed through organizational changes and devolvement of 
responsibilities to practice unit level, but in most instances this can be 
argued to have been marginal to the quality drive. 
(9) Managers taking on the responsibilities of acting as role models. The 
major impediment to this might be seen to be the changing nature of 
the relationship between professionals and managers, and the conflict 
which has frequently been seen as a consequence of this change. 
(10) Provision of feedback on management role. Unlike many commercial 
organisations, this has not generally been formalised in the NHS. 
(11) The provision of recognition and rewards for quality improvements. 
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Whilst a few award schemes have emerged, these are far from 
universal in the current financial climate within the NHS, and it could 
be suggested that there has been more of a move towards negative 
sanctions rather than positive rewards. 
(12) The development and maintenance of appropriate processes for 
delivering quality. Although there have been attempts to utilise the 
information collected by way of clinical audit processes to develop 
quality protocols, this has been somewhat constrained by the focus on 
outcome measures as the primary measure of health care quality. 
When considering the key components of quality previously identified - access, 
equity, acceptability, efficiency, effectiveness and appropriateness, a number of 
dilemmas have emerged as the attempts to quantify quality have developed. When 
appraising access to health care services, there is a need to incorporate not only issues 
relating to physical access, but also concerns about the range and level of appropriate 
services, as well as the distribution of such services. Such information is not 
consistently collated, as services undergo change and development, and access may 
vary within the financial year. In addition, responsibilities for access can be seen to 
be shared between purchasers and providers, and so the information available may 
be fragmented or incompatible. Therefore it is virtually impossible to comment on 
the quality of health care in terms of access in its broadest sense. 
There are a number of components within the NHS, as it was initially established, 
that can be seen to relate to equity (Whitehead 1994) : 
(1) Universal entitlement to health care. 
(2) Pooling of the financial risks associated with the procurement and 
provision of health care. 
(3) Health care services which are free at the point of delivery. 
(4) Universal high standard of care. 
(5) Selection of patients for treatment on the basis of clinical need, 
dissociated from the ability to pay for health care services. 
(() The non-exploitative ethos which underpins the service. 
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(7) The `feel good' factor. 
Whilst challenges may frequently be made in the media that some of these 
components are being eroded, there is a lack of research evidence to confirm or deny 
such claims. However, the potential risk which is posed to equity in the use of block 
contracts, by way of both the opportunity and the incentive being given to provider 
units to `cream skim', has been identified (Bartlett and LeGrand 1994). 
When considering health care quality in relation to acceptability, again there arises 
the fundamental difficulty of the separation of the purchaser from the patient or 
consumer of the health care service, and whilst purchasers are charged with acting 
in the interests of the patients, there appears to be no consistent effort to determine 
what is considered as acceptable by the patient. Despite the greater emphasis on 
patient participation since the publication of Working for Patients (DoH 1989) and the 
identification in the Patient's Charter (DoH 1991) of the greater need for public 
involvement in health care decisions, progress has been patchy at best, and there 
remains little concern for the acceptability of health care provision in any individual 
sense. 
Efficiency relates to the amount of benefit accrued from resources utilised, and some 
of the problems associated with measuring efficiency have been discussed earlier, and 
highlight the difficulties associated with quantifying what is essentially a human 
service. However the efficiency dimension of quality is one which will remain an 
important issue, as the demand for health care resources continues to exceed the 
supply. Although, as discussed, certain performance indicators have been devised, 
such as waiting times, which are used to measure the efficiency of the services 
provided, these remain very crude gauges which can be seen to fail to incorporate all 
of the factors which relate to efficiency. Four primary techniques for evaluating 
efficiency have been identified (Phillips, Palfrey and Thomas 1994): 
(1) Cost minimisation - which entails achieving the required outcomes at 
the least possible cost. It involves choosing between the range of 
strategies available for realizing stated goals. 
(2) Cost effectiveness - efficient service provision is judged to be that 
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which achieves greatest success for each unit of cost. 
(3) Cost benefit - utilisation of different strategies is likely to produce 
different outcomes, and so it is necessary to devise strategies for 
comparing costs and benefits achieved and choosing the strategy which 
accrues the greatest net benefit. 
(4) Cost utility - efficiency is evaluated by examining the utility of the 
intervention. Attempts to introduce the construct of Quality Adjusted 
Life Years (QUALYs) as a measure of cost utility has remained 
largely in the domain of management theory, and there is little 
evidence to suggest that there has been any systematic attempt to 
determine the quality of service provision by utilising such methods. 
There can also be seen to be an ethical consideration arising in relation to the 
efficiency component of quality, because when there are limited resources, as there 
always will be whilst health care demand continues to outstrip health care resources, 
then rationing decisions have to be made. If maximum efficiency is to be achieved, 
then those decisions could severely disadvantage the old, the disabled, the poor and 
those suffering from diseases which cannot be cured. Whilst care and palliative 
procedures can produce benefit for such groups, there is a risk that such benefit may 
be discounted if `cure' is taken as the main or only criteria of effectiveness. 
Decisions of this sort would not, of course, be readily acceptable to professionals, 
politicians or the public, and so whilst efficiency is sought, there appears to be an 
implicit understanding that it is sought only to a certain, unspecified, level. Although 
techniques can be identified for measuring efficiency, these are much more explicit 
in being able to measure the cost of services. The benefits of services do not have 
such easily identifiable measures and thus remain largely subjectively appraised, as 
objective measures remain underdeveloped. 
One of the central aims of the NHS Reforms was to improve efficiency through the 
introduction of the internal market. The belief was that as hospitals competed for 
service contracts so efficiency would improve as hospitals devised strategies to ensure 
that they did not price themselves out of the market. However, this could only ever 
hope to be achieved if three conditions were fulfilled: 
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(1) That a high cost hospital is so because of inefficiency and not because 
of any other factors, such as local conditions which result in 
unavoidably higher costs, or because the hospital is providing a quality 
of service which is better than its competitors. As yet, there is no 
reliable information which can be used to compare hospitals, other 
than financial information, and so judgements about whether a hospital 
is efficient may well be made on subjective rather than objective 
criteria. This cost/quality relationship is crucial since if costs directly 
reflect quality, purchasers must decide whether to opt for higher or 
lower quality. 
(2) It will be possible, and relatively easy to move patients from high cost, 
inefficient hospitals to low cost, efficient ones. It will always be 
simpler in theory than in practice to accommodate patients in anything 
other than their local hospital, and whilst some patients may be willing 
and prepared to travel for treatment, for some groups of patients, in 
particular the old and disabled, this may not be a viable option. 
(3) The cost data which is used to determine efficiency is both accurate 
and reliable. One of the major difficulties in the implementation of the 
NHS Reforms was that the quality of management information was 
poor, and evidence suggests that despite resource management 
programmes progress is slow and as yet the reliability of management 
information in the NHS cannot be assured (Packwood, Keen and 
Buxton 1991). 
Similarly in relation to effectiveness, it can be seen that there is a need to develop 
measures which include more than a measure of changes in health status. In order 
for decisions to be made about the effectiveness of health service provision, the aims 
and objectives, in terms of measurable outcomes, must be explicitly stated, so that the 
actual achievements can be compared with those intended. Five major problems have 
been identified in relation to measuring the effectiveness component of quality in the 
NHS (Phillips, Palfrey and Thomas 1994): 
(1) Providers of health care services may often state their aims in rather 
vague terms, using concepts such as `meeting need' without expressing 
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this in terms which can be measured. 
(2) Effectiveness cannot be correlated with the provision of a quality 
service. It is quite possible for an organisation to be effective, but to 
provide services which are inappropriate or under-utilised. 
(3) Effectiveness measures take no account of the cost of achievement, and 
so as a measure of quality cannot stand alone, but need to be 
considered alongside efficiency measures. 
(4) Improving effectiveness may have unintended consequences. An effort 
to improve effectiveness may lead to a reduction of in-patient stays, 
but result in a rise in re-admission rates. If this occurs the apparent 
improvement in effectiveness is spurious. 
(5) It is not always possible to link cause with effect. Apparent 
improvements in effectiveness could be related to factors other than the 
strategies employed to achieve this benefit, for instance improvement 
in social or environmental factors outside the influence of the health 
care provider, and possibly unknown. 
Determining appropriateness of care is also problematic in that, again, it needs to 
include not only the professional perspective, but also the perspective of the patient, 
and indeed that of the society as a whole (NHSE Working Party 1993). From the 
professional perspective, despite the drive towards evidence based medicine, there is 
little consideration of the health care interventions of nurses, or the range of 
paramedical staff involved in the direct delivery of care to the patient. The wide 
variation in rates of procedures between areas, between hospitals and between 
individual medical practitioners lends support to the view that there must be wide 
variation in what health care professionals, and in particular doctors, believe to be 
appropriate care. Despite attempts to address this, change is slow. From a patient's 
perspective their judgement on the appropriateness of the health care they receive is 
determined not only by the level of their knowledge and understanding, but also by 
their values and belief systems, all of which will influence their view of the 
appropriateness of the health care they are offered. From society's perspective, the 
determination of the appropriateness of health care will depend on a number of 
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influences including economic, political, social and cultural factors, and as society 
undergoes change so will the social view on the appropriateness of a wide range of 
health care interventions. It is likely that this will not only influence the range of 
services which are provided, but also be an important criteria by which the quality 
of health care provision is judged. 
Strategies for quality assurance in the NHS 
When considering how the NHS has been seen to be attempting to assure the quality 
of care provided across the variety of provider units, there can be seen to have 
emerged five main strategies (Phillips, Palfrey and Thomas 1994): 
(1) Systems have been set up to carry out inspections, formal in 
connection to the statutory role of Health Authorities in relation to 
nursing and residential homes, and informal in connection to the 
advisory role of Community Health Councils in relation to Health 
Authority services. Three major limitations to inspection as a 
mechanism of quality control have been identified: 
(a) Inspection visits are infrequent, and therefore cannot 
evaluate the process of the care which is carried out. 
(b) In certain circumstances the inspector may be employed 
by the same authority responsible for the services being 
inspected. 
(c) Formal inspections are usually structured around a 
given set of criteria, and offer little opportunity for the 
views of patients to be considered. 
(2) A procedure for conducting regular reviews of health services was 
established in 1982. Whilst such reviews provide a useful amount of 
service information, as a mode of quality assurance they are fairly 
restricted: 
(a) Relating, as such reviews do, to the approved plans of 
the organisation, they are largely concerned with issues 
of efficiency and budgeting, and pay little attention to 
other issues, such as access, effectiveness, equity, 
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acceptability or appropriateness. 
(b) Although the plans may have been devised with 
reference to professional staff and users, the review is 
the province of senior management, and thus does not 
seek the views of either the health care professionals or 
the patients. 
(c) Reviews attempt to capture a broad picture of the 
organisation at the time at which the review is taking 
place, in relation to achieving the goals of the plans 
which have been made. There is little evidence to 
suggest that the review procedure, in itself, will have 
any impact on the quality of care provided. 
(3) Systems of medical audit have been in place since the mid-1980s, 
evolving into systems of clinical audit following the NHS Reforms, 
however the effectiveness of such systems in promoting quality 
improvements has been challenged (Maynard 1991) : 
(a) The confidentially with which such audits are carried 
out prevents the views of patients being taken into 
account. 
(b) The standards which are used in clinical audit are 
devised, in the main, by professional staff, without 
reference to the patient. 
(c) Even if clinical audit leads to quality improvements, 
there is no guarantee that these will be perceived as 
such by the patients. 
(4) Performance indicators have been increasingly used to judge 
performance, since the new managerialism took hold in the 1980s, but 
whilst providing a wealth of statistical data, the usefulness of this can 
be questioned as a method of quality assurance: 
(a) Again the determination of the standards used to 
construct performance indicators does not involve the 
patient. 
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(b) The quantitative nature of performance indicators puts 
the focus on outputs rather than inputs. 
(c) They take no account of the sophistication of local 
information systems, nor of differing priorities. 
(5) Patient satisfaction surveys have been widely used, over a long period 
of time, to evaluate the quality of services (McGhee 1961, Cartwright 
1964, Raphael 1977, Gregory 1978), and although such mechanisms 
may be useful they, too, have their limitations: 
(a) The assumption is made that patients have adequate 
knowledge of the available alternatives. 
(b) The level of satisfaction will be dependent on the 
expectations of the individual, and so cannot claim to be 
an objective evaluation of health care services. 
(c) The methodology of patient satisfaction surveys have 
proven to be limited, in the main, to questionnaires, the 
timing of which is likely to have a major effect on the 
results. 
When considering the ways in which attempts have been made to set up systems of 
quality assurance in relation to the provision of health care services, it can be seen 
that a diversity of strategies has been utilised over time. None of these strategies can 
be seen to have provided a complete answer to the intricacy of quality service 
provision. The difficulties associated with quality assurance programmes had been 
recognised in the commercial sector, and related to the limitations of what was 
essentially a bottom-up approach to quality improvements and so such programmes 
expanded across organizations to include all of the activities happening within the 
organisation, and even to the external organisations which functioned as suppliers. 
Such an approach came to be known as Total Quality Management (TQM) and 
resulted in quality becoming a central focus of organisational aims (Joss and Kogan 
1995). Integration of the TQM approach into the NHS has not been without its 
problems, and whilst some have argued against particular models of TQM in the NHS 
(Ovretveit 1990), others, including professional bodies have emphasised their 
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commitment to it (RCN 1991). The NHS appears to have experienced particular 
problems in the incorporation of existing quality assurance programmes into a new 
TQM programme (Dailey and Carr-Hill 1991) .A detailed study of the 
implementation of TQM at 38 NHS units concluded that it was not successfully 
implemented at more than two sites (Centre for the Evaluation of Public Policy and 
Practice 1994). This suggests that in the transposition of TQM from the commercial 
sector to the health care sector, its power to transform the culture and practice of an 
organisation is lost. 
Factors which are significant in the provision of health care can be seen to relate to 
two (structure and process) of the three elements of quality - structure, process and 
outcome (Donabedian 1969) which can in turn be seen to relate to the key 
components previously identified. Having already determined the problems which 
exist in relation to the outcomes of health care, there also needs to be a consideration 
of how structure and process factors might influence the quality of health care. 
Structural factors influencing the quality of health care 
When considering the structure of health care services, this can be seen to have 
undergone major changes throughout the history of the NHS, and even more so since 
the implementation of the NHS Reforms, and yet evidence of the effect of structural 
changes on the quality of care is sparse. In the commercial world successful 
organisations are seen to be those which are characterised by a culture which is both 
dominant and homogenous (Peters and Waterman 1982). These are not characteristic 
features of the post-Reforms NHS. Indeed there is some evidence to suggest that the 
implementation of the NHS Reforms, through changing the underlying values of the 
NHS, has resulted in a more divisive culture which highlights areas of conflict within 
the organization (Caldwell and Francome 1993, BMA 1994, Francome and Marks 
1996). It was generally accepted that there was a need to transform the culture of the 
NHS, if the Reforms were to succeed, and to encompass professional staff within the 
new managerialism. Whilst the importance which was accorded to this can be seen 
to be reflected in the amount of both energy and resources utilised to `sell' the 
Reforms to the professional bodies, success was limited as can be seen by the largely 
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negative response of the professionals to the changes. However, there is some 
evidence to suggest that at least some professionals viewed the Reforms as a means 
by which they could enhance their professional power base. It has long been 
recognised that whilst doctors working within the NHS had a high degree of technical 
and political autonomy, they had lacked any economic autonomy (Friedson 1977). 
It could be argued that although the NHS Reforms might be seen to have reduced the 
political autonomy of doctors, without any real change in their economic autonomy, 
their position could in fact be strengthened by their greater involvement in general 
management (Elston 1991). However, there has been no systematic review of the 
way in which this increased involvement of doctors in management of health care 
services has impacted on the quality of patient care, if there has been such an impact. 
One study which has specifically examined quality of care in relation to health service 
structure revealed that 62 % of respondents, including both management and clinical 
staff, believed that there had been a detrimental effect on the quality of work which 
was related to its sheer volume (Appleby et al 1994). 
In many ways the structural elements of quality can be more easily measured than the 
elements of process and outcome, and so data is more easily available. Several 
structural aspects of care which relate to quality have been identified, one common 
measure used is to relate numbers of specialists available in relation to population 
(Hopkins 1990). The major difficulty associated with this is that there is no universal 
agreement as to the numbers of specialists required, and whilst attempts have been 
made to arrive at agreed figures, such agreements are by no means fixed. However, 
what can be achieved by such measures, is that distribution of resources across the 
country can be compared, and inequalities in distribution which will result in 
inequalities of access can be recognised. Another structural influence on the quality 
of health care can be seen to be the quality structure itself, including the existence 
of organizational standards against which achievements can be measured, and the 
process of clinical audit. 
Process factors influencing the quality of health care 
When considering the process element of health care quality, the focus turns from the 
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macro elements of the organisation to the micro elements of the interaction between 
the patient and the direct provider of the health care intervention. The importance 
of this interaction is well acknowledged as being the foundation on which quality of 
care is derived and judged (Einstat and Felner 1983), and so it is evident that the 
interpersonal as well as the technical component of care is one which determines the 
patients' perceptions of the quality of health care they receive. Thus the way in 
which health care professionals practice has a significant impact on the quality of 
care, and factors which can be seen to disrupt this practice, or impede the 
interpersonal interaction between professional and patient, will have a detrimental 
effect on that quality of care. 
It has often been suggested that the effects of stress on those providing care has 
proven to be such a disruption. The issue of stress in relation to health care 
professionals has been well researched both in terms of cause and effects. When 
considering the causes of stress, lack of support (Hingley and Harris 1986), excessive 
workload (Cassem and Hackett 1972, Gray-Toft and Anderson 1983, Sutherland and 
Cooper 1990, Wheeler and Riding 1994), organisational and management issues 
(Harvey 1992, Wheeler and Riding 1994), poor relationships (Cassem and Hackett 
1972, Gray-Toft and Anderson 1973, Wheeler and Riding 1994) and poor working 
conditions or facilities (Wheeler and Riding 1994) have all been identified. The 
effects of stress on health care professionals in relation to the quality of care they 
deliver has also been explored, and one such effect is seen to be a shift in the way 
they view patients, from positive and caring to negative and uncaring (Spencer 1986), 
another is the avoidance of decisions, problems and changes (Firth at al 1986), areas 
which clearly illustrate the relationship of professional stress to quality of care. 
A further process factor which has been seen to be significant in relation to the 
quality of health care provision is the pattern of work organization, and a system of 
work which promotes individualized, personalized care is one which is likely to 
enhance the quality of care (Wells 1980, Redfern and Norman 1990). Obviously the 
provision of an individualized system of care is likely to have serious cost 
implications, and thus as the drive for efficiency gains momentum, the possibility 
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exists that conflict will emerge between two of the components of quality - structure 
and process. 
Quality of care and the NHS Reforms 
Improving the quality of care provided by the NHS was a key aim of the NHS 
Reforms, one which has been subject to much debate and speculation but little in the 
way of in-depth evaluation. When examining the key components of quality there 
can be seen to be some movement resulting from the implementation of the Reforms. 
When considering access to health care services, the change which has resulted in 
most impact is the creation of GP fundholders which can be seen to have provided 
a fast track to both hospital consultations and admission for elective surgery, thus 
allowing the patients of GP fundholders to enjoy improved access to services not so 
easily accessible to the patients of GPs who are not fundholders (Mahon and Wilkin 
1994, Francome and Marks 1996). Another issue which can be seen to relate to 
access, is that the government chose to localise decision making in relation to 
rationing and priority setting (Bouffard 1992), and whilst this was argued to allow 
greater responsiveness to local needs, it also means that geographical differentiations 
in access are likely to worsen over time. Whilst one area of access, that of waiting 
times, has been extensively studied, and be seen to have improved since the 
implementation of the NHS Reforms, other areas which have been identified such as 
accessibility within hospitals have been largely ignored. The issue of covert 
inaccessibility through ignorance, apathy or rationing by GPs, is neither well 
recognised nor articulated in the NHS (Hopkins 1990), and this is something which 
the NHS Reforms did not make any real attempt to address. More overt forms of 
rationing have also appeared as purchasers made decisions not to fund certain 
procedures such as in-vitro fertilisation and tattoo removal (Dean 1991, Woodman 
1993). 
When considering the impact that the NHS Reforms have had on the quality 
component of equity, there is a significant lack of data, as well as a lack of consensus 
as to how equity should be determined: 
It is not that easy to ascertain the precise notion of equity adopted by the 
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NHS. This ambiguity creates some problems, because each notion carries a 
different ideological weight and has different policy implications. It seems to 
be the case that equality of access (and not utilisation) has been and remains, 
post reform, the principal equity objective behind the NHS. As such, in 
theory, there is no a priori reason to believe that the post reform NHS is less 
equitable. (Malek, Vacani and Rasquinha 1993 p 249) 
Indeed, it has appeared to be the case that the rather narrow definition of equity 
which relates to access only, has resulted in only partial data being available on which 
to evaluate the effects of the NHS Reforms on equity. There has, for instance, been 
little exploration of the ways in which different client groups have experienced the 
effects of changes in the NHS, and whilst differences have appeared in relation to 
patients of fundholding GPs as compared with non-fundholding GPs, there has not 
been a systematic review of the groups of patients which have been most affected. 
There is also a divergence of opinion as to the overall effects of the Reforms on 
equity, and whilst some have claimed that the Reforms have been associated with 
greater inequality (Hudson 1992, Pearson 1992, Whitehead 1994), others have argued 
that there has always been inequality in the NHS, and the Reforms have merely made 
that inequality more visible (Powell 1996). 
With regard to the acceptability of care, several commentators have highlighted the 
idea that health service provision needs to be acceptable not only to the patient, but 
also to the staff who are the direct providers of care, and who may also become 
patients at various times during their lives (Hopkins 1990, Bell, Brown and 
McCartney 1993). However, obviously this acceptability has also to relate to the 
willingness of the purchasers to finance the service, yet there has been no concerted 
attempt to delineate the concept of acceptability, let alone to attempt to align the 
different concepts of acceptability which may exist in relation to purchaser, provider 
and patient. Despite the fact that greater patient participation is encouraged in the 
post-reform NHS, there has been no systematic attempt to determine whether or not 
services are, in fact, more acceptable to patients now than before the Reforms were 
implemented. Although it might be supposed that the acceptability of health care 
provision could in some way be determined by patients' expression of satisfaction or 
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dissatisfaction, this can be a notoriously misleading measure in terms of reliability 
and validity (Bond and Thomas 1992). Another method which has been widely 
utilised as a way of determining the acceptability of care from the patient's 
perspective has been in the recording of levels of complaints, and whilst there is 
much evidence to suggest that these have risen since the NHS Reforms were 
implemented, this cannot be taken to expose a worsening in quality, in fact the 
reverse may be the case if provider units are making it easier for patients to 
complain, and are improving recording of complaints received. 
As previously stated, claims that the NHS has functioned more efficiently since the 
implementation of the Reforms has largely focused on improvements in certain 
performance indicators such as waiting times and throughput rates, and at first sight 
it would certainly appear that better value for money is being achieved, as the amount 
of health care provided seems to be rising more rapidly than the amount of resources 
being utilised. However, as a measure of quality these performance indicators are 
lacking in substance as they fail to consider all three elements of quality (structure, 
process and outcome) and the possibility exists that if one element improves another 
may deteriorate. Unless all three elements are monitored this may not be detected. 
Measuring the effectiveness of health service providers in terms of outcomes has 
been, arguably, the least developed measure of quality, a deficiency which has been 
identified, but as yet not rectified. Whilst in the past the effectiveness of care has 
largely been evaluated by measuring the adverse outcomes of care such as peri- 
operative mortality rate, or hospital acquired infections, and such information remains 
valuable, there is also a need to evaluate the positive effects of care. To determine 
the quality of outcomes of health care intervention requires the explicit definition of 
aims of care in terms not only of health status, but also in terms of well-being, and 
as yet such work has not been developed adequately enough for meaningful comment 
to be made about the impact of the NHS Reforms on effectiveness of health care. 
The final component of health care quality, that of appropriateness has perhaps been 
best defined by the RAND corporation: 
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Appropriate (care means) that the expected health benefit (ie increased life 
expectancy, relief of pain, reduction in anxiety, improved functional capacity) 
exceeds the expected negative consequences (ie mortality, morbidity, anxiety 
of anticipating the procedure, pain produced by the procedure, misleading or 
false diagnoses, time lost from work) by a sufficiently wide margin that the 
procedure is worth doing (RAND 1986 cited in Hopkins 1990 p 6). 
Appropriateness of care incorporates not only utilisation, but also under-utilisation of 
health care services. The drive towards evidence based medical care has attempted 
to address the issue of appropriateness of care, through the development of 
recommended protocols for particular clinical conditions, the issuing of clinical 
guidelines, and the monitoring of adherence to such guidelines (Grimshaw and Russell 
1993, Appleby, Walshe & Ham 1995), and such strategies are becoming more 
commonplace in both hospital and GP practice. As yet the data which would enable 
the effects of the Reforms on appropriateness of care to be judged is not available, 
and it may well prove impossible to separate the effects of the Reforms from other 
developments (e. g. in medical research) which are unrelated to them. 
The further the effects of the Reforms on the quality of health care are explored the 
more unclear and uncertain the picture becomes. Information is partial and often 
crude, and in many cases can be seen to be structured by ideology rather than by 
objectivity. Without doubt there have been improvements in quality in some areas 
and deteriorations in others, but what is lacking is a systematic review of quality 
across the NHS. Even if this is carried out, it is by no means certain that the full 
impact of the Reforms on the quality of care would be revealed. Quality is in itself 
a complex and dynamic concept, and the NHS a complex and dynamic organisation, 
and it may well be unrealistic to hope to achieve more than a idea of general trends 
in quality, even though the notion of measurability remains important and will 
continue to develop. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE IMPACT OF TIE NHS 
REFORMS ON PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 
Implementation of the NHS Reforms 
In the interviews with senior managers of Greenfield, Stockton and the Health 
Authority, and doctors and nurses working within both hospitals, similarities and 
differences in the approaches of the two hospitals to full implementation of the NHS 
reforms were revealed. Perhaps the most significant of the differences was in the 
pace of change, Stockton applying for Trust status in the first wave, and Greenfield 
adopting a more staged approach. The result of this was that Stockton became an 
NHS Trust some two years before Greenfield. 
There had been no scope for people to think creatively, and to come up with 
their own ideas, and again that was something we wanted to address by taking 
over the direct management of the hospital as soon as we could. (Senior 
manager, Stockton) 
We had to determine what and how much we were doing... so that was the first 
stage. The second was to work out what our costs really were, and then try 
to apportion and attribute them sensibly and realistically. (Senior manager, 
Greenfield) 
Despite their different approaches to the timing of full implementation, in general 
there was consensus within the management of both hospitals and in the Health 
Authority that the NHS reforms represented positive health policy. 
I am actually very pro-reforms and 1 think that it is possibly the best thing 
that has ever happened to the health service. (Senior manager, 
Greenfield) 
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The reforms have allowed us to get on with the business we do best - providing 
health care - without the previous requirement to go through endless tiers of 
bureaucracy, it got rid of the external hierarchy. (Senior manager, Stockton) 
The reforms encouraged the hospitals to really think about what they are 
doing, and what they are able to do, and what they need to do, they allowed 
things to happen more quickly, and provided the motivation - through 
competition - for hospitals to do all they could to improve their service 
provision. (Senior manager, HA) 
Whilst the professionals working within the hospitals were more likely to voice 
concerns about the nature of the reforms, there was a widespread recognition that 
some form of change was necessary. 
Of f course it had become increasingly obvious over recent years, that the NHS 
could not continue to absorb the ever-increasing costs, there needed to be 
some changes so that we could use resources more efficiently - but that doesn't 
mean that I approved of all the things that happened. (Nurse, Greenfield) 
I recognised that the NHS needed to be overhauled, but what they have done 
is throw the baby out with the bathwater. Surely we should have tried to save 
what was good, and improve what was not, instead we destroyed everything, 
good and bad. (Doctor, Stockton) 
We all realised that we couldn't go on with the ideas of a previous generation, 
there needed to be change, but I think that the change needed to build on our 
strengths instead of trying to bring big business into what is still, after all, a 
public service. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
Things weren't perfect, I accept that, but did we really need to start treating 
patients as if they were tins of beans on a supermarket shelf? (Nurse, 
Stockton) 
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The management of both hospitals believed that if the reforms were to be successful, 
then they had to be both understood and supported by the professional staff working 
within the new system, and the key step in both Greenfield and Stockton was seen to 
be communicating the changes effectively. 
We needed to get our professional staff on board.... we knew that they would 
be very influential in this. We spent a lot of time doing what we called 
roadshows, an over-the-top title perhaps, but we were going round at all hours 
of the day and night discussing our plans with the staff, outlining what we saw 
as the benefits of becoming a self-governing Trust, and hearing what their 
views on it really were. (Senior manager, Stockton) 
So making sure that staff at all levels of the organisation from ward staff to 
consultants to finance and managerial staff understood what the basic 
principles of contracting were, and the information that was required in order 
to operate the system, was absolutely key to success. (Senior manager, 
Greenfield) 
So through the staff side, and through open meetings, I ran, I think, about half 
a dozen open sessions on contracting, we got the information through. In total 
about 300 staff, from a total of 1500 employed, attended these meetings. 
(Senior manager, Greenfield) 
A different approach to the communication process between the two hospitals can be 
discerned. Stockton adopted a technique which attempted to sell its proposed changes 
to the staff who would actually determine their success, whereas the management of 
Greenfield focused on ensuring at least a basic level of understanding of the 
implications of the externally imposed changes as the first step. There was evidence 
from staff at all levels and in both hospitals that calls into question the effectiveness 
of communication about the Reforms. 
I can still walk round the wards and find a number of staff who don't 
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understand the relevance of the way in which the health service works now. 
(Senior manager, Greenfield) 
I really think that, whilst the managers may have got to grips with the 
changes, many of the grass roots staff remained in the dark. (Senior manager, 
HA) 
I became very aware that there were a lot of people about who had no clear 
idea about what was going on - no understanding of what the 
purchaser/provider split was going to mean, and I myself was very unclear 
about what some of the changes were, and it was only after a few years that 
I began to appreciate the implications of GPfundholding. (Nurse, Greenfield) 
There was no idea of negotiation or even discussion, we were told what we 
had to do. Now you would think, wouldn't you, that someone would have sat 
down and asked me how I thought the changes should be introduced in my 
own department, after all, surely I am the one that would have the most 
understanding? (Doctor, Stockton) 
There seemed to be differences of opinion as to how these changes would 
affect the way we worked, everyone seemed to be saying something different. 
(Doctor, Greenfield) 
For a long while I thought that these changes were nothing to do with me 
really, and I found it hard to see why they would change the way we worked. 
I found out the hard way! (Nurse, Stockton) 
Whilst a number of doctors and nurses identified their feelings of being threatened by 
the changes, this was obviously given closer consideration by the managers of 
Greenfield than of Stockton. Whether or not this attention allayed any of the fears 
remains open to question. 
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Clearly our professional staff had a lot of concerns, most of them needless, as 
it happens. We would have control of our own destiny as a result of the 
Reforms, and that must be better for everybody. (Senior manager, Stockton) 
Although we were reassured that there would be no redundancies I for one 
found it hard to believe that, when everything I saw on television or read in 
the newspaper seemed to contradict that. (Nurse, Stockton) 
All staff, and I mean all staff, needed to understand that there was no 
guarantee of a pay cheque unless we could secure contracts which paid us to 
treat patients that the purchasers wished us to treat as opposed to the patients 
that we wanted to treat. (Senior manager, Greenfield) 
Senior staff were saying to as many people as possible that it did not mean by 
becoming a Trust, this would mean redundancies. It was also extremely 
important to make clear the realities of the world. Trust status and 
redundancies were not linked, but that if we lost contracts, redundancies 
would follow. (Senior manager, Greenfield) 
I felt that the possibility of redundancies was used as a threat, not to the 
medical staff perhaps, but certainly to nurses and others. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
The initial impact of the Reforms 
One area in which change was immediately apparent was in the way in which 
relationships were remodelled, and it became evident that there were some difficulties 
both related to the development of new roles and relationships, and the deconstruction 
of those roles and relationships which had characterised the pre-Reforms NHS. 
Some GP fundholders were attempting to use their new freedom to settle old 
scores. (Senior manager, Greenfield) 
It was a big change in terms of our relationship with them (the HA) but in 
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terms of their relationship with us it didn't seem so very different, because they 
had always seen themselves as the allocators of money. In the past, of course, 
they had a very big stick with which they could beat us -a block allocation of 
so many million pounds, and there was no limit as to what they could demand 
that we did with it. The contracting process did give us a bit more control, 
and that is why it felt different to us, we could actually say - well you have 
only given us money to do so many cases, and now that we've done those we 
won't do any more unless you give us more money. (Senior manager, 
Stockton) 
The vast majority of people that I sat across the table from in terms of contract 
negotiations had never done that sort of job before, and therefore had never 
had to develop those skills... they don't all understand the nature of 
negotiation, it is just not the case that we are given a contract and that is the 
end of it, the terms must be negotiated. (Senior manager, Greenfield) 
It became obvious to me that they (the purchasers) had huge amounts of detail 
about Stockton hospital, and a very close relationship with them, and my view 
is that this is inappropriate when you get round the negotiating table, in terms 
of where contracts are placed. (Senior manager, Greenfield) 
I tend to get myself very involved in terms of service development issues 
because I'm very interested in that area, and we work very differently with the 
different Trusts, because they have different ways of carrying out their 
business. (Senior manager, HA) 
It took a while for relationships to break down and reform in a rather more 
constructive fashion, and I think that took us about two years to achieve. 
(Senior manager, Greenfield) 
The major difference between the two hospitals in terms of purchaser/provider 
relationships could be seen to be in the importance of GP fundholding. 
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GP fundholding is very underdeveloped in this area, there's only five 
fundholders, which represents a very small part of our budget. (Senior 
manager, Stockton) 
We were unusual in a sense that, as a proportion of our income being in the 
hands of GP fundholders, we had the biggest proportion in the country of 
money being in the hands of GPs -4%- so although it does not sound much 
in relation to the totality, if we lost 4% of our elective work, trying to make 
those savings would actually be very painful. (Senior manager, Greenfield) 
I think that GP fundholding has been a very positive change, the day of the 
arrogant consultant who didn't care about the GP has gone, although the 
transition has not always been an easy one. (Senior manager, Greenfield) 
There is no clear consensus as to whether or not the implementation of GP 
fundholding has led to the development of a two-tier service, although it is obvious 
that this is a matter over which there was, and still is, considerable concern, certainly 
at Greenfield, where such fundholders have greater importance in relation to the 
overall budget. 
We're not at all sure that we're keen on what is inevitably a two-tier service 
if you have a greater number of GPfundholders. (Senior manager, Stockton) 
I think that we have had relatively few problems, compared with some 
hospitals, because we have far fewer fundholding GPs who might like to start 
dictating what we should be doing, when really they have very little idea how 
a modern hospital functions. (Doctor, Stockton) 
it is just not the case that the patients of fundholding GPs get a better service. 
Yes, we might have to improve our service to get the contracts from the GPs, 
but then that service is improved for all patients, not just the patients of the 
fundholders. (Senior manager, Greenfield) 
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Well, unfortunately, and as distasteful as we might find it, I have to say that 
yes, the patients of GPfundholders do get a better deal, especially when we 
have completed the contracts for the Health Authority, and you only have to 
consider the benefits of outreach clinics, for example. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
There is a genuine concern that patients coming from GPfundholders will get 
priority, in reality I don't believe that this happens a great deal, but the 
potential is there, and really there is no difference between the patient who has 
their treatment funded by the Health Authority or the patient who has their 
treatment funded by their GP - or at least there shouldn't be. (Nurse, 
Greenfield) 
An almost immediate impact from the Reforms was in the emergence of a whole 
range of new activities which were to take up a great deal of time, certainly for some 
individuals. 
As far as I am concerned I would think that about a quarter of my life is spent 
in contract discussions and negotiations, which is not really what it is all 
about. (Senior manager, Greenfield) 
There is an absolutely incredible bureaucracy accompanying the internal 
market, much of my time is spent in a morass of paperwork, often having to 
replicate what appears to me to be meaningless trivia. (Senior manager, 
Stockton) 
I spend a lot of time involved with service reviews which take the form of an 
in-depth visit. Although the visit may only be one day, or even a half day , the 
preparatory work is very detailed. A questionnaire for a service review 
frequently runs to fifteen pages or more, including more than fifty 
questions.... these are given out three to four weeks in advance of the visit so 
that everyone in the team can be involved.... When we make the visit we will 
go through the questionnaire in some detail, discussing and elaborating on the 
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answers. (Senior manager, HA) 
Consultants have had to become much more rigorously involved in the business 
side of the work we do, over half of our consultants are actively involved in 
management. (Senior manager, Greenfield) 
I now have a far greater management load, very little of my time used to be 
spent on what I would consider purely management activities, now most of my 
time is. (Nurse, Greenfield) 
I've had to learn how to manage a budget, and control patient throughput in 
relation to our contracts, I feel I'm a manager now, not a nurse. (Nurse, 
Stockton) 
To my surprise I was expected to become involved in marketing, now I ask 
you, would you ever have expected to see the day when a senior hospital 
consultant would be required to tout for business? But I must say that I think 
our meetings with local GPs have been very productive, so I am not so anti 
the business approach now as I was in the beginning. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
Reflections on the success of the NHS Reforms 
Following implementation of'the Reforms a significant number of the individuals 
involved found that ideas underwent a change as they lived through the reformation. 
Please don't get the idea that I am in favour of returning to the old hierarchy, 
but we must develop networking between professional groups, on a national 
basis. It concerns me that so many professionals, and I see it more of a 
problem for nurses than for doctors, are working in isolation within their 
Trusts. There are signs that this is being addressed, but not with any 
consistency. (Senior manager, HA) 
1 am disillusioned, but that is merely because of the bureaucracy.... Region are 
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still there, they may not be as powerful as they once were, but still able to 
stick their oar in, to put it bluntly, as are the NHS Executive ... there's no 
doubt it does constrain. (Senior manager, Stockton) 
At the moment it really is a dog-eat-dog type of relationship between 
providers, they refuse to give us information about what they are doing, people 
are very secretive, and will do all they can to take business away from us. It's 
all very predatory and really not very nice. I feel very strongly that at the end 
of the day this is not a business, it's a public service. (Senior manager, 
Stockton) 
It's not working as it should, there's little sign that any real needs assessment 
is being carried out so purchasing tends to be related to historical patterns. 
There is no sign of long term strategic planning at all, and a big problem is 
that trying to negotiate on a yearly basis does actually disrupt the 
organisation, and gives us no stability at all. If you took the contracting 
process to its logical conclusion then I take a gamble on every member of staff 
that I have whilst we have one year contracts at a maximum. (Senior manager, 
Greenfield) 
The so-called brave new world of the new NHS has proved to be somewhat of 
a damp squib. We haven't got rid of the old problems, although we seem to 
have added plenty of new ones, I only hope that when the next big change 
comes - and come it will - we will all have learnt from the mistakes of the past 
few years. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
I think that the NHS reforms have created far more problems than they 
attempted to solve, I feel I've been to hell and back, there's been so much 
pressure. (Nurse, Stockton) 
The characteristics of the sample studied 
To determine the extent of the impact of the NHS Reform on the practice of clinically 
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based doctors and nurses a total of 194 questionnaires were distributed as described 
previously. Consideration was given to the probability that there would be differences 
which would emerge in relation to the area of clinical speciality, and so this was one 
of the key variables identified within the sample. The possibility was considered that 
the Reforms had different effects according to clinical speciality. The main areas 
identified were medical, surgical, trauma/orthopaedic, intensive care, 
theatre/anaesthetics and paediatrics. The category Medical includes both general 
medical services, and specialist services such as neurology and cardiology (both in- 
patient and day care). Surgical includes general surgery and various surgical 
specialities such as urology, gynaecology and ear, nose and throat, again both on an 
in-patient and day care basis. Whilst the same specialities are not identical between 
the two hospitals, they share similar characteristics in relation to case-mix and 
throughput. Trauma/Orthopaedics includes Accident and Emergency services, 
admission units, elective orthopaedics and trauma services. Intensive Care includes 
only those professionals working solely in a dedicated Intensive Care facility and 
likewise Theatre/Anaesthetics includes only those professionals working solely within 
the area, rather than using theatre facilities eg, surgeons are not included in this 
category, as they are theatre users rather than designated theatre staff. The category 
of paediatrics includes those professionals working in areas designated solely to caring 
for children. The category other includes those relatively few clinically based 
professionals working in related departments such as pathology, radiology and out- 
patient services. 
Of these 194 questionnaires 11 were returned as unavailable for the survey due to 
death, retirement or long term sick leave, leaving an effective sample of 183. 
Following a second mailing and reminders 129 questionnaires were returned, a 
response rate of 70.49% The characteristics of the respondents can be identified in 
tables 7.0 to 7.3. There do not appear to be any differences between the 
characteristics of the responders and the non-responders. One respondent failed to 
give details other than profession and hospital. 
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Table 7.0 Respondents by hospital and profession 
Doctors % of respondents Nurses % of respondents 
Greenfield 28 21.7% 45 34.9% 
Stockton 21 16.3% 35 27.1% 
Total 49 38.0% 80 62.0% 
Table 7.1 Respondents by length of service in NHS 
Length of service Number % of respondents 
Under 5 years 4 3.1% 
5-9 years 12 9.4% 
10-14 years 32 25.0% 
IL 
Over 15 years 80 62.5% 
Table 7.2 Respondents by length of service in present post 
Present post Number % of respondents 
Under 5 years 43 33.6% 
5-9 years 43 33.6% 
10-14 years 12 9.4% 
Over 15 years 30 23.4% 
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Table 7.3 Respondents by area of clinical speciality 
Area of work Number % of respondents 
Medical 34 26.6% 
Surgical 36 28.1% 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 15 11.7% 
Intensive care 9 7.0% 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 13 10.2% 
Paediatric 15 11.7% 
Other 6 4.7% 
Total 128 100% 
Changes to workload 
As suggested by the Delphi study workload was viewed by the respondents as being 
an area of their practice which had been particularly affected by the implementation 
of the Reforms. 
I've never had to work so hard as I do now, nursing has always been hard 
physical and emotional work, but I'm now having to work longer and longer 
hours to keep up with the work I have to do. (Nurse, Stockton) 
The working day has extended remarkably, I now often have to attend meetings 
either before or after a full day of seeing patients. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
The only way that we can keep up with the workload we are expected to carry 
is to work more and more unpaid overtime, a certain amount of this has 
always been part and parcel of a ward sister's job, but I get the impression 
that it's now required, not just a matter of good will. (Nurse, Greenfield) 
I've had to take on more and more management duties, yet no-one has taken 
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on any of my clinical load. (Doctor, Stockton) 
This increase in workload is consistent across both hospitals (Table 7.4) and both 
professions (Table 7.5). 
Table 7.4 Extent of change in level of workload by hospital 
Workload Greenfield Stockton All 
Greatly increased 38 (52.0%) 28 (50.0%) 66 (51.2%) 
Increased 33 (45.2%) 26(46.4%) 59(45.7%) 
Unchanged 2(2.7%) 1 (1.8%) 3 (2.3%) 
Decreased 0 0 0 
Greatly decreased 0 1 (1.8%) 1 (0.8%) 
Table 7.5 Extent of change in level of workload by profession 
Workload Doctors Nurses 
Greatly increased 25(51.0%) 41 (51.3%) 
Increased 20 (40.8%) 39 (48.7%) 
Unchanged 3 (6.1%) 0 
Decreased 0 0 
Greatly decreased 1 (2.0%) 0 
The increase in workload appears across all areas of work, differences emerging only 
in the rating of professionals as to whether the workload has been increased or 
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greatly increased (Appendix 1) 
What became evident during the interviews was that professionals were very 
concerned about the changing balance of their workload, as well as the level of 
workload itself. 
I seem to work more as a manager than as a nurse nowadays, there is more 
and more administrative work which has to be done. (Nurse, Stockton) 
There is an ever-increasing amount of paperwork to be done, whereas a phone 
call may have sufficed in the past now I have to complete a two page form in 
triplicate. However despite this, no-one has seen fit to reduce my patient 
load, not that I would have wanted them to - but what it means is that I 
cannot be so available to support my junior staf. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
More and more paperwork means less and less time for patients. (Doctor, 
Stockton) 
... a never-ending mountain of paper, most of it not directly related to patient 
care. (Nurse, Greenfield) 
This concern, even consternation, about the disproportionate increase of indirect care 
and administrative workload, can be seen to be in direct conflict with the policy aims 
of recent years. The nurses' clinical grading during the 1980s and the increase in 
consultant posts during the 1990s were both aimed at creating a clinical environment 
in which care was delivered by those with the greatest knowledge, skills and 
experience. However, the implementation of the NHS Reforms led to a shift away 
from direct care in the balance of workload of senior doctors and nurses and can be 
seen to have unintentionally created increased bureaucracy. 
Although there was an increase in all areas of workload this increase was greatest in 
relation to administration, and least when considering direct care. The increased 
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workload in relation to direct care can be seen across both hospitals (Table 7.6) and 
professions (Table 7.7). 
Table 7.6 Extent of change to level of direct care carried out by hospital 
Direct Care Greenfield Stockton 
Greatly increased 11 (15.1%) 7(12.5%) 
Increased 24(32.9%) 25(44.6%) 
Unchanged 25(34.2%) 11 (19.6%) 
Decreased 11 (15.1%) 11 (19.6%) 
Greatly decreased 2(2.7%) 2(3.6%) 
Table 7.7 Extent of change to level of direct care carried out by profession 
Direct Care Doctors Nurses 
Greatly increased 9 (18.4%) 9 (11.3%) 
Increased 17(34.7%) 32(40.0%) 
Unchanged 17(34.7%) 19(23.8%) 
Decreased 4(8.2%) 18 (22.5%) 
Greatly decreased 2(4.1%) 2(2.5%) 
This increased workload in relation to direct care can be identified throughout the 
various clinical areas (Appendix 2). 
When considering indirect care, that is care that is patient focused, but is not carried 
out in direct contact with the patient, an increased workload can be confirmed. This 
is a change which extends across both hospitals (Table 7.8 ), and professions (Table 
7.9) in a similar pattern. 
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Table 7.8 Extent of change in level of indirect care carried out by hospital 
Indirect Care Greenfield Stockton 
Greatly increased 24(32.9%) 21 (37.5%) 
Increased 34(46.6%) 24(42.9%) 
Unchanged 15(20.5%) 10(17.9%) 
Decreased 0 1 (1.8%) 
Greatly decreased 0 0 
Table 7.9 Extent of change in level of indirect care carried out by profession 
Indirect care Doctors Nurses 
Greatly increased 13(26.5%) 32 (40.0%) 
Increased 23(46.9%) 35 (43.8%) 
Unchanged 12(24.5%) 13 (16.3%) 
Decreased 1 (2.0%) 0 
Greatly decreased 0 0 
The changes in relation to indirect care can be seen to extend across all areas of 
clinical speciality (Appendix 3). 
When considering administration, that is work which is neither patient focused, nor 
carried out in direct contact with the patient, again there can be seen to be an 
increased workload which spans both hospitals (Table 7.10). There also appears to 
be little difference between doctors and nurses in relation to the increased 
administrative workload, with more than nine out of ten in both groups claiming that 
this has been greatly increased or increased (Table 7.11) 
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Table 7.10 Extent of change in level of administration carried out by hospital 
Administration Greenfield Stockton 
Greatly increased 37(50.7%) 34(60.7%) 
Increased 31 (42.5%) 19(33.9%) 
Unchanged 5 (6.8%) 3(5.4%) 
Decreased 0 0 
Greatly decreased 0 0 
Table 7.11 Extent of change in level of administration carried out by profession 
Administration Doctors Nurses 
Greatly increased 31 (63.3%) 40(50.0%) 
Increased 14(28.6%) 36(45.0%) 
Unchanged 4(8.2%) 4(5.0%) 
Decreased 0 0 
Greatly decreased 0 0 
There is a similar pattern emerging across all clinical specialities, which confirms that 
the increased workload is a shared experience across hospitals, professions and 
clinical specialities (Appendix 4). It is not evenly distributed across all categories of 
work, and in all areas although there has been a uniform increase, this increase is 
greater in relation to indirect and administrative care. It appears that there has been 
a shift away from direct care towards indirect care and administration. 
Conflict with managers 
A further area explored during the survey was that of conflict with managers, an area 
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which emerged as significant during the Delphi study, and which was confirmed both 
during the interviews and through the survey 
I don't feel the managers have any idea of what care is all about - it's a real 
them and us situation. (Nurse, Stockton) 
I feel that I am always having to battle with the managers to achieve anything 
at all. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
Every day it's a fight with the management to get what we need to do our job. 
(Doctor, Stockton) 
I think that conflict with our managers is inevitable, it's as if we are trying to 
aim for different things. (Nurse, Greenfield) 
Some respondents chose not to answer this question but, nevertheless, an increase in 
the level of conflict between doctors and nurses and their managers could be seen 
across both hospital sites (Table 7.12). 
Table 7.12 Extent of change in level of conflict with managers by hospital 
Conflict Greenfield Stockton All 
Greatly increased 27 (37.0%) 21 (39.6%) 48(38.1%) 
Increased 34(46.6%) 21 (39.6%) 55(43.7%) 
Unchanged 11 (15.1%) 8 (15.1%) 19(15.1%) 
Decreased 1 (1.4%) 1 (1.9%) 2(l. 6%) 
Greatly decreased 0 2 (3.8 %) 2(l. 6%) 
The pattern of increasing levels of conflict with managers was similar both between 
doctors and nurses (Table 7.13) and across all clinical specialities (Appendix 5) 
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Table 7.13 Extent of change in level of conflict with managers by profession 
Conflict Doctors Nurses 
Greatly increased 19(38.8%) 29(37.7%) 
Increased 18(36.7%) 37(48.1%) 
Unchanged 9(18.4%) 10(13.0%) 
Decreased 1 (2.0%) 1 (1.3%) 
Greatly decreased 2(4.1%) 0 
Changes to levels of stress experienced 
The. final area which was the subject of direct inquiry was that of changes in the level 
of stress generated by professional practice, as a direct result of the NHS Reforms. 
This had been a recurrent theme in the professional literature, and predictably 
emerged during the Delphi study as being an important effect of the implementation 
of the Reforms. Indeed this was upheld by the survey which revealed that 118 
(91.4 %) respondents were experiencing increased or greatly increased levels of stress 
in their practice. Whilst these levels of increased stress may well be a secondary 
rather than primary effect of the NHS Reforms, related possibly to increased 
workloads and increased levels of conflict with managers, there can be no doubt that 
this must be of considerable concern to both the professionals concerned and also to 
the managers, as the effects ' of stress take their toll. During the interviews the 
unacceptability of the increasingly stressful experience of professional practice was 
a repeated theme. 
The pressure is immense, I feel like I'm on a treadmill, and I just can't get off. 
I eat, breathe, sleep and dream about work - it never leaves me, sometimes it 
all gets so much that when I eventually go home I feel guilty about not being 
at work. My family just can't understand the pressure I'm under. (Nurse, 
Greenfield) 
I can't take any more, I'll be retiring in a few weeks, I never wanted to retire 
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early, but I'm afraid that if I don't go soon it will kill me. (Doctor, 
Greenfield) 
I know it makes me sound a bit of a wimp but some mornings I just can't bear 
to get out of bed, I don't know how I'll be able to stand the stress of trying to 
please the patients, the doctors, the managers and everybody else. They keep 
telling us we have got to manage better, but we're having to do more and 
more with less and less, and it won't change unless there's either a real 
disaster or a miracle. (Nurse, Stockton) 
Life in the health service has always carried a certain level of stress, we 
expect that, and our training equipped us to handle it, but nothing like we're 
seeing now. I think, no -I know that there is an awful lot of distress around, 
people who have always been strong are crumbling under the pressure. 
(Doctor, Stockton) 
Increased experience of stress can again be seen to extend across both hospitals (Table 
7.14) 
Table 7.14 Extent of change to level of stress experienced by hospital 
Stress Greenfield Stockton 
Greatly increased 38 (52.1%) 33 (58.9%) 
Increased 31 (42.5%) 16 (28.6%) 
Unchanged 4(5.5%) 6(10.7%) 
Decreased 0 1 (1.8%) 
Greatly decreased 0 0 
There also appears to be consistency between the experience of doctors and of nurses 
(Table 7.15). 
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Table 7.15 Extent of change to level of stress experienced by profession 
Stress Doctors Nurses 
Greatly increased 27(55.1%) 44(55.0%) 
Increased 17(34.7%) 30(37.5%) 
Unchanged 4(8.2%) 6(7.5%) 
Decreased 1 (2.0%) 0 
Greatly decreased 0 0 
When considering areas of work it can be seen that there is a shared experience of 
increased stress throughout all clinical areas (Appendix 6). 
As can be seen the implementation of the NHS Reforms has had a significant and 
extensive impact in several areas related to the professional practice of doctors and 
nurses working in both hospitals, and in a variety of clinical areas. This has been an 
unintended consequence of the policy thrust of the Reforms, but nevertheless one 
which can be seen to have transformed professional practice in a way which perhaps 
reflects the paradox of trying to instill a market philosophy into a public service, 
without due consideration of the dichotomy of the underpinning value and belief 
systems. This, perhaps, demonstrates the importance of adopting a broad approach 
to policy evaluation, which seeks out these unintended consequences of policy 
implementation as well as investigating the stated aims of such policy. 
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CHAPTER 8 
TIIE CHANGING NATURE OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 
Changes in the way professionals practice 
Although the Delphi study had identified a change in the way that professionals 
practice as an important outcome of the NHS Reforms, it did not reveal the specific 
nature of this change, and so this was an area which was subject to an open question 
on the survey, and also raised in the interviews with practitioners. That significant 
changes had taken place became evident, although differences in the precise nature 
of those changes did emerge both between hospitals and between professions, as well 
as between clinical areas. Changes to professional practice were both positive and 
negative, although it is true to say that there did appear to be more negative than 
positive changes identified by the respondents. 
It's been a very big change, my role has expanded, and I'm spending my time 
doing many things that I haven't had to do before. (Nurse, Stockton) 
I've changed the way I work as well as the things I do. (Doctor, Stockton) 
The way I work has changed, has been forced to change, by the changes that 
have taken place, I'm not saying that this has all been bad, in fact in some 
ways I feel that I am now more effective as a nurse, by becoming involved in 
areas other than those in which nurses were traditionally involved. (Nurse, 
Greenfield) 
I am no longer able to function solely in the professional arena, I have had 
to adapt to incorporate the agendas of the managers and the politicians into 
my day to day work. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
It was also clear that those managers responsible for the implementation of the 
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Reforms, also recognised at an early stage that the changes would necessitate distinct 
alterations in the ways in which doctors and nurses practised. 
I was concerned that the clear professional lines of accountability would be 
lost, and that some of the strengths of professional practice, such as decision 
making based solely on client need, would be weakened. (Senior manager, 
HA) 
I realised, but was not sure that the doctors and nurses always realised, that 
they would have to change the way that they practised, and begin to take on 
a much greater management role, and the responsibilities that went along with 
that role. (Senior manager, Greenfield) 
To be honest some of the aspects of professional practice, whilst admirable, 
had become a bit of a luxury in a cash pressed service, and some of us could 
see that the Reforms would necessitate a fundamental change in the way in 
which doctors and nurses practised. (Senior manager, Stockton) 
The answers to the question relating to the nature of changes in professional practice 
resulting from the Reforms were panel coded, and those which occurred most 
frequently (in over 15 % of respondents) were subject to analysis. In all 98 
respondents (76%) identified ways in which their practice had changed, citing a total 
of 361 examples, of which 328 were panel coded into 8 categories. 6 respondents 
had given two or more examples which fell into one category, and these were 
recorded as a single example for each of those 6 respondents. 
Increased bureaucracy 
This appeared in the replies of 67 (52.0%) of respondents, which is perhaps not a 
great surprise when considering the increased administrative workload which has 
already been identified. This was also an area frequently emerging during the 
interviews as a significant difference in professional practice in the reformed NHS. 
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There is an absolutely incredible amount of paperwork which we now have to 
do, it's bureaucracy gone mad! (Doctor, Stockton) 
It's a bureaucratic nightmare, the records which we now have to keep, and the 
information we have to gather, to what purpose - God only knows. (Doctor, 
Greenfield) 
I think we've become more and more like the Civil service is meant to be, 
everything in triplicate, and the accumulation of a wealth of useless paper and 
information. (Nurse, Greenfield) 
I'm beginning to feel personally responsible for the demise of the Rain Forest. 
In the past if I needed something urgently I could ring stores and if it was in 
stock, a porter would bring it to the ward. Now I'm told that I must stop 
making these ad hoc requests, and must order everything through the ordering 
procedure. That's all very well, and I can see that from a financial point of 
view it makes sense, but after all we are looking after human beings here, and 
there will always be those times when we haven't been able to predict, with 
that sort of precision, what we will need. Last year we had an outbreak of 
diarrhoea on the ward and you just wouldn't believe how difficult it was to get 
an extra supply of incontinence pads! I'm not saying that our managers are 
unsympathetic, but it seems that the system is just not set up with the needs of 
real people in mind, because real people can't be organised, categorised and 
processed through the ward. (Nurse, Stockton) 
Identification of an increased level of bureaucracy was greater at Greenfield where 
47 (64.4 %) of respondents regarded this as an important change in practice compared 
with 20 (35.7%) of respondents at Stockton (k. 2 9.317, p 0.005). There appears to be 
no statistically significant difference between professions with 24 (49.0%) doctors and 
43 (53.8%) nurses citing increased bureaucracy as an area of significant change. 
When considering the influence of area of clinical speciality, there is a significant 
difference between those working in medical areas (for whom this has been a more 
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widely experienced practice change), and those working elsewhere () 5.577, p= 
0.025). 
Table 8.0 Identification of increased bureaucracy as a significant change in practice, by clinical 
Speciality 
Increased bureaucracy Number of respondents 
Medical 24(71%) 
Surgical 20(56%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 7(47%) 
Intensive care 4(44%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 5 (38%) 
Paediatric 4 (27%) 
Other areas 2 (33%) 
During the interviews several factors emerged which support the existence of such a 
difference. Firstly, in relation to the apparently high level of increased bureaucracy 
cited by those working in medical areas, several professionals described how the 
increased pressure to improve patient throughput, aligned with the perceived bed 
shortages, resulted in them having to plan discharges for patients who still had a lot 
of health needs to be met, and so discharge planning had become significantly more 
complex and time consuming. The new community care policy discussed in Chapter 
5 also resulted in an increased amount of form filling and liaison with other agencies, 
which had previously been far less time consuming. Medical consultants had also 
pointed out that many of their patients had complex health problems, and it was quite 
a common practice for them to have to refer patients to specialists outside their own 
hospital, and this was particularly problematic if it involved an extra-contractual 
referral, or if the patient was the patient of a GP fundholder. For those respondents 
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working in surgical areas, a common theme to emerge during the interviews was the 
bureaucracy which surrounded the creation of the internal market. Contract 
specifications and monitoring, extra-contractual referrals and GP fundholding were 
all seen to have created their own bureaucracy. The relatively low number of 
respondents working in paediatric areas who viewed this as an area in which they had 
seen significant changes in professional practice is less easy to explain, but it can be 
assumed that children in hospital do not bring with them the same difficulties in 
planning post-discharge care. As most of this will be carried out by parents, 
supported by the community paediatric nursing team, there is less involvement with 
other agencies. Also the nature of contracts for paediatric care, which are mainly 
block contracts, differ from the cost and volume contracts which proved to be 
problematic in surgical areas. 
Spending less time with patients 
This relates to the increased patient throughput, not necessarily to spending less of 
the working day with patients, which has meant that less time is spent with each 
individual. 60 (46.5%) respondents identified this as an important change in their 
professional practice. No statistically significant difference emerged between either 
hospital or profession During the interviews it became obvious that this was a change 
in practice which, when it occurred, was generally condemned. 
I have less time to spend with patients, and although I try very hard to make 
sure that they understand what I am telling them, I now tend to assume that 
when they say they understand they do, in the past I might have delved a bit 
more. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
I think that the patients are very aware that we are rushed, I feel very guilty 
when I notice a patient in distress who hasn't liked to call for a nurse because 
we are so busy. (Nurse, Stockton) 
I like to think that we do take the time to give the care needed by those whose 
needs are greatest, but in saying that I have to accept that the patients who 
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are not so dependent are often neglected, we have to prioritise, and although 
we've always had to do this to organise our work, in the past everyone 
eventually got the attention they needed, now they don't always. (Nurse, 
Greenfield) 
I used to value the time I spent with patients, and so did they, but I am seeing 
many more patients now, as well as having to take on more of a managerial 
role, that I just don't have as much time to spend with individuals. (Doctor, 
Stockton) 
There appears to be very little difference between the various clinical specialities in 
relation to this pressure on time (Table 8.1) 
Table 8.1 Identification of less time available to spend with individuals as an important change in 
practice, by clinical speciality 
Less time Number of respondents 
Medical 15(44%) 
Surgical 18(50%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 7(47%) 
Intensive care 4(44%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 7(54%) 
Paediatric 7(47%) 
Other areas 2 (33%) 
Whilst it may appear that proportionately fewer respondents working in clinical areas 
other than those specified view this as a significant change in their practice, this can 
be explained by the nature of their practice, as, in the fields of radiology, pathology 
and out-patients, they were unlikely to have been spending lengthy periods of time 
with any one individual prior to the reforms, and although undoubtedly they too are 
seeing more patients, this does not necessarily entail a significant reduction in time 
spent with each because, as identified by two respondents, the organisation of services 
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such as these has changed dramatically, rather than the nature of the service itself. 
Reduced level of support available 
Experience of a reduced level of support being available was cited by 85 (38.8%) of 
respondents as a way in which their practice had changed. A similar experience was 
reported at Greenfield where 31 (42.5 %) respondents gave examples in this category, 
and at Stockton where 19 (33.9%) respondents gave such examples. No significant 
difference emerged in relation to profession with 19 (38.8 %) doctors and 21 (26.3 %) 
nurses providing examples. The nature of the support which was reduced emerged 
during the interviews as varying most between nurses and doctors. Doctors 
highlighted the difficulties of providing actual clinical support for junior staff whereas 
nurses also identified a reduction in the level of managerial support available. 
One of the effects of our need to become more efficient is that we no longer 
house our patients on just two wards, because of the bed shortages the patients 
must be placed where there is a bed available, and so we see patients being 
cared for by nurses who are not really experienced in that particular type of 
case, and that is a worry. We have always been able to rely on experienced 
ward sisters keeping a close eye on the junior doctors, and letting us know if 
they were out of their depth. We can no longer rely on that level of expertise 
if for instance a medical patient is on an orthopaedic ward or vice versa, and 
so there's no back-up system for those times when the junior staff are working 
alone, or at least a reduced level of back-up. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
We are expected to look after patients that we are not experienced in looking 
after, which means that we are compromising care - having to ring other 
wards asking for advice, and of course we cannot always get the input that we 
need from them because they too are working under pressure. Sometimes, 
especially when I am really concerned about a patient, I feel as though there's 
no-one to turn to. (Nurse, Greenfield) 
I can't understand that when we have so many more managers than we did 
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before, that they are less available to help us, and that we have to do more 
and more management work. (Nurse, Stockton) 
More management work has been delegated to us, and although I do feel well 
supported by my manager, I know that is not true of all my colleagues. 
Although we do try to support each other when the going gets tough there is 
a limit to what we can do. I suppose that one of the reasons why I feel that 
I get enough support is that I have been around a while, and probably need 
less support than those who are new to the job. One thing's for sure, I 
wouldn't like to be a newly appointed ward sister nowadays, because I don't 
think that the level of support and guidance that is needed is there. (Nurse, 
Greenfield) 
I don't like to admit it but I think that I have become one of those consultants 
that I used to decry for abandoning their junior staf. It's not that I don't 
want to teach and support my junior colleagues, but there are a limited 
number of hours in the day and an ever-increasing amount of work to fit into 
them, and that goes for the junior staff as well as for me. I know they have 
tried to reduce junior doctors hours, and that's good, but the work is still 
there, and there is only so much that we can expect the nurses to do. I often 
used to take one of the house officers into clinic with me to give him a chance 
to improve his clinical examination skills, but now we are under enormous 
pressure to see more patients and so I can't do anything that will slow the 
clinic down, even if it was a good teaching experience. (Doctor, Stockton) 
When examining the issue of a reduced level of support in relation to clinical 
speciality, again differences do emerge (Table 8.2). There is a significant difference 
between those working in medical areas (for whom this has been a more widely 
experienced practice change), and those working elsewhere (p 6.435, p=0.025). 
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Table 8.2 Identification of a reduced level of support as an important change in practice, by clinical 
speciality 
Reduced support Number of respondents 
Medical 17 (50%) 
Surgical 12(33%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 3(20%) 
Intensive care 2(22%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 4(31%) 
Paediatric 1 (7%) 
Other areas 1 (17%) 
During the interviews several possible explanations for this difference were suggested. 
Those respondents working in medical areas frequently highlighted the problems 
associated with having patients cared for outside the medical wards (outliers) and the 
problems associated with bed shortages. All of respondents interviewed who worked 
within medical areas reported that they felt inadequately supported by managers when 
they were trying to find beds for patients, and if those beds then turned out to be in 
wards not designated for the care of such patients, extra difficulties arose for the 
doctors trying to manage those patients. Those respondents who described working 
within a well established team, felt supported by that team. 
We keep each other going really, it's probably a bit like any crisis, it doesn't 
matter about status, we all muck in and help each other. I know if I've had 
a really bad day that the others on the ward understand, and will help out 
when they can. A couple of weeks ago we were really stretched, two people 
were off sick, and we were exceptionally busy - all having to work a lot of 
extra hours, well one evening when we'd worked for hours with one patient, 
and eventually managed to get him safely to ICU, the registrar sent out for 
pizzas for us all. It may seem a little thing but it showed us he had 
appreciated all our work, and was aware that none of us had taken a break 
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all day. (Nurse, Greenfield) 
We've got a good team, and I feel that this is essential for good patient care, 
I know that the nurses will recognise if a patient is going off, they after all are 
more experienced than the housemen, and I know that if I'm called then I'm 
needed. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
The low level of reduction in level of support experienced by those working in 
paediatric areas may well be partly explained by the fact that the team is less likely 
to be disrupted because paediatric patients are not cared for on adult wards, nor are 
adults ever placed in paediatric areas. Another factor which may be significant is the 
size. and structure of the area's management group - clinical directorate (in the case 
of Stockton) or the practice management group (in the case of Greenfield). Several 
respondents suggested that because their particular management was so large, it was 
difficult to seek support and guidance over specific issues, whereas two respondents 
highlighted how supportive their particular, smaller, management group was, and this 
may go some way to explain the differences between clinical specialities. A final 
factor which appeared to be notable was in relation to the availability of a recognised 
expert, whether doctor or nurse. 
Employing a nurse specialist was probably the best thing that happened for us, 
it's so helpful to be able to pick up the telephone and ask for advice or to 
bounce around ideas, it's good to know that there is someone else around. 
(Nurse, Greenfield) 
At least now that I've been around a while I've learnt who to turn to when I 
need some advice or help with a patient. (Doctor, Stockton) 
I work very closely with the nurse specialist, and this has allowed us to 
improve our services, but also has enabled us to develop a support network for 
the unit. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
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The factors which appear to have been most significant in whether or not a reduced 
level of support has been an important change in professional practice, are largely 
organisational rather than professional and as such, this reduced level of support 
experienced by some respondents could be argued to be a secondary rather than a 
primary effect of the NHS Reforms. 
Greater economic awareness 
It was reported by 40 (31.0%) respondents reported that the NHS Reforms had 
required them to develop a greater degree of economic awareness in the course of 
their professional practice, which had meant a significant change in the way that they 
practised. There was no significant difference between Greenfield where 21 (28.8 %) 
respondents gave examples, and Stockton where 19 (33.9%) gave examples. A 
significant difference did emerge between professions with 10 (20.4%) doctors and 
30 (37.5%) nurses giving such examples (X2 3.401, p=0.05). This variation 
between doctors and nurses also emerged during the interviews, and it was suggested 
that it may be partly explained by the greater involvement of consultants than of 
clinically based nurses in management prior to the Reforms. Nurses involved in 
management prior to 1991 had been employed on management rather than nursing 
grades. So, to a large degree, even senior nurses engaged in clinical work had been 
protected from much of the budgetary control and financial management. The 
majority of the professionals surveyed and interviewed were positive about the need 
for a more economically aware practitioner, but several concerns were expressed 
about the possibility of finance rather than clinical need determining clinical 
management. 
Looking back I have to admit that there was a lot of waste in the past, and I 
suppose that we never really considered the cost of the things that we used. 
Now, though, I have to be very aware of the cost of what I'm doing, because 
I have a limited budget, and when it's spent I know that I won't be given any 
more, so cost is one of the factors I have to think about in everything that 1 
do, from advising on wound care to planning offduty rotas. (Nurse, Stockton) 
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I do worry sometimes that I consider the cost of a course of action more than 
perhaps I should. I know that patients would want me to decide on their 
treatment based on my medical knowledge rather than my financial acumen. 
(Doctor, Greenfield) 
I think that it is wrong to make decisions solely on cost, but I feel that this is 
what I am sometimes expected to do. I'm not saying that we should not be 
careful with our limited resources but at the end of the day I feel that the 
question which needs to be asked is `Does the patient need this? ' not `Can we 
afford this? ' and if the NHS does not have the resources to meet patients 
needs, then I think that this is the politician's problem not mine. (Nurse, 
Greenfield) 
It's become very important to keep cost in mind the whole time, because if we 
waste resources in one area, then those resources are gone for good and are 
no longer available to help the patients that are still waiting for treatment. It's 
very easy to be emotive about the patients that are actually in our wards, but 
we need to keep in mind those patients who have not yet arrived at our door. 
(Doctor, Stockton) 
The importance of economic awareness to professional practice was also recognised 
by the managers. 
Doctors and nurses had to get to grips with economic reality, and appreciate 
the importance of good budget control, and inevitably this would affect the 
way that they worked. (Senior manager, Greenfield) 
Our professional staff could no longer go on practising in a state of disregard 
for cost. (Senior manager, Stockton) 
The Reforms required that professional staff developed a much greater 
awareness of what they were doing, because prior to the need to be able to 
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cost services to negotiate contracts I suspect that most doctors and nurses had 
very little, if any, idea of how much what they were doing was actually 
costing. (Senior manager, HA) 
When considering the importance of economic awareness as a significant change in 
professional practice in relation to clinical speciality (Table 8.3) no statistically 
significant difference is apparent. 
Table 8.3 Identification of greater economic awareness as a important change in practice, by clinical 
speciality 
Economic awareness Number of respondents 
Medical 10(29%) 
Surgical 11 (31%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 7(47%) 
Intensive care 4(27%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetics 2(15%) 
Paediatric 4(27%) 
Other areas 2 (33%) 
This was however an issue which arose during the interviews, especially in relation 
to those respondents working in Trauma/Orthopaedics and Intensive care. This may 
be partly explained by the relatively high cost of many of the resources that are 
utilised in these clinical specialities, and also by difficulties arising in relation to 
contractual arrangements. 
In order to be able to give first rate emergency treatment we need to be able 
to access the most modern technology, and this does not come cheap, but in 
the long term may well mean the difference between an excellent service and 
a service which is just good enough. (Doctor Trauma/Orthopaedics) 
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Staffing costs are very high in Intensive Care, and very little can be done to 
reduce that - we are already cut to the bone - but there is always pressure to 
utilise less well qualified staff when we are trying to get bank cover, and it is 
often suggested that we must look for more ways to reduce our staff budget. 
So far we have managed to resist, but I don't know how long that will last. 
(Nurse Intensive Care) 
I get lots of patients referred to me from outside the area, and it's become an 
important part of my work to be familiar with the rules governing extra- 
contractual referrals, because if 1 get it wrong then I might end up doing work 
for which the hospital will not be paid. (Doctor Trauma/Orthopaedic) 
Last week we actually had a GP fundholder turn up on the unit to see exactly 
what we were doing for his patient. Now that would never have happened 
before GPs held their own budget. (Nurse Intensive Care) 
Although greater economic awareness was not seen to be an important change in 
practice for those respondents working in theatre/anaesthetics (15%) this is possibly 
due to the fact that there had been a high level of awareness prior to the Reforms, 
and although processes may have changed, there has not been a significant increase 
in levels of economic awareness relative to the other clinical specialities. 
As a theatre sister a large part of my job has always been resource 
management, which 1 don't think is true of ward sisters, they have had to 
become much more involved since the reforms. But from my point of view 
whilst there have been some changes it is more to do with accounting than 
actually having to take on more financial responsibility. (Nurse 
Theatre/Anaesthetic) 
Overall there were certainly a number of accounts of how much time was spent in 
managing budgets, and in discussing budgets during meetings, and for a large number 
of respondents this relatively new aspect of their work had taken on significant 
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importance. 
Working longer hours 
This was an area of practice change identified by 39 (30.2%) respondents. There is 
no significant difference between Greenfield where 21 (28.8 %) respondents identified 
this as an important change in practice, and Stockton where 18 (32.1 %) respondents 
did likewise. During the interviews all the respondents from both hospitals felt that 
they were working longer hours as a direct result of the NHS Reforms, although 
respondents from Greenfield were more likely to perceive this as significant to their 
practice. There is a significant difference in relation to profession with 10 (20.4%) 
doctors and 29 (36.25 %) nurses citing longer working hours as a significant change 
in the way in which they practised (x2 2.859, p=0.05). Amongst those interviewed, 
whilst doctors identified that they were working longer hours the view was expressed 
that some of the extra time worked was necessitated more by the attempts to reduce 
junior doctors' hours rather than by the Reforms. 
There is no doubt that we are having to work a lot more unpaid overtime, and 
this is due to both the increased patient throughput and dependency, and also 
to the increased amount of management we have had to take on. I think that 
the level of unpaid work carried out by people working in the NHS is the only 
thing which is stopping it falling apart, and that will only be for as long as 
people can keep it up. (Nurse, Greenfield) 
I've stopped doing any private work because to be quite, frank, I have neither 
the time nor the energy, and yet I'm starting work earlier in the morning, 
finishing later at night, and getting called in much more frequently when I'm 
on-call. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
It's only Wednesday and I've already worked for 39 hours, now they only pay 
me for 371 /2 hours, so effectively I'm working unpaid for the next two days. 
On a good week I will work 50 hours, on a bad week I lose count. I don't 
know how much longer I can take it, working these hours. (Nurse, Stockton) 
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Everybody is working longer, with the exception perhaps, of the junior 
doctors, but even their supposedly shorter working hours are often more myth 
than reality. It seems to me that it should have been obvious that we were 
already working flat out and that to implement these changes would stretch us 
to breaking point. I know that management kept telling us that we had to 
work smarter not harder - but that's pure bull. (Doctor, Stockton) 
With two exceptions there appears to be little variation related to clinical speciality 
in regard to longer working hours being an important change in professional practice 
(Table 8.4) 
Table 8.4 Identification of longer working hours as an important change in practice, by clinical 
speciality 
Longer hours Number of respondents 
Medical 11 (32%) 
Surgical 14(39%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 5 (33%) 
Intensive care 1 (11%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 4(31%) 
Paediatric 6 (40%) 
Other areas 1 (17%) 
The two areas which had a relatively low identification of longer working hours as 
an important change in practice were Intensive care (11 %) and `other clinical areas' 
(17%) and explanations can be found for this in the nature of the work carried out in 
these areas. 
I know that many of the ward staff are working longer and longer days, but 
that is something that we cannot allow in ICU because we just cannot afford 
the mistakes that might happen if people are overtired, although I'm not saying 
that this approach doesn't sometimes give us grief. I'm very aware that the 
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ICU nurses have a reputation for being bolshie, but so far we have managed 
to stand our ground. I don't want it to sound as though I'm criticising my 
ward colleagues, very often they are the only trained nurse on duty, and so 
they may well have no way out other than to stay on duty past their time, but 
we are staffed in the main by trained nurses and so it is different. Also our 
patients are eventually transferred out of the unit, and if we are especially 
short staffed it is usually possible to transfer a patient out to a ward rather 
that having to ask someone to work on. (Nurse, Intensive Care) 
In the main, at the moment, we run a nine to five service with on-call services 
outside of these times, so my working day is quite tightly structured, and I 
don't find that I am working longer hours than I did before the changes. I 
suppose the only real difference is that, whereas I used to be able to find time 
to keep myself up-to-date with what is in the professional journals during the 
working week, now I don't, so it's something that I have to do at home during 
the evenings. (Doctor, Radiology) 
During the interviews it could be discerned that there were a number of concerns in 
relation to the lengthening working day, which perhaps explains why it was perceived 
by so many to be an area of important change in their professional practice. 
I'm constantly tired, and now, if at the end of a shift a patient calls for 
attention, my heart sinks, I don't think that I have the patience that I used to, 
it's been worn down by so much work. (Nurse, Medical) 
When, like me, you are coming towards the end of your career, it becomes 
harder and harder to cope with the sort of hours that are required, and more 
and more senior people are opting for early retirement, now while that might 
be jolly good thing for the individual, if it becomes widespread, the experience 
base of the profession is weakened. (Doctor, Medical) 
Working these long hours has affected my health, my marriage and the way 
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in which I treat my patients. I know that if I want to consider myself, I need 
to get out of nursing, but when I do, I know that I will have regrets. (Nurse, 
Trauma/Orthopaedic) 
It seems ludicrous that I continue to advise my patients on a healthy lifestyle 
whilst being forced into a work pattern that is far from healthy. The effect of 
working such long hours is that we begin to treat patients like objects instead 
of people, because sometimes that is the only way to get through. (Doctor, 
Anaesthetics) 
One of my colleagues very nearly made a drug error last week, and it made 
me realise how easy it could be to harre a child through sheer tiredness, I 
know that I am not as quick thinking at the end of a long shift as I am at the 
beginning. (Nurse, Paediatrics) 
Without exception those who had experience of longer working hours as an important 
change in their practice viewed this change as harmful, with negative effects both for 
themselves and their patients. 
Low staffing levels 
Another area which was deemed important in relation to the changes in practice 
caused by the Reforms was that categorised as low staffing levels, and 35 (27.1 %) 
respondents identified examples of changing practice which fell into this category. 
No statistically significant difference emerged in relation to hospital with 24 (32.9 %) 
respondents from Greenfield and 11 (19.6%) from Stockton identifying this as an 
important change in practice. Similarly there is no statistically significant difference 
between the professions, with 25 (31.2 %) nurses and 10 (20.4 %) doctors identifying 
this as an important change in their practice. It is interesting to note that 9 out of the 
10 doctors citing examples of low staffing levels in the survey, and all the doctors 
interviewed who had experienced low staffing levels were referring to the staffing 
levels of nurses, and reported no significant changes in medical staffing levels. 
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We used to have 5 nurses on duty on the early shift when we had 19 beds, now 
we have 28 beds and only 1 extra nurse. It actually isn't possible to meet all 
the patients' needs with the staff available. (Nurse, Greenfield) 
I can see that the nurses are really pushed, and things that need to be done 
just aren't, it's very difficult for us to be able to accurately prescribe 
intravenous fluids for our patients when the fluid balance charts are not 
properly completed, and yet I know how difficult cult it must be for the nurses to 
be able to do everything that needs to be done, they have to make choices, and 
sometimes those choices will be wrong. In effect what it means, is that with 
such poorly staffed wards I am now reluctant to ask the nurses to do any more 
than is absolutely necessary, and if, for instance a patient needs to have a 
daily weight recorded, then I will ask the house officer to see that it is done. 
Then, of course, depending on the individual, either the patient will be 
weighed if and when the doctor has time, or the doctor will end up in a battle 
with the nurses to get them to do it. Now a few years ago I wouldn't even 
have had to ask for daily weights to be done, Sister would have recognised 
that it needed to be done, and done it would be. (Doctor, Stockton) 
We do our best, but more and more often our best is just not good enough, the 
patients we now have in our ward are all very sick, there's no such thing now 
as a convalescent patient in hospital, and are very dependent on nursing care, 
yet at the same time we have fewer trained nurses on duty, and a bigger 
turnover of staff, so that the nurses are less experienced. I'm ashamed to say 
it, but quite often our patients are frankly neglected, and that's not because 
of lack of knowledge or lack of skill, it's simply because of lack of nurses, and 
until nurses can be given an extra pair of hands, or more nurses are allocated 
to each ward, then patients will continue to be neglected. (Nurse, Stockton) 
There are just too few nurses to deliver care to a group of patients who are 
increasingly dependent. This isn't satisfactory to the patients, and it's not 
doing any good to the nurses either because the low level of staffing is 
168 
incredible stressfu' 1. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
There can be seen to be variations in the experience of low staffing levels which 
relate to clinical speciality (Table 8.5). There is a significant difference between 
those working in Intensive care, Theatre/Anaesthetics and Paediatrics (for whom this 
has been a more widely experienced change in practice), and those working elsewhere 
(X2 5.544, p=0.025). 
Table 8.5 Identification of low staffing levels as a significant change in practice, by clinical speciality 
Low staffing levels Number of respondents 
Medical 7 (21%) 
Surgical 8 (22%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 3 (20%) 
Intensive care 5 (56%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 5 (38%) 
Paediatric 6 (40%) 
Other areas 1 (17%) 
During the interviews several factors emerged which might explain these variations. 
Increases in patient throughput are experienced differently, and this might go some 
way towards explaining the high level of examples of low staffing levels reported in 
Intensive care. 
Because the throughput of patients has increased we are now doing far more 
transfers, both back to the ward and also to other hospitals, and this means 
that at most times during the day at least one nurse is unavailable on the unit 
because of coordinating a transfer. (Nurse, Intensive Care) 
We always used to be able to keep a bed free in ICU so that it would be 
available for emergencies, now that is no longer the case, the beds are kept 
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full, and if an emergency arises then we have to identify a patient who is safe 
to transfer out. Now I know that full bed occupancy makes sense to the 
managers, but what they don't realise is that when we initially negotiated our 
staffing levels, we calculated for a less than full bed occupancy, which means 
that we are now short staffed in practice, but not in the managers books. 
(Nurse, Intensive Care) 
In paediatrics where 6 (40%) of respondents gave examples relating to low staffing 
levels, and theatre/anaesthetics where 5 (38 %) gave similar examples, expansion of 
services may have more to do with the experience of low staffing levels than any 
increase in patient throughput. 
We have developed very many new services for children and their families, and 
there have been some resources transferred from the hospital to the community 
to support this, so very often the ward staff may well be stretched. (Doctor, 
Paediatrics) 
We have had to extend our theatre facilities to meet our contracts, for instance 
we now have elective lists on a Saturday, but these extended services have not 
been fully funded, we are expected to do just that little bit more and stretch 
ourselves just that little bit further, and we've about reached the limit of what 
we can achieve without extra staff being employed. (Nurse, Theatre) 
This concern with practising in an environment which is limited in terms of human 
resources is again one which is viewed negatively for its effect on both the 
professional and the patient. 
Reduced professional autonomy 
Reduced professional autonomy was a practice change identified by 25 (19.4%) 
respondents. There was no significant difference between hospitals with 14 (19.2%) 
respondents from Greenfield identifying examples within this category, as compared 
with 11 (19.6%) from Stockton. The largest variation appeared between doctors and 
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nurses, with 16 (32.7%) doctors and only 9 (11.2%) of nurses identifying reduced 
professional autonomy as an area of important change in their professional practice 
(X2 7.618, p=0.005). 
Managers make decisions now, not clinicians, I am told what I can and can't 
do for my patients by managers with no medical knowledge whatsoever. 
Sometimes I think my patients might as well seek medical advice from their 
bank manager. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
During the ward round the surgical registrar and I decided on a change of 
dressing for a very difficult cult wound. We wanted to change to a product that 
we both had experience of as being particularly good in that type of difficult cult 
wound. We found out from pharmacy that because it was so expensive it could 
only be prescribed by the consultant in very special circumstances, never 
matter that an experienced doctor and ward sister recommended its use. What 
annoys me is that it is not a matter of the consultant having the expert 
knowledge to decide on the use of an expensive product, this policy is used as 
a way of stopping us using certain things. What the managers who make these 
sorts of decisions just don't understand is that it is a very blinkered way of 
looking at managing resources, and that very often what appears to be an 
initial expense can turn out to be a saving if the patient can go home sooner. 
(Nurse, Stockton) 
I just can't accept that it is right for managers to be able to tell senior 
consultants who they can and can't admit, surely if in my professional opinion 
a patient needs to be treated as a matter of urgency then I should be able to 
go ahead and do so, but I can't unless the managers agree - it's ridiculous! 
(Doctor, Stockton) 
We had a patient in recently who, as he was recovering from his operation, 
it was found that he had another problem requiring surgery. Now in the days 
before the Reforms, the patient would have had his second operation while he 
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was in, and gone home just a couple of days later than originally expected. 
But because this man's GP was a fundholder he had to be contacted, and he 
refused outright to fund the second operation, because it turned out that he 
could get it done cheaper at a different hospital, and no matter what our 
consultant said he could not be persuaded otherwise. Now I know it wasn't 
a matter of life and death, but it was going to cause the patient a lot of 
unnecessary hassle, and I can't see why the financial considerations of the GP 
should have come first, the consultant decided that he needed an operation so 
surely he should have been allowed to do the operation. (Nurse, Greenfield) 
Variations in the experience of reduced professional autonomy can be seen in relation 
to clinical speciality (Table 8.6), although because of small sample size statistical 
significance cannot be established. 
Table 8.6 Identification of reduced professional autonomy as an important change in practice, by 
clinical speciality 
Reduced professional autonomy Number of respondents 
Medical 8 (24%) 
Surgical 8 (22%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 4 (27%) 
Intensive care 1 (11 %) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 4 (31%) 
Paediatric 0 
Other areas 
11 ---- I 
0 
-- 
i 
Whilst not proven to be statistically significant, the low rate of examples in this 
category amongst respondents working in intensive care areas is probably a reflection 
of the fact that the majority of this group were nurses, medical staff utilising Intensive 
care facilities tended to place themselves in one of the other clinical speciality 
categories. It is probable that for professionals working in `other clinical areas', 
there have been no reported examples of experiencing reduced professional autonomy 
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as a way in which practice has changed because as previously identified, the major 
impact of the NHS Reforms for this group has been in the organisation and structure 
of their work rather than in care delivery itself. An explanation for professionals 
working in paediatric areas failing to identify reduced autonomy as a way in which 
their practice has changed since the implementation of the Reforms is less readily 
available. It would appear that they do believe that they may have had a different 
experience from those professionals working in adult service areas, but cannot fully 
account for this belief. 
I think that the effect of the Reforms has been rather different in paediatrics 
when I listen to my friends who work on the adult wards. Our managers don't 
seem to interfere with what we do in quite the same way, I'm not saying that 
we aren't given the same sort of budget targets, but I do feel that within those 
targets we seem to have a bit more freedom, although I don't know why that 
is. (Nurse, Paediatric) 
I think that management may be a bit more hesitant in involving themselves in 
paediatrics, now I don't know if that is, perhaps, because we have been more 
accepting of the Reforms than our colleagues, or that they fear the publicity 
more if something goes wrong with the care of a child. (Doctor, Paediatrics) 
This issue of reduced professional autonomy was one which was implicitly identified 
as a likely effect of the implementation of the NHS Reforms by the managers. 
The doctors and to a lesser degree, the nurses, had to learn to become team 
players, they could not continue to play their professional card when tough 
decisions had to be made, and they did slowly begin to realise that, if the 
Trust failed in any significant way, well that it was their livelihood at stake. 
(Senior manager, Greenfield) 
I think it fair to say that there was a certain amount of distrust at the 
beginning. The doctors thought that as managers we would leap in and begin 
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to order them about, but in fact our major problem was in getting the doctors 
to begin to take managerial responsibility for their decisions as well as 
professional responsibility. I suppose, to be honest there were times when we 
did step in and take decisions that the doctors were unhappy about, but usually 
this was a situation in which we couldn't get them to make the decision. 
(Senior manager, Stockton) 
I think that some degree of conflict was inevitable, many of the professional 
staff feared that the NHS Reforms posed a threat to their professional 
autonomy, and to be truthful I suppose that it did pose a threat to the way that 
they viewed their professional autonomy at that time. (Senior manager, HA) 
This aspect of the changing nature of professional practice was viewed somewhat 
ambiguously, with clear differences emerging between doctors and nurses. 
I feel very strongly that decisions which directly affect patients should be made 
by the consultant who is, after all, ultimately responsible for the patient. 
(Doctor, Stockton) 
Consultants should have the final say, and it's not right, nor proper if their 
decisions are overturned by non-clinicians. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
I know that some of the doctor's feel that they have lost some of their power 
because managers now have some input into decisions about service 
provision. I think that they were often unaware that sometimes the decisions 
that they made rode roughshod over the opinions of others. After all becoming 
a consultant was not accompanied by an instillation of wisdom, and while 
I agree that they should make decisions about patients, this has to be done in 
the context of the whole situation, and they may not have all the available 
information. (Nurse, Greenfield) 
I think that the nurses have developed better working relations with the 
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managers than the doctors, who seem to see them as a threat. (Nurse, 
Stockton) 
More patient centred approach 
The final category which respondents identified as being an area of important change 
in their professional practice was that categorised as a more patient centred approach 
to care. 22 (17.1 %) respondents provided examples of change which came into this 
category. There was a variation between hospitals with 18 (24.7%) respondents from 
Greenfield reporting this as an important change in their practice as compared with 
only 4 (7.1 %) from Stockton (ý 5.734, p=0.025). A possible explanation for this 
difference is the focus which Greenfield gave to the development of patient friendly 
services, and the achievement of the Patient Charter standards. 
In order for us to retain our contracts we saw it as vital to our survival to 
develop the sort of services that patients would want, because after all if a 
patient goes back to their fundholding GP complaining and dissatisfied, well 
then he is likely to take his contracts elsewhere. (Senior manager, Greenfield) 
We had no choice we had to achieve the Charter standards, and we saw that 
as something extremely important , for after all these would 
be criteria by 
which purchasers would decide where to place their contracts. (Senior 
manager, Greenfield) 
This approach was somewhat different to that of Stockton, who adopted a more 
cynical approach to the Patient's Charter standards. 
I believe the Patient's charter to be a purely political document, that's what 
it's all about - merely ticks in boxes..... it's something that the politicians can 
stand up and shout about, but to my mind it's pretty meaningless, and 
although we do what we have to do, after all it is a political imperative, we 
don't see it as providing the principles by which we develop our services. 
(Senior manager, Stockton) 
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I don't think that the standards set out in the Patient's Charter are realistic, 
all they do is increase patients' expectations , and when they aren't met we 
will receive the inevitable complaint. (Doctor, Stockton) 
There is no significant variation between nurses and doctors in relation to this 
category with 7 (14.3 %) doctors and 15 (18.8 %) nurses citing examples in this 
category. However some variation does appear in relation to area of work (Table 
8.7) although again, because of small sample size statistical significance cannot be 
established. 
Table 8.7 Identification of a more patient centred approach as an important change in practice, by 
clinical speciality 
More patient centred Number of respondents 
Medical 6 (18%) 
Surgical 6 (17%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 5 (33%) 
Intensive care 1 (11 %) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 2 (15%) 
Paediatric 1 (7%) 
Other areas 1 (17%) 
The major variation which appears in relation to clinical speciality is that 5 (33 %) of 
professionals working in trauma/orthopaedic areas have experienced this as an area 
of important change in their practice, far higher than in the other clinical specialities. 
Many of the examples given in this category appear to be from professionals working 
within accident and emergency rather than in orthopaedic areas, and whilst not 
statistically significant this was an issue which arose during interviews. 
We have come to realise that accident and emergency is the shop window of 
the Trust, and as such it is important to give a good impression to the people 
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who use the department. We have tried to make the waiting areas much more 
comfortable, and little things like improving the direction signs, and creating 
a children's play area, these have made the department much more user- 
friendly 
. To be honest I think that in the past we have organised the 
department to suit the staff rather than the patients, but now that we have to 
think about making sure we keep our contracts we have had to change our way 
of thinking. (Nurse, Trauma/Orthopaedics) 
When we were under the threat of losing the Accident and Emergency at 
Greenfield it made us look at our service in a new way, what was it about us 
that would ensure that we survived, we couldn't cut costs any further, and we 
couldn't spend vast sums of money to improve services, but what we did do 
was to re-organise some of the things we do so that they suited the patient 
better. (Doctor, Trauma/Orthopaedics) 
There's been a lot of work put into making our department a nicer place for 
the patients, and although some of the ways in which we now do things might 
not be as easy for us, they are better for the patient, we make a point of 
putting the patient first. (Nurse, Trauma/Orthopaedics) 
Those who gave examples of ways in which their practice had become more patient 
centred viewed this as a positive change, and one which was generally welcomed. 
Overall, when considering these examples of the ways in which professional practice 
has changed as a result of the NHS Reforms, it can be seen that such changes are 
widespread, and whilst differences may exist between hospitals, between professions 
and between clinical specialities, there can be no doubt that the Reforms of 1991 had, 
and continue to have, an important influence on professional practice. Such changes 
can be viewed both positively and negatively, but what remains unarguable is that 
where there is a significant change in the way that professionals carry out their 
professional duties, there must be some impact on the care which is received by the 
patient. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE IMPACT OF THE NHS REFORMS ON THE QUALITY 
OF CARE DELIVERED BY PROFESSIONALS 
Overall changes to the quality of care 
The Delphi study had suggested that professionals believed that the implementation 
of the NHS Reforms had affected the quality of care that they delivered to their 
clients. The extent of this belief was explored during the survey, by the use of a 
direct question. The specific nature of that change was investigated by way of two 
open questions in which the respondents were asked to give examples of 
improvements and deteriorations in the quality of care, and also during the course of 
the interviews. It became evident that quality of care was viewed as an important 
component of both professional practice and service delivery, by both managers and 
professionals. 
In the early months of the changes we did think a lot about volume, and cost 
of course, but we also realised that we had to start to think about the quality 
elements, the standards of care - what sort of standards are we buying, what 
quality did we really want to buy? This was really where needs assessment 
started developing, not because of quality, but quality fed into it. As needs 
assessments were done so contract specifications began to be formulated, at 
least the broad outline, and quality very quickly became an issue, because it 
became obvious that there were different standards. (Senior manager, HA) 
We have always focused very much on quality in our organisation, and one of 
the things which has been helpful is that we have had specific quality 
standards in our GP contracts. GPfundholders, in my opinion, have done 
more to improve the quality of the service in the last two years than anything 
else in the previous five years. We've become aware of the need to tell other 
people what we are doing well, and what we are really saying is that there are 
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times when we are better able to judge qualitively what we are doing, than the 
purchaser, and it is important that we take this on board rather than merely 
reacting and responding to purchaser pressure. (Senior manager, Greenfield) 
One of the things that I have been very unhappy about was that up until now, 
and I don't see any signs that it is changing, is that contracts are about 
money, and that's it. Not only has there been little regard to quality, the 
discussions on quality have been entirely separate from the contract 
negotiations so, if you like, it is a kind of `add-on' which was done by more 
junior officers and not seen as being part of the contract discussions, which 
is, of course, a nonsense. (Senior manager, Greenfield) 
We have a four pronged approach to quality, we are members of the King's 
Fund organisational audit which looks at every aspect of the organisation, 
including nursing, we also have a Quality of Service committee which is 
chaired by one of our non-executive members which holds the remit to look at 
all the quality indicators, but to also look at things like patient 
satisfaction.... The third thing is our clinical audit programme, and we really 
are getting into clinical audit, not just medical and nursing audit. The fourth 
area is our Site Working Party which looks at the very tangible things, such 
as how user friendly the hospital is, how accessible it is and so on. (Senior 
manager, Stockton) 
I am quite involved with quality issues, it's something I see as being very 
important, and it worries me that whenever quality seems to befalling then we 
begin to look at it in a different way, so that the change is not so obvious. 
(Nurse, Greenfield) 
We monitor the quality of our practice mainly by way of audit, but this doesn't 
tell us about every aspect of quality, for instance it takes very little notice of 
what the patient thinks. (Doctor, Stockton) 
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Sad to say there is more talk about quality of care than there is actual quality, 
which is fundamentally wrong, because if we can't provide quality care for our 
patients then we might as well go and work in Sainsburys. (Doctor, 
Greenfield) 
I think we pay more attention to quality now than we used to, it's become 
more important to be able to identify what we are doing well and what must 
be improved. (Nurse, Stockton) 
However while there does seem to be a general acceptance of the importance of 
quality assurance, there is not such a clear consensus as to the impact the NHS 
Reforms have had on the quality of care delivered by professionals (Table 9.0) 
Table 9.0 Changes to the quality of care offered 
Quality of care Number of respondents 
2Improved due to the Reforms 23 (19.7%) 
Improved unrelated to the Reforms 17 (14.5%) 
Unchanged 27 (23.1%) 
Worsened due to the Reforms 45 (38.5%) 
Worsened unrelated to the Reforms 5 (4.3%) 
As can be seen 34.2 % of respondents answering this question believe that the quality 
of care that they are able to offer their patients has improved, although only 19.7% 
attribute this to the Reforms. Some of the other factors which may have contributed 
to an improved quality of care were revealed during the interviews, factors such as 
the increased acknowledgement of the importance of, and the availability of 
continuing education and advancement of medical knowledge and techniques. Several 
professionals also highlighted areas in which developments preceded the 
implementation of the Reforms. 
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Yes, I think I do now offer my patients better care, but I don't think it's 
anything to do with the Reforms, you might even say it's in spite of them. I 
think one of the main reasons that I have been able to improve the care I give 
is that recently 1 have been doing a degree, and that has taught me to really 
begin to think about what it is that I do and how I do it. There's been a lot 
of interest for nurses to continue their education in the past few years, and as 
a profession I think that we've come a long way, nurses can function much 
better now as a member of the multi-disciplinary team and that has certainly 
gone a long way to improving patient care. (Nurse, Greenfield) 
There's no doubt that patients, or at least, a large number of patients are 
getting a better quality of care, but that's nothing to do with the Refor, ns, it's 
more to do with medical and technological developments. For instance one 
of the biggest improvements has been in the development of laparoscopic 
surgical techniques, which have shortened the length of stay and speeded up 
the recovery process. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
Care has improved, but many of the improvements were underway before the 
Reforms, like our nursing development unit. (Nurse, Stockton) 
42.8 % of respondents believed that the quality of care they offered patients had 
worsened, and of these only 4.3 % felt that this deterioration was unrelated to the 
Reforms. During the interviews, factors other than the Reforms which may have had 
an influence on a worsening quality of care were not explicitly identified, although 
several professionals did suggest that our increasing expectations and those of our 
patients were not the product of the Reforms, and that often when the quality of care 
was perceived to be worsening, it was more a matter of new expectations being 
unmet. 
I'm not saying that sometimes care isn't poor, but it could be that we are 
unrealistic as to what is possible, and I don't think that this is the fault of the 
Reforms, it's probably just human nature. (Nurse, Stockton) 
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When comparing responses from the two hospitals differences can be identified, 
although because of the small sample size, they are not statistically significant 
(Table 9.1) 
Table 9.1 Changes to the quality of care offered, by hospital 
Quality of care Greenfield Stockton 
Improved due to Reforms 14 (20.6%) 9 (18.4%) 
Improved unrelated to Reforms 12(17.6%) 5(10.2%) 
Unchanged 18(26.5%) 9(18.4%) 
Worsened due to Reforms 21 (30.9%) 24 (49.0%) 
Worsened unrelated to reforms 3 (4.4%) 2(4.1%) 
Whereas 38.2 % of respondents from Greenfield felt that the quality of care they offer 
has been improved, and 20.6% attributing this to the Reforms, only 28.6% of 
respondents from Stockton claim an improved quality of care, with 18.4% attributing 
this to the Reforms. As can be seen the greatest variation is in those respondents who 
believe that improvements in the quality of care are unrelated to the Reforms, with 
17.7% from Greenfield believing this to be the case, as compared with 10.2% from 
Stockton. 
What did become evident during the interviews was a different culture between the 
two hospitals, especially in relation to interprofessional collaboration between nurses 
and doctors. It would appear that the strong working relationships which had 
developed at Greenfield created the environment in which such quality developments 
could flourish, although both nurses and doctors believed this to still be at an early 
stage. 
I like to think that the old doctor-nurse hierarchy has broken down, we work 
as a team and we each learn from each other. We've seen a lot of good ideas 
coming from the nurses as to how we can develop our services, and they work 
very well in the Practice Management Group. I think that we have under- 
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utilised the skills of nurses in the past, and there is a lot of scope for them in 
the future. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
At this hospital the doctors and nurses work as a team, it's not like other 
hospitals I've worked at where it's a them and us sort of relationship. We all 
pull together and although we have our disagreements at times, we are all 
working towards the best care for our patients. (Nurse, Greenfield) 
There are still a lot of ways in which the care we give to patients could be 
improved, and not all of those will cost a great deal of money, and I suppose 
that as a team we will continue to look for ways that we can deliver better 
care, not only us nurses, but the doctors and physios are all involved. (Nurse, 
Greenfield) 
This type of collaborative care culture was one which did not emerge as a significant 
issue in the interviews with professionals from Stockton, and may have provided at 
least a partial explanation for the variations identified. When considering the 
responses between professions less variation can be seen (Table 9.2) 
Table 9.2 Changes to the quality of care offered, by profession 
Quality of care Doctors Nurses 
Improved due to Reforms 10(21.3%) 13 (18.6%) 
Improved unrelated to Reforms 5 (10.6%) 12(17.1%) 
Unchanged 14(29.8%) 13 (18.6%) 
Worsened due to Reforms 16 (34.0%) 29 (41.4%) 
Worsened unrelated to 
Reforms 
2(4.3%) 3(4.3%) 
Doctors and nurses are very close in the proportion of respondents who believe that 
the quality of care has improved with 31.9% of the doctors who responded to this 
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question, and 35.7% of the nurses, who believe this to be the case. A higher 
proportion of doctors (29.8 %) believe that quality of care is unchanged than do nurses 
(18.6%) a percentage differential of 11.2 There is a smaller differential (7.4) in the 
percentage of those who believe the quality of care to have worsened, with 38.3 % of 
doctors and 45.7 % of nurses holding this opinion. 
The biggest variation in the quality of care relating to the impact of the NHS Reforms 
can be seen when examining responses by areas of work (Appendix 7, summarised 
in Table 9.3) 
Table 9.3 Summary of work area statistics on changes to quality of care offered 
Quality Minimum 
% 
Maximum 
% 
Range 
% 
Mean 
% 
Standard 
Deviation 
Improved 17.6 51.6 35.0 34.6 11.1 
Worsened 20 55.9 26.9 37.1 15.01 
It is evident that the work area is the variable most closely related to the improvement 
or worsening of the quality of care offered by respondents. The most positive picture 
of improved quality of care is presented by those respondents working in medical 
areas, 51.6% of those responding to this question believing that the quality of care 
has improved, and only 35.5 % believing that care has worsened. At the opposite end 
of the scale the most negative picture of quality of care is presented by those 
respondents working in surgical areas of whom 55.9 % believe that the quality of care 
has worsened, and only 17.7% that it has improved. 
During the interviews several professionals suggested explanations for the apparent 
difficulties in maintaining quality of care within surgical areas. 
Of course, the Reforms have had the most impact on surgical services, we 
have been the hardest hit. The main reason for this is that is the type of cost 
and volume contracts that we have negotiated. We were really negotiating in 
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the dark because whatever they say about needs assessment, the need for 
medical services is not that predictable. Now what happens is that we base 
our contracts on the level of work that we have done previously, but other 
things changed that prevented us from doing what we had done before..... there 
was a massive increase in emergency cases, and also we were getting more 
and more medical patients housed on our wards, because elderly care services 
had contracted. So of course we struggle to meet our contracts, there's a lot 
of pressure on us, but when push comes to shove then emergency cases will be 
given priority over patients coming in for elective surgery. (Doctor, 
Greenfield) 
It's a nightmare in the surgical wards, we are overflowing with medical 
patients because they don't have enough beds, we seem to be getting more and 
more emergencies coming in, and then we get blamed for not completing our 
contracts, but we just can't do it all, at least not properly. ' (Nurse, Stockton) 
The type of surgical patients have changed, they are much more dependent, 
many of them are really very heavy nursing problems, yet there is all this 
pressure to move people through quickly so that we can meet our contracts. 
Friends of mine who work on the medical wards don't seem to be getting this 
extra pressure to meet throughput targets. ' (Nurse, Greenfield) 
We are the victims of reactive management in the surgical directorate, they 
close beds because money is tight, we can't get our elective cases through, 
they fear that contract money will be lost, so extra beds are opened to deal 
with the long waits. I feel like 1'm on a roundabout, and the patients are just 
not getting the care that they need, when they are cared for on wards which 
are staffed by inexperienced nurses, or rather nurses who are experienced in 
a different field of practice. (Doctor, Stockton) 
Improvements in the quality of care offered by professionals 
Although the response to the direct survey question revealed the perception of the 
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direction of changes to quality of care offered by professionals, it could not identify 
the specific nature of quality changes, and so respondents were asked to specify 
examples of improvements and deteriorations in the quality of care that they offered 
to their patients which could be directly attributed to the Reforms. The opportunity 
to complete this section of the questionnaire was taken by 88 (68.2%) respondents. 
However, this included 35 respondents (27.1 %) who did not offer any examples but 
stated that there were no examples of improvements in the quality of care which could 
be attributed to the Reforms. There was no significant difference between hospitals 
in relation to those believing there to have been no improvement with 21 (28.8 %) 
respondents from Greenfield and 14 (25 %) from Stockton holding this opinion. 
Similarly there is no statistical significance between professions with 15 (30.6%) 
doctors and 20 (25 %) nurses believing there to have been no quality improvements; 
and no difference which relates to clinical speciality (Table 9.4). 
Table 9.4 Respondents explicitly identifying no quality improvements due to the Reforms, by clinical 
speciality 
No quality improvements Number of respondents 
Medical 10(29%) 
Surgical 10(28%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 4 (27%) 
Intensive care 2(22%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 4(31%) 
Paediatric 3 (20%) 
Other clinical areas 2(33%) 
The remaining 53 respondents who completed this section gave 184 examples of 
improved quality of care offered to their patients (averaging 3.5 examples per 
respondent) These were panel coded and seven categories of quality improvement 
were identified. There were 13 instances when respondents gave two or more 
examples which fell into the same category and all but one of these were disregarded 
for this stage of the analysis. Thus the categorisation is by respondents who gave one 
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or more examples rather than of examples per se. 
improved quality in the seven categories: 
(1) Improved organisation. 
(2) Expanded range of services. 
(3) Patient-focused care. 
(4) Resource management. 
(5) Patient information 
(6) Clinical audit. 
(7) Community liaison. 
This left 171 examples of 
Improved organisation 
In this category 52 (40.3%) respondents gave examples. There was no significant 
difference between Greenfield where 28 (38.4%) respondents provided such 
examples, and Stockton where 24 (42.8%) gave such examples. Similarly no 
difference emerges between professions with 18 (36.7%) doctors and 34 (42.5%1) 
nurses identifying examples whereby improved organisation represented an 
improvement to the quality of care. A diversity of examples were submitted which 
fall into this category. 
We have a computer system which allows us to access lab results much more 
quickly, and so start treatment sooner than we could before. 
Admissions are centralised, so that we can find out very quickly bed 
availability should we need to admit a patient. 
The expansion of day care services has allowed us to become much more 
organised in planning patient care. 
The development of a one stop clinic will be a real boon to breast care 
patients as well as being more cost-effective. 
Pre-admission clinics have been a big improvement for patients as well as 
187 
reducing the in-patient stay. 
We now offer a same day results service for GPs. 
There is no statistically significant difference between clinical specialities in the 
frequency with which this category appears in the responses (Table 9.5). 
Table 9.5 Improved organisation identified as a quality improvement, by clinical speciality 
Improved Organisation Number of respondents 
Medical 13 (38%) 
Surgical 18 (50%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 6 (40%) 
Intensive care 5 (56%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 3 (23 %) 
Paediatric 5 (33%) 
Other clinical areas 2 (33%) 
Improved organisation, whilst not without difficulties in some areas, has been viewed 
as a positive change in many cases, which has been viewed as instrumental in 
improving the quality of care. 
In the Health Service we are well accustomed to change and reorganisation, 
I think what has been different this time is that we, as service providers, have 
been allowed to re-organise our own departments, within limits of course, to 
meet the needs of our client group. This has meant that the people responsible 
for the reorganisation have been the ones who were best placed to identify 
problems and suggest solutions, and so we have been able to improve the 
quality of care. (Doctor, Surgical) 
I think that we are much more efficient now, because we are more aware of 
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the need to be better organised and to avoid waste, and this has definitely 
improved the service to the patients. (Nurse, Medical) 
We have had to radically change the way that we do things, and that has been 
painful at times because the way we organised things before was comfortable 
for us if not for the patients! (Nurse, Trauma/Orthopaedic) 
Expanded range of services 
In this category 34 (26.4%) respondents gave examples of improvements in the 
quality of care they could offer which related to an expanded range of services 
available for the patients. There was no significant difference between hospitals, with 
18 (24.7%) respondents from Greenfield, and 16 (28.6%) from Stockton giving 
examples which came into this category. When considering this category in relation 
to profession, again there is no statistically significant difference with 12 (24.5%) 
doctors and 22 (27.5 %) nurses citing examples of expansion in the range of services 
available improving the quality of care that they were able to offer. 
The opening of a new Diabetic centre. 
An improved range of diagnostic facilities. 
Drop-in clinic for same day referrals. 
Much greater range of cardiology investigations available on-site. 
Better availability of link workers to translate. 
Establishment of a joint dialysis unit. 
Wider range of day care services. 
A discharge suite has been set up. 
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When considering this area of quality improvement in relation to work areas, again 
no statistically significant differences can be seen (Table 9.6). 
Table 9.6 Expanded range of service provision identified as a quality improvement, by clinical 
speciality 
Expanded range of services Number of respondents 
Medical 11 (32%) 
Surgical 9 (25%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 2 (13%) 
Intensive care 3 (33%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 4 (31%) 
Paediatric 3 (20%) 
Other areas 2 (33%) 
Explanations for the relatively low number of examples given in this category for 
respondents working in trauma/orthopaedic and intensive care areas, are not easily 
determined, although some possible reasons which might provide a partial 
explanation, did emerge during the interviews. However, as this difference cannot 
be statistically verified, it may be no more than chance. 
I can see that there has been quite a lot of money spent in developing certain 
services, but in a sense, we are fairly marginalised from these, and don't 
benefit as much as some of the wards. (Nurse, Intensive care) 
We still have great problems in finding beds for patients in A&E, and while 
the expansion of day care services has helped many people, it doesn't help us 
with our main problem - bed shortages. (Doctor, Trauma/Orthopaedic) 
Patient focused care 
In relation to patient focused care 23 (17.8 %) respondents identified quality 
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improvements in this area. These improvements were diverse, but the common factor 
was that the care offered by the professional was better focused towards the patients 
needs. 
Integrated clinics have reduced the number of times that patients have to visit 
the hospital. 
Advanced skills training for nurses is both cheaper for the hospital and better 
for the patient. 
Saturday morning operating lists for day care patients is very helpful for those 
who need to arrange child care. 
Planned early discharges. 
There is no significant difference appearing between hospitals with 12 (16.4 %) 
respondents from Greenfield, and 11 (19.6%) from Stockton giving examples which 
came into this category. This was however, an area of apparent difference between 
professions during the interviews, although not statistically significant, with 17 
(21.2%) nurses, and 6 (12.2%) doctors giving examples of improved quality in this 
category. Whilst the reasons for any differences between the professions are likely 
to be multi-factorial, they are presumably related to the expanded role of many nurses 
which can be seen as a secondary effect of the Reforms, in that the drive for 
efficiency revealed an under utilisation of the skills of experienced nurses. 
We realise now that we had failed to fully use the array of skills that our 
senior nurses had developed, and it was only through our need to improve our 
efficiency, that we really began to address this. We now offer our senior 
nurses advanced skills training, which allows them to take on a number of 
tasks which would previously been undertaken by doctors, and of course, this 
means that patients get the care they need when they need it, rather than 
having to wait for a doctor to become available. (Senior manager, Stockton) 
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In the past nurses have been held back, and not encouraged to do what they 
knew that they were capable of, and I think that as the managers have become 
more and more conscious of cost, then they began to realise that there were 
a number of things that nurses could do perfectly well, and at the same time 
improve the service to the patients. (Nurse, Greenfield) 
Nurses are recognised as having a major role to play in the development of 
services in the future, and in ensuring the provision of quality within those 
services. Our progress towards providing the most cost effective service relies 
heavily on developing the skills of nurses. (Senior manager, Greenfield) 
Nurses now carry a lot of responsibility for areas that used to be part of the 
doctor's work, and I am sure that this will continue to develop, because nurses 
are the people who are in most constant contact with the patient, and it is 
better for them if nurses can carry out as much of their care as possible. 
(Nurse, Greenfield) 
Differences emerged in this category in relation to work area (Table 9.7) although, 
again, these cannot be proven to be statistically significant due to the small sample 
size. This was not an area of quality improvement which emerged during the 
interviews as being particularly related to clinical speciality. 
Table 9.7 Patient focused care identified as a quality improvement, by clinical speciality 
Patient focused care Number of respondents 
Medical 6 (18%) 
Surgical 4 (11%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 4 (27%) 
Intensive care 3 (33 %) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 1 (8 %) 
Paediatric 4 (27%) 
Other areas 1 (17%) 
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Resource management 
Another category to emerge in relation to quality improvements was that of resource 
management, with 21 (16.3%) respondents giving examples which came into this 
grouping. 
Resource management at departmental level, or even ward level, allows the 
use of resources to best meet the patient's needs. 
Changing duty rotas to provide better ward cover. 
Controlling our own budget - we can spend on what is really needed. 
Being able to allocate our resources where they are needed. 
A statistically significant difference did not emerge between the hospitals, with 9 
(12.3 %) respondents from Greenfield, and 12 (21.4 %) from Stockton giving examples 
in this category. Any apparent difference may well be explained by the fact that 
budgets had been devolved much earlier at Greenfield than at Stockton, and so 
examples of improvements in quality of care within this category, may have been less 
likely to be attributed to the Reforms at Greenfield than at Stockton. Similarly, no 
significant difference could be related to profession with 16 (20.0%) nurses and 5 
(10.2%) doctors providing examples within this category. Any apparent difference 
is likely to be a reflection of the greater involvement that consultants had with budget 
management prior to the Reforms than did nurses. When considering the influence 
of clinical speciality (Table 9.8), there is a significant difference between those 
working in Medical, Trauma/Orthopaedic, Paediatric and Other areas (for whom this 
is a more widely experienced area of quality improvement), and those working 
elsewhere (2 9.672, p=0.005). These differences are likely to be related to the 
level of involvement with financial issues prior to the Reforms, with respondents 
identifying quality improvements with resource management, being those who had 
experienced responsibility for resource management as a direct effect of the Reforms. 
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Table 9.8 Identification of resource management as a quality improvement, by clinical speciality 
Resource management Number of respondents 
Medical 7 (21%) 
Surgical 3 (8%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 5 (33%) 
Intensive care 0 
Theatre/Anaesthetics 0 
Paediatric 4 (27%) 
Other areas 2 (33%) 
It is arguable whether the quality improvements identified as being due to resource 
management can be directly attributable to the NHS Reforms, or would have occurred 
as a natural consequence of the drive towards resource management of the 1980s. 
However what is evident is that the Reforms gave the necessary impetus to extend 
and improve existing resource management schemes. 
Until the Reforms were implemented, there was, if you like, lip service paid 
to the idea of resource management in any real sense. What the Reforms have 
done is to bring resource management to where it should be - at the sharp face 
of care delivery. (Senior manager, Stockton) 
Of course I'd heard of resource management, but it only became a reality as 
we began to relate it to our contracts, and began to plan how we could service 
those contracts. (Nurse, Greenfield) 
Patient information 
Examples which fell into this category were given by 16 (12.4 %) respondents. There 
was no significant difference between hospitals with 10 (13.7%) respondents from 
Greenfield and 6 (10.7%) from Stockton giving examples which came into this 
category. Differences between the professions cannot be statistically demonstrated 
with 12 (15.0%) nurses and 4 (8.2%) doctors giving examples in this category. 
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More information sheets available about various investigations. 
Better pre-admission information. 
Clearer instruction leaflets, in more languages. 
More written information available, which is better produced. 
Apparent differences, although not statistically significant, emerged between 
respondents working in Medical, Intensive Care and Other clinical areas (who 
experienced quality improvements in this category more widely) and those working 
in other areas. Differences in this category relating to work areas (Table 9.9) can be 
associated with particular projects which had taken place. 
We have spent a lot of time trying to produce information for patients and 
relatives, because we know that admission to ICU is very stressful, and now 
that patients are likely to spend less time with us, it is important that we get 
this information across as effectively as possible. (Nurse Intensive care) 
Many of our patients have to undergo a variety of investigations, and so we 
have worked with our colleagues in the X-ray department to improve our range 
of information sheets. Because we have to get patients in and out so quickly 
we have had to use a lot more written information than we did in the past, and 
I think that this has been very helpful for the patients. (Doctor Medical) 
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Table 9.9 Patient information identified as a quality improvement, by clinical speciality 
Patient information Number of respondents 
Medical 7 (21%) 
Surgical 3 (8%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 1 (7%) 
Intensive care 2 (22%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 1 (8%) 
Paediatric 1 (7%) 
Other areas 1 (17%) 
Clinical audit 
Clinical audit was identified as having been an area of quality improvement by 13 
(10.1 %) respondents. 
Clinical audit - we have identified areas where improvements are needed. 
Auditing our practice has alerted us to any problems far earlier than before. 
Audit helps us to identify what works and what doesn't 
There was no significant difference between hospitals, with 8 (11.0 %) respondents 
from Greenfield and 5 (8.9%) from Stockton giving examples which came into his 
category. There is a more apparent difference between professions, although not 
statistically significant, with 10 (12.5 %) nurses as compared to 3 (6.1 %) of doctors 
giving examples in this area. A possible explanation for this apparent difference 
emerged during the interviews. 
Clinical audit has replaced our old M&M (Mortality and Morbidity) 
meetings, which were seen as somewhat punitive by many doctors, and I think 
that they still view the audit process in this light. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
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In my opinion nurses are far more open to the possibilities of clinical audit, 
many of the doctors are wary, but nurses see it far more as a way of 
enhancing their practice. (Nurse, Stockton) 
Differences between work areas (Table 9.10) cannot be so easily explained, and it is 
possible that the apparent differences are no more than chance, although it is likely 
that those respondents who are new to the process of clinical audit are more able to 
see the actual and potential benefits in relation to the quality of patient care. 
Table 9.10 Identification of clinical audit as a quality improvement, by clinical speciality 
Clinical audit Number of respondents 
Medical 4 (12%) 
Surgical 2 (6%) 
Trauma/ Orthopaedic 3 (20%) 
Intensive care 1 (11%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetics 1 (8 %) 
Paediatric 2(13%) 
Other areas 0 
Again this is an area which was under development prior to the implementation of the 
NHS Reforms, the major effect of the Reforms being to integrate the variety of audit 
processes being undertaken to an over-arching process of clinical audit. However, 
the perception of those interviewed was that the Reforms had fostered the 
development of audit, and that without the Reforms, it may have remained under- 
developed. 
Before the Reforms we played at audit, but now it's necessary to survive, we 
must be able to identify what it is that we are doing and what we need to 
improve on, in order to retain our contracts. (Senior manager, Stockton) 
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I believe that without the Reforms we would not have developed clinical audit 
in the way we have. Although, no doubt, it was seen as useful before, there 
was no force to improve or further develop it, and it probably wouldn't have 
been. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
Community liaison 
The final category identified in relation to quality improvement was that of 
community liaison of which 12 (9.3 %) respondents provided examples. 
Better communication with GPs has resulted in a better service for patients. 
We communicate better with those who will be giving post-discharge care. 
There is more liaison between hospital and community. 
More information is passed from community to hospital and vice versa, so that 
time is not wasted collecting information that is already available elsewhere. 
Within this category there is again no significant difference between hospitals with 
7 (9.6%) respondents from Greenfield and 5 (8.9%) from Stockton giving examples 
in this category. This is also true when considering professions with 5 (10.2%) 
doctors and 7 (8.8%) nurses giving similar examples. Variations do appear in 
relation to work area (Table 9.11) which, although not statistically significant, might 
reflect, with perhaps the exception of surgical areas, the differing levels of 
community liaison necessitated by the nature of the work undertaken. 
There is no apparent explanation for the relatively low identification of community 
liaison as a quality improvement by those respondents working within surgical areas, 
although it is possibly related to the level of community liaison which was undertaken 
prior to the implementation of the Reforms. 
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Table 9.11 Identification of community liaison as a quality improvement, by clinical speciality 
Community liaison Number of respondents 
Medical 6(18%) 
Surgical 1 (3%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 2(13%) 
Intensive care 1 (11%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetics 0 
Paediatric 2(13%) 
Other areas 0 
Deteriorations in the quality of care 
In response to the open question requesting examples of deteriorations in quality of 
care directly attributable to the NHS Reforms 92 (71.3 %) took the opportunity to 
offer 424 examples (averaging 4.6 per respondent). When these answers were panel 
coded eight categories of quality deterioration were identified. There were 32 
respondents who gave two or more examples which came into the same category, and 
for this stage of the analysis all but one of these were disregarded. Thus the 
categorisation is by respondents who gave one or more examples rather than of 
examples per se. This left 361 examples in the eight categories: 
(1) Time limitations. 
(2) Access to services. 
(3) Staffing levels. 
(4) Skill mix. 
(5) Continuity of care. 
(6) Inequalities. 
(7) Cancellations and delays. 
(8) Premature discharge. 
Time limitations 
The area of deterioration in the quality of care which appeared most frequently was 
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that which was classified as time limitation, and 67 (51.9%) respondents gave 
examples which were included in this category. 
I no longer have enough time to give patients adequate counselling. 
Patients have died alone because there is no time to be with them. 
There is not enough time available to feed patients properly. 
The amount of time available to see each patient in clinic is too short. 
There is no time to be able to just stop and listen. 
There is not enough time to help patients cope with their fears. 
We just don't have the time to do everything that the patients need 
If you ask me the one thing that would improve patient care more than 
anything else, it would be if we had more time 
There is never enough time, never. 
This category can be seen to relate closely to two of the important changes in 
professional practice identified in Chapter 8, first to the increased workload and 
secondly to a reduction in staffing levels, both changes which limit the amount of 
time available for individual patients. A significant difference can be seen between 
hospitals in relation to this area with 44 (60.3%) respondents from Greenfield, as 
compared with 23 (41.1 %) from Stockton giving examples in this category (x2 4.037, 
p=0.025). This finding may well be closely related to the relative (rather than 
absolute) fall in staffing levels experienced at Greenfield, which has been previously 
identified. When considering this area in relation to profession a significant 
difference can be identified. Examples are given by 18 (36.7%) doctors and 49 
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(61.2%) nurses (x, 6.637, p=0.005). This greater incidence of examples from 
nurses can be seen to relate to their greater experience of reduced staffing levels. 
Less variation can be seen when considering this area in relation to work area (Table 
9.12) 
Table 9.12 Identification of time limitation as a quality deterioration, by clinical speciality 
Time limitations Number of respondents 
Medical 21(62%) 
Surgical 18(50%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedics 8(53%) 
Intensive care 6(67%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetics 7(54%) 
Paediatric 6(40%) 
Other areas 1 (17%) 
The greatest variation which appears in the low level of examples reported in this 
area by respondents working in other clinical areas can be explained by the different 
nature of their work. 
Access 
The second most frequently reported area of quality deterioration was that of access, 
58 (45 %) of respondents giving examples which came into this category. 
Access to specialist services is much poorer. 
Access to services outside of the Trust is almost impossible. 
Referrals take very much longer. 
Convalescence is no longer provided. 
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There is a long wait for some services. 
No statistically significant difference exists between hospitals, with 36 (49.3 %) 
respondents from Greenfield, and 22 (39.3 %) from Stockton giving examples in this 
area. Neither is there any significant difference between professions, with 23 
(46.9 %) doctors and 35 (43.8 %) nurses giving examples in this category. There can, 
however, be seen to be a significant difference between those respondents working 
in Medical, Surgical and Trauma/Orthopaedic areas (who experience access as a 
quality deterioration more widely) and those working elsewhere (,, r2 9.009, p=0.005) 
Table 9.13 Identification of access as a quality deterioration, by clinical speciality 
Access Number of respondents 
Medical 19(56%) 
Surgical 20(56%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 8(53%) 
Intensive care 2(22%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 4(31%) 
Paediatric 4 (27%) 
Other areas 1 (17%) 
In relation to the three areas in which access could be seen to be a particular problem 
- medical, surgical and trauma/orthopaedics, the same explanation could be seen to 
recur. 
There are virtually no long stay beds available now, and community care is 
not always appropriate, for various reasons, and it can take months to arrange 
residential or nursing home care, which of course means we have a bed which 
is blocked. (Nurse, Medical) 
The medical wards are always blocked, we get their overspill, and so can't 
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admit patients who require surgical treatment. (Doctor, Surgical) 
Many of our patients need very lengthy rehabilitation, especially if they are 
elderly, but there just isn't the availability of medium and long term beds any 
more, it's a case of being in an acute ward or being sent home, and so we 
always have a number of long term patients who don't really require hospital 
care but who aren't well enough to go home, and are not candidates for a 
nursing home. (Nurse, Trauma/Orthopaedic) 
In my opinion one of the most short-sighted moves ever was the massive 
reduction in long-term care for older people. Many of our patients are just 
not suitable for so-called community care, and so they end up staying for some 
considerable time, in an equally unsuitable acute hospital bed. (Doctor, 
Medical) 
Every week it's the same, having to juggle the elective admissions because we 
have beds blocked by long-term patients with nowhere to go. (Nurse, Surgical) 
There are two issues relating to access which can be seen to arise here, firstly access 
to non-acute services, and secondly denial of access because of inappropriate use of 
acute facilities. 
Staffing levels 
Again this was an area which was exposed as a significant change in professional 
practice, only to re-emerge as an area of quality deterioration. 54 (41.9%) 
respondents offered examples of quality deterioration in this category. 
Patients are having to wait longer for a nurse because there are fewer nurses 
available. 
Less nurses - more post-operative complications. 
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Medications are often late because there are not enough nurses. 
There are too few nurses to be able to prevent pressure sores. 
There are never enough nurses to allow one to come on the ward round, so 
they often are unclear as to changes in treatment. 
As in relation to reduced staffing levels as a change in practice, some variation 
appeared in relation to hospital which was not statistically significant, with 34 
(46.6%) respondents from Greenfield and 20 (35.7%) from Stockton giving examples. 
The difference between professions however, did prove to be significant with 9 
(18.4%) doctors and 45 (56.3%) nurses doing likewise (, 16.396, p=0.0005). 
Explanations for these differences which appear in relation to quality deterioration in 
the category of staffing levels are likely to mirror those for the differences in 
perception of reduced staffing levels as a significant change in professional practice. 
Different views between reduced staffing levels as an important practice change 
(Table 8.5), and staffing levels as a category of quality deterioration (Table 9.14), do 
appear to be related to work areas. Those respondents working in 
Trauma/Orthopaedics were more likely than colleagues working elsewhere to 
experience quality deteriorations in this area (2 5.388, p=0.25) 
Table 9.14 Identification of staffing levels as a quality deterioration, by clinical speciality 
Staffing levels Number of respondents 
Medical 12 (35%) 
Surgical 15 (42%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 11 (73%) 
Intensive care 5 (56%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 4(31%) 
Paediatric 5 (33%) 
Other areas 2(33%) 
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It appears that the impact of reductions in staffing levels is not consistent in its effects 
and in some work areas the effect on the quality of care may well be more marked 
than in others. 
Skill mix 
An area which is closely linked to, yet distinct from staffing levels, is that of skill 
mix, a category in which 44 (34.1 %) respondents provided examples of deterioration 
in quality of care. 
Untrained staff are delivering more and more direct care, for which they lack 
skill. 
Even when well supervised, health care assistants cannot be expected to carry 
out care as ski fully as a trained nurse. 
Lack of experience means slower identification of problems. 
Inexperienced staff are unable to respond as appropriately in an emergency. 
Poor skill mix means poorer care. 
Respondents highlighted two areas in relation to skill mix: the higher proportion of 
untrained staff; and the inexperience of many staff. Little difference can be seen 
between hospitals, with 27 (37.0%) respondents from Greenfield, and 17 (30.4%) 
from Stockton citing examples of quality deterioration in this category. The 
difference is significant when considering profession, with 36 (45.0%) nurses, 
compared to only 8 (16.3 %) doctors offering examples (il 9.877, p=0.005) It is 
interesting to note that the examples given by doctors relate to the skill mix of nurses, 
as this appears to be an area of change which has been largely confined to nurses, 
although of course affecting the work of doctors. 
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Table 9.15 Identification of skill mix as a quality deterioration, by clinical speciality 
Skill mix Number of respondents 
Medical 8(24%) 
Surgical 12 (33%) 
TraumalOrthopaedic 9(60%) 
Intensive care 3 (33%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 5 (38%) 
Paediatric 5 (33%) 
Other areas 2 (33%) 
In relation to work areas (table 9.15) a significant difference emerges in relation to 
the high number reported by respondents working in trauma/orthopaedic areas who 
were more likely to experience quality deteriorations in this area than were their 
colleagues working in other clinical specialities (, x2 3.744, p=0.05). There has been 
no clear explanation emerging during the interviews to account for this difference. 
Continuity of care 
41 (31.8%) respondents reported examples of quality deterioration in this category. 
Moving patients , 
from ward to ward as beds become available means that 
continuity of care is non-existent. 
High usage of bank and agency staff means that care is fragmented. 
Community care is a joke, patients don't get their care continued at home and 
more and more of them end up being re-admitted. 
Care is prioritized on a day to day basis, and so is no longer consistent. 
An apparent difference, which was not statistically significant, did emerge between 
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hospitals with 26 (35.6%) respondents from Greenfield, compared to 15 (26.8%) 
from Stockton giving examples in this category. During the interviews possible 
explanations for this apparent difference did emerge. 
One of the biggest changes that I have had to learn to live with is that I no 
longer have all my patients within two wards. They are now scattered all over 
the hospital, and may well be moved several times during their stay. This 
makes a nonsense of the idea of continuity of care. One patient may have had 
three or four teams of nurses looking after them during a one week stay. 
(Doctor, Greenfield) 
Although we end up looking after all sorts of patients, we do tend to keep them 
on the ward once they've arrived. There doesn't seem much point to keep 
moving them around, unless there's a very good reason. (Nurse, Stockton) 
It would appear that at Greenfield more attempt is made to place patients in the 
specialist ward as soon as possible after their admission, whilst this does not seem to 
be such an issue at Stockton. This may explain why quality deteriorations relating 
to this area may be more prominent at Greenfield. When examining this area in 
relation to professions, there is no significant difference, with 15 (30.6 %) doctors and 
26 (32.5 %) nurses giving examples in this category. Some variations can be seen in 
relation to clinical speciality (Table 9.16), although these are not statistically 
significant. 
The low level of examples given by respondents working in intensive care, 
theatre/anaesthetic and other clinical areas can be explained by the nature of the work 
that is undertaken in these areas, these categories being those which undertake what 
can be termed transitional care, from which transfer or return to other wards is 
expected. Similarly in paediatric areas, there is no cross-over with adult services, 
and children are cared for solely within the paediatric unit, so the problems which 
occur due to ward transfers do not arise. Overall quality deterioration related to 
continuity of care is of a different nature within the different work areas. 
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Table 9.16 Identification of continuity of care as a quality deterioration, by clinical speciality 
Continuity of care Number of respondents 
Medical 11 (32%) 
Surgical 15 (42%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 5 (33%) 
Intensive care 1 (11%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 3 (23%) 
Paediatric 3 (20%) 
Other areas 1 (17%) 
Inequalities 
39 (30.2 %) respondents gave examples which relate to the exacerbation of inequalities 
in care provision, although these were of a diverse nature. 
Patients of GP fundholders get preferential treatment. 
Less services are available for old people. 
Patients who go to A&E rather than their GP often manage to speed up their 
admission. 
Patients who complain the loudest get the quickest treatment. 
Patients who have been on the list longest get their treatment before those who 
may need it more. 
There is little difference between hospitals in relation to the percentage of respondents 
giving examples falling within this category, with 23 (31.5 %) respondents from 
Greenfield, and 16 (28.6%) from Stockton citing examples of quality deterioration 
which relate to the worsening of inequalities. Also little difference between 
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professions can be seen with 16 (32.7%) doctors, and 22 (27.5%) nurses giving 
similar examples. When considering clinical speciality (Table 9.17) a significant 
difference emerges in relation to those respondents working in medical areas (who 
have a wider experience of quality deterioration in this area) compared to those 
working in other clinical areas ( 5.044, p=0.025). 
Table 9.17 Identification of inequality as a quality deterioration, by clinical speciality 
Inequalities Number of respondents 
Medical 16(47%) 
Surgical 12 (33 %) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 5 (33%) 
Intensive care 2(22%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 1 (8 %) 
Paediatric 2(13%) 
Other areas 1 (17%) 
Other variations in relation to clinical speciality can be identified, but statistical 
significance cannot be established. It is likely that in relation to respondents working 
within theatre/anaesthetics and other clinical areas, any changes in quality in relation 
to the existence of inequalities may remain hidden, as when professionals come into 
contact with clients in theses areas, the decision to treat, or at least to pursue 
investigations has already been made, and so the time at which inequality is most 
likely to occur comes prior to their interaction with the client. The two examples of 
quality deterioration in relation to inequalities which were offered by respondents 
working within paediatric areas both related to the ability of GP fundholders to obtain 
quicker referral to specialist services which required extra-contractual referrals than 
could non-fundholding GPs. The two examples given by respondents working in 
intensive care areas both related to the necessity to employ age-related criteria for 
admission to ICU beds in times of bed shortages. For those areas where higher 
numbers of examples were given in this category a more diverse range of cases were 
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cited. All gave examples relating to the advantages accorded to the patients of GP 
fundholders. Respondents working in surgical and trauma/orthopaedic areas also 
highlighted the drive to reduce the number of patients on waiting lists for over 
eighteen months, which was seen to disadvantage those who may have had greater 
clinical need, but had been waiting for a shorter period of time. The apparently high 
level of examples given in this category by respondents working in medical areas 
appears to be somewhat different in nature in that quality deteriorations in relation to 
inequalities here tended to relate to two particular patient groups, older people, and 
those with chronic illness. This was supported during the interviews. 
It's becoming so that we are hesitant to admit someone with a long term 
illness, because we are likely to experience problems getting them home again, 
because social services are such a disaster. If services are set up already, and 
appear to be working reasonably well, it may be that we won't be able to 
improve things very much, and they could even become worse. Now of 
course, we will still admit anyone who needs treatment, but in the past we 
would often admit say a patient with Parkinsons to see if we could better the 
treatment, and that will require close observation, because things can go 
wrong. 1'm reluctant to do that now, because we might not be able to arrange 
discharge so easily, and we could end up with a patient in one of our beds for 
a long time who neither needs nor wants to be there. (Doctor, Medical) 
I think that older people get a very bad deal, many of the patients I have 
would benefit from intensive physiotherapy and occupational therapy, but 
because these services are limited I feel that they are concentrated on younger 
patients, not that anyone will admit to that. (Nurse, Medical) 
Inequalities have always existed within the NHS, and these have been well recognised 
and documented. However the evidence of this study suggests that in certain aspects 
the Reforms have exacerbated some areas of inequalities. This may be a primary 
effect, such as the unequal advantages enjoyed by the patients of GP fundholders, or 
a secondary effect, such as the curtailment of services to certain patient groups, as 
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a way of keeping within financial limits. 
Cancellations and delays 
37 (28.7%) respondents gave examples of quality deteriorations which came into this 
category. 
Operations are often cancelled on the day. 
Emergency operations are often delayed for hours. 
Some patients have their operations cancelled two or three times. 
There is a much longer wait for some investigations. 
Discharges home are often delayed because services can't be set up. 
A significant difference did emerge between the hospitals with 26 (35.6 %) 
respondents from Greenfield, compared to 11 (20.8 %) from Stockton giving examples 
of delays and cancellations as a quality deterioration (XZ 3.211, p=0.05). It is 
possible that this difference could be a reflection of their different pre-Reform 
experience. 
We have always had to cancel a certain number of our admissions, simply 
because it is impossible to predict how many of our beds will be required for 
emergencies. (Nurse, Stockton) 
In the past we used to cancel very few of our booked admissions, but now it 
happens regularly. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
A difference which is not statistically significant appears between the professions with 
18 (36.7%) doctors and 19 (23.8%) nurses giving examples in this category. This 
apparent difference is likely to reflect the doctors' greater involvement in attempting 
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to manage both their waiting lists, and the prioritisation of treatments/investigations 
within their patient group. Differences appear in relation to clinical speciality, 
although not statistically significant (Table 9.18). 
Table 9.18 Identification of cancellation/delay as a quality deterioration, by clinical speciality 
Cancellations/Delays Number of respondents 
Medical 12(35%) 
Surgical 14(39%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 6 (40%) 
Intensive care 2(22%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 2 (15%) 
Paediatric 1 (7%) 
Other areas 0 
The results show that the respondents who have reported the greatest number of 
quality deteriorations in relation to cancellations/delays are those working within the 
medical, surgical, and trauma/orthopaedic areas. Those respondents working in 
theatre/anaesthetic and other clinical areas, whilst often cited by respondents in 
medical, surgical and trauma/orthopaedic areas as being the originators of such 
delays, are apparently unaware of this quality deterioration in their own practice. 
Those respondents working within intensive care and paediatric areas believe that 
their patients are prioritised, and are aware of the effect of this on other patients. 
If our patients need any special investigations as a matter of urgency they do 
get priority because they are critically ill, but I know that this probably means 
that a patient somewhere else in the hospital has his or her investigation 
delayed or even cancelled. (Nurse, Intensive care) 
Children are always put first on the operating lists so they are never cancelled 
because the list has over-run. (Nurse, Paediatrics) 
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Dealing with patients who are experiencing cancellations and delays is something 
which causes great concern among both doctors and nurses. 
I dread those mornings when we have no empty beds and several patients due 
to be admitted, and it happens nearly every week . From first thing in the 
morning we are trying to find ways to empty beds, and it may be that we are 
able to discharge enough patients or that one of the medical wards can take 
one of the patients from us, but often we just can't and the patients rings at 
10 o'clock only to be told that a bed isn't yet available and they should ring 
back at twelve, and so it goes on and sometimes the patient may not be 
admitted until that evening, or even the morning of their operation. Of course 
the problem then is that we are trying to care for a patient who is both 
stressed out and inadequately prepared for the operation. Sometimes a patient 
who has been put on hold will ring the ward directly instead of the bed 
manager, and some of them are really quite aggressive, and I can understand 
why, but at the same time I feel like shouting back at them -It's not my fault' 
-what's worse of course is when the patient is very upset, I feel so useless. 
(Nurse, Surgical) 
If we have a patient who is waiting for an investigation which will determine 
if they have a life threatening disease, and then we subject them to a delay, 
which we often do, well I feel that does real harm . (Doctor, Medical) 
Premature discharge 
Perhaps linked to the previous category is the quality deterioration categorised as 
premature discharge, of which examples by 21 (16.3%) respondents were given. 
Premature discharge means the discharge of a patient who in the opinion of the 
respondent would have been best served by remaining in hospital, as opposed to early 
discharge, which was not viewed as evidence of quality deterioration 
Patients are sent home far too early because we have closed too many beds. 
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We have gone too far in trying to reduce in-patient length of stay, patients are 
discharged too early. 
Discharging patients too soon. 
Patients are sent home when they are still ill and distressed. 
There is no difference between the two hospitals in this area of quality deterioration 
with 12 (16.4 %) respondents from Greenfield and 9 (16.1 %) from Stockton giving 
examples in this category. There is a variation between the professions, although not 
statistically significant, with 16 (20.0%) nurses as compared to 5 (10.2%) doctors 
providing examples in this category. The doctors who were interviewed recognised 
that their seniority did, to a degree, protect them from many of the problems 
associated with premature discharge, and so it is likely that deteriorations in quality 
here are not so apparent to them. 
Of course, in the end, if I need a bed for a desperately ill patient I will put a 
degree of pressure on the houseman and the nurses to speed up the discharge 
of a patient, and I know that it causes them problems, but I have to focus on 
the patient with the greatest need. (Doctor, Stockton) 
If we are trying to push for the discharge of an elderly lady who has had a 
CVA it's the nurses who get all the grief from the relatives and social services, 
I can to a large degree ignore it, because they won't involve me unless they 
have to. (Doctor, Greenfield) 
Some variation also appears in relation to work areas although this is not statistically 
significant (Table 9.20). 
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Table 9.20 Identification of premature discharge as a quality deterioration, by clinical speciality 
Premature Discharge Number of respondents 
Medical 7(21%) 
Surgical 9(25%) 
Trauma/Orthopaedic 1 (7%) 
Intensive care 2(22%) 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 1 (8%) 
Paediatric 1(7%) 
Other areas 0 
Respondents working in `other' areas would not normally be directly involved in the 
discharge of patients. The one example given by a respondent working in 
theatre/anaesthetics related to the reduced choice of available anaesthetic agents when 
early discharge is planned, and the one example given by a respondent working in 
paediatrics related to day care surgery for children. The low level of examples in this 
area given by respondents working in trauma/orthopaedics is in part because those 
respondents working within accident and emergency areas would not be directly 
involved in discharge of other than short stay patients, but why this does not appear 
to be a problem experienced in the orthopaedic wards cannot be readily explained, 
and may be no more than chance. Whilst the variation is not statistically significant 
in medical, surgical and intensive care areas, the quality deterioration associated with 
premature discharge emerged during the interviews as a common experience, and one 
which causes much concern. 
I think that the level of readmissions due to early discharge is very much 
underestimated, because when a patient is discharged too early they often feel 
very dissatisfied, and so if they experience problems they are unlikely to return 
to the hospital which they feel has treated then poorly. I know that I often see 
patients in Casualty who have post-operative complications following surgery 
in another local hospital, and they just will not return to that hospital, and so 
the people there probably will never include that patient in their audit figures. 
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In the same way I am sure that some of our patients, if we were to investigate, 
would have been found to have been readmitted elsewhere because we have 
sent then home far too early. (Doctor, Surgical) 
I really worry about some of the patients I send home, it keeps me awake at 
nights, because I worry how they will cope. Very often I am put in the 
position of sending them home in order to be able to admit someone else, 
when I know that a few more days in hospital would make a great difference 
to their recovery. (Nurse, Medical) 
Comparing the nature of quality changes 
In order to include all the examples which were offered by the respondents, and to 
facilitate comparison between the nature of improvements and deteriorations in the 
quality of care delivered by respondents in practice, a framework was constructed 
which incorporated the six principles of quality (Maxwell 1984, Shaw 1986) and the 
three components of quality (Donabedian 1969). Panel coding was utilised to 
allocate each example within the framework constructed, and so consider the changes 
in quality from a range of perspectives. 
Of the 184 examples of quality improvement given by respondents it was possible to 
classify 176, the remaining 8 being too non-specific to classify (Table 9.21). An 
example of a quality improvement which was classified as a structure/efficiency 
improvement is that of the development of a centralised admissions service. This 
speeded up Accident and Emergency and elective admissions by setting up a system 
to centralise the collation of bed availability data across the hospital, rather than doing 
this at Unit level. An example of a quality improvement which was classified as a 
process/access improvement was that of the development of a one-stop breast clinic, 
which reduced the number of times a woman had to visit the clinic prior to treatment 
planning. Prior to this development a woman referred with a breast lump would have 
visited the clinic, been seen by a consultant, then sent away to have a variety of tests 
done, prior to returning to clinic the following week for results and treatment 
planning. The setting up of the one-stop clinic revolutionised the process by 
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arranging for these women to be seen early in the morning, have all their 
investigations carried out at times designated for patients from this clinic, then 
returning to see the consultant for diagnosis and treatment planning. This resulted 
in women waiting less time to be seen in the clinic, and commencing treatment 
earlier. 
It can be seen that clusters of quality improvements appear in the structure column. 
In relation to the process element, quality improvements here relate most closely to 
the principles of acceptability and efficiency, and there appear to be very few quality 
improvements in relation to outcome of care. When considering the principles of 
quality, there can be seen to be an absence of quality improvements which relate to 
equity, and very few which relate to appropriateness. 
Table 9.21 The nature of quality improvements identified by respondents 
Structure Process Outcome 
Access xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xx 
xxxxxxx xxx 
Equity 
Acceptability xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxx 
Efficiency xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxx 
Effectiveness xxxxxxxxxxxxxx xx xx 
Appropriateness xxxxxx 
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Of the 424 examples of quality deteriorations given by respondents it was possible to 
classify 408 (Table 9.22). In relation to these examples, none are identified which 
relate to outcome, although this was something which emerged marginally during the 
interviews. Quality deteriorations were identified in relation to both structure and 
process, although there is a more dense concentration in the process column. Such 
deteriorations can be noted across the range of principles, with a particularly high 
concentration in relation to appropriateness. Thus it can be seen that whilst the NHS 
Reforms have initiated improvements in quality in some areas, these have been 
counterbalanced by deteriorations in others. Even in relation to those structure 
aspects of quality which appear dominant in quality improvements, there were also 
many examples of deterioration in quality. 
An example of a quality deterioration which was classified as process/equity was the 
fast-tracking of fundholding GPs patients at certain times of the year. This process 
was seen to seriously disadvantage the patients of non-fundholding GPs. An example 
of a quality deterioration classified as structure/effectiveness was that of discharges 
home being delayed because home care services were not available. 
Despite the adoption of what purported to be a more integrated approach to quality 
dictated by the Reforms, they do not appear to have had the desired effect of a 
universal pattern of quality improvement. What is of particular concern is that the 
focus on structural improvements can, in many cases be argued to have created 
deteriorations in the process of professional care delivery. 
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Table 9.22 Examples of quality deteriorations identified by respondents 
Structure Process Outcome 
Access xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxx 
xxxxxx 
Equity xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
x 
Acceptability xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxx 
Efficiency xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxx 
Effectiveness xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Appropriateness xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
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CHAPTER 10 
A TYPOLOGY OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSE TO THE NIHS 
REFORMS 
The values and beliefs of professional practice 
The principles which underpin the NHS have been clearly stated since Beveridge first 
presented his vision of a nationalised health service. These principles of equity, 
comprehensiveness and universality have been widely examined, debated and 
challenged, yet have remained the bedrock on which the NHS is said to operate for 
nearly fifty years. What has been less well explored are the principles on which 
health care professionals practice within the NHS. The principles which guide 
practice can be seen in the professional guidelines and codes of conduct which set out 
the framework for professional practice. The values and beliefs on which those 
principles rest are less explicit as is the question of how these values and beliefs align 
with the principles which underpin the NHS. It appears to be a taken for granted 
assumption that the values and beliefs of the health care professionals are congruent 
with those of the organisation, and what has not been explored is the way in which 
the two belief systems interrelate and interact. 
During the interviews with health care professionals, the values and beliefs of the 
interviewee were located on the continuum of health care principles outlined by 
Beauchamp (1976). All respondents were asked to locate their current beliefs, as well 
as those beliefs of the pre-Reform period, in an attempt to detect any movement 
along the continuum. When comparing positions a significant degree of clustering 
has emerged since the implementation of the Reforms (Diagrams 10.0 and 10.1). 
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Diagram 10.0 Self location on the continuum of health care beliefs, prior to the NHS Reforms 
xxxxx 
XXXXXxxXXXx xxX xx 
Health care is a social right 
which should be funded 
and provided by the State 
and freely accessed by all 
citizens, subject to need. 
Health care is a service 
commodity which should, 
with limited exceptions, 
be funded and provided 
privately, and be subject 
to the laws of supply and 
demand. 
Diagram 10.1 Self location on the continuum of health care beliefs at time of interview 
XXxxxx 
xXXxxxXXXx 
X 
XXXX 
Health care is a social right 
which should be funded 
and provided by the State 
and freely accessed by all 
citizens, subject to need. 
Health care is a service 
commodity which should, 
with limited exceptions, 
be funded and provided 
privately, and be subject 
to the laws of supply and 
demand. 
As can be seen from the above diagrams, there had always been a divergence of 
values and beliefs in relation to the system of health care among the health care 
professionals interviewed. The experience of the implementation of the NHS 
Reforms appears to have consolidated those values and beliefs into three main 
clusters. When the interviews were analyzed, three distinct types of professional 
response to the NHS Reforms emerged, which could be seen to align with the self 
location on the health care belief continuum. At the public justice end of the 
continuum could be seen the Traditional professional, with egalitarian beliefs, who 
continued to focus their practice around the needs of the individual patient. At the 
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market justice end of the continuum could be seen the Transformed professional, with 
managerial beliefs, who focused their practice around the needs of the market. The 
cluster in the centre of the continuum could be seen to represent the Transitional 
professional, who shared the some of the beliefs of both the Traditional and the 
Transformed professional and who attempted to focus their practice on both the needs 
of the individual and the needs of the market. Each of these three types can be seen 
to exhibit distinct characteristics in relation to a variety of criteria which emerged 
from the analysis of the interviews: 
(1) The recognition of the values and beliefs which underpinned their 
professional practice. 
(2) The initial and on-going response to the NHS Reforms. 
(3) The nature of change in their professional practice. 
(4) The perception of the experience of the implementation of the NHS 
Reforms. 
(5) The nature of professional relationships with both the patients and the 
organisation. 
(6) The nature of the focus on quality of care. 
(7) Sources of support and satisfaction from practice. 
Each of the three types identified experienced their professional practice 
in different 
ways, and could locate the changes that they had experienced in relation to the 
implementation of the NHS Reforms. 
The Traditional professional 
Those nine health care professionals who located themselves in the cluster towards 
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the public justice end of the health care beliefs continuum provided a range of 
comments during their interviews which indicated that the values and beliefs which 
underpinned their practice had consolidated and strengthened as a result of their 
experience of the implementation of the NHS Reforms, and that they were more able 
to recognise such beliefs as having an important role to play in the shaping of their 
professional practice: 
The more I see of the effects of the introduction of the contracting process, the 
more I am convinced that it is fundamentally wrong. How can we treat health 
care as something which is bought and sold when we claim to have a free 
health care system? In some ways a totally private system would be better, 
because at least then it's up-front and honest that what you get is what you 
pay for. The NHS is something we should be proud of. I know we haven't 
always got it right, but I like to think that we tried to do the best for our 
patients, and 1 don't think that we do that now. When I hear my colleagues 
talking about contracts and costs, quite frankly I'm disgusted. I don't know 
what's happened to them. They used to be talking about patients and their 
needs. 
I think that the way the NHS has gone is wrong. It values money over people 
and you'll never convince me that can be right. It makes me sick when I hear 
politicians talking about good old fashioned values. Where's the good old 
fashioned values in our hospitals nowadays? 
I never used to think much about whether the system was right, I took it for 
granted that the NHS set out to do the best for people. But now I realise that 
the system itself has to be sound for sound work to be done in it, and that's 
what I think we've lost. To me the NHS has changed, and now it's like one of 
those beautiful looking shiny apples which is full of maggots it might look 
good on the surface but it's not much use when it's needed. 
When I was a student I remember one of our tutors telling us that to maintain 
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the public's trust in nurses we always had to behave in a way that was ethical 
and moral, and you know that was probably an off the cuff remark that she 
made, but it's always stayed in my mind, and that's probably what has made 
me aware of the ethical difficulties culties of the new system of contracting. I don't 
care whether they want to run the NHS like a business or not, but what I do 
care about is whether or not I, as a nurse, can do my work in a way that is 
right. 
Throughout the interviews with the health care professionals who placed themselves 
in this category, a recurring theme emerging was a challenging of the justness of the 
Reforms, and to a large degree, this appeared to be the factor which most influenced 
a rather negative response to the implementation of the Reforms. Neither did it seem 
that this response had been markedly modified in the period following the 
implementation of the Reforms: 
I knew that the NHS needed a fairly radical overhaul, after all it was 
unreasonable to think that it could continue to run unchanged as the world 
changed around it. But what I objected to was the way in which it was 
changed One of the major problems with the NHS was that it had never really 
had any success in improving the health of those people at the lower end of 
the social scale, and as far as I can see the NHS Reforms could only worsen 
the situation. 
Most of us working in the NHS could see that the result of making some GPs 
fundholders would be to make better services available to some patients than 
to others, and to be honest the only reason that it hasn't been a lot worse than 
it is, is that I think many of the GPs themselves feel uncomfortable with that. 
However there are a few who are enjoying their little bit of power, and they 
don't seem to give a damn that their patients are doing better than patients of 
non fundholders. 
The ideas which led to the NHS Reforms were wrong then and they're wrong 
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now, and what I can't understand is why more people are not prepared to 
stand up and say that. It's almost like brainwashing the way I hear some of 
my colleagues spouting the views of the managers as if they were some 
undeniable truth. Tell me, how can it be right for someone with no 
understanding of the medical facts to decide whether or not I can refer one of 
my patients to a specialist outside of the area? 
I know that there are not enough resources to meet all of the demand but what 
I object to is the unfair way in which I see those resources shared out. The 
Reforms have made the NHS a very biased system, with some people doing 
considerably better than others. 
Whilst this group of health care professionals, like all others have experienced 
changes in the way they have practised, these appear to be less marked than the 
changes which have been experienced by those located in the other clusters along the 
health care belief continuum. In fact conscious limitation of changes to practice can 
be seen to be a feature of this group: 
I have not let the changes change the way I view my patients. Like everyone 
else I have to work harder now than ever before, but I don't put anything 
before the needs of my patients, and if that means I ignore some of the dictates 
from management, well that's the way it is. I know that this doesn't make me 
popular with management. Recently I was told that I had an `attitude' . Well 
I only hope that if I ever need to be a patient somebody will have enough of 
an attitude to care for me before they fill in yet another set of forms! 
I try not to get too involved with all the practice management business. I 
know someone has to do it, but I still see my role as one which is primarily 
concerned with patient care, and that's where my energy goes. 
I'm well aware that I would never be appointed as a ward sister now, but I'm 
here and it will take a lot to move me. They don't really want sisters who 
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care for patients any more, they want highflying ward managers, and that's 
just not my way. To my way of thinking a ward sister should be concerned 
firstly with the patients, and secondly with the staff, who also need looking 
after. That's how I see my job, and that's what I do. 
Despite the essentially negative response to the NHS Reforms, this group of health 
care professionals has viewed the experience of the implementation of the NHS 
Reforms as something which can be seen as both positive and negative. Positive 
aspects can be seen to relate to structural changes in the system of management, and 
negative aspects to the stress which has been generated: 
I think that the Practice Management Groups have been very successful., and 
from my point of view it's made it much easier for any concerns I may have, 
to be heard. Personally, I don't play a very active role in the PMG at the 
moment. It's not something that I'd rule out completely, but for the time being 
I'm quite content with the way things are running, and it's made my life easier 
in many respects. 
We have much easier access to management nowadays , and I do think that 
they are more willing to listen to us, probably more willing than we are to 
listen to them! 
Practice based management groups are proving a much more effective way of 
running the operational side of our services, and it has allowed more people 
to become involved. I never thought that I'd become so interested in the 
running of a unit, but it has meant that the people who carry out the business 
of the unit have a big say in how it's organised. 
Change is always stressful, but 1 think that the changes that we've been 
through in the NHS in the last few years have been more stressful than most. 
Now some of that stress comes from, I know, the fact that we have much more 
work to do in the same time, but also because we have had to learn the rules 
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of a whole new way of doing things, and sometimes those rules just don't seem 
to make any sense whatsoever. 
I don't think that many people outside of the NHS will have realised just how 
much stress has been created by the health service changes. Like many of my 
colleagues I've been off sick with stress related symptoms, and things don't 
look likely to improve. 
I don't think that there is much compassion around when you talk about stress. 
I have found things incredibly stressful in recent years, but nothing is really 
done to help. The way the NHS runs now is bound to cause stress. 
In relation to this group's professional relationships within the organizational 
structure, there is open recognition of differences of opinion, aims and beliefs, yet 
perhaps somewhat surprisingly, any conflict which is generated is viewed in a positive 
way, and whilst attempts are made to resolve such conflict, it is not something which 
the traditional professional seeks to avoid: 
The professional staff and the management do see things differently erently although 
we are all part of the same organization we have a different perspective on 
things. Now that's not all together a bad thing because it prevents any of us 
from becoming too blinkered. So if I get too enthusiastic about some new 
procedure or gadget I can be sure that the business manager will say - Now 
hold on, what's the cost implication of this? - and similarly if I feel that he is 
going too far in attempting to make cost savings, say by freezing nursing 
vacancies, I will say - We can't do this without some impact on patient care, 
and that's what we have to consider here. 
I feel that I'm very lucky with the managers that I have to deal with, but that's 
not to say that we don't disagree a lot of the time. To me they are far too 
concerned with cost rather than care, but I can also see that they see me as 
being unrealistic in what I expect to be able to achieve. In the past I'm 
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surprised that we haven't come to blows, and it's been a near thing at times, 
but I think that we've now got to the stage where we respect each others 
differences, and although I don't expect it ever to be an easy relationship it 
is one which enables us to work together, and no matter what it may have 
been like in the past, we do have to work together as a team. 
If a week goes by when I didn't have at least one stand up row with ........ I'd 
think that something was wrong with either him or me! But I think that's a 
sign of a healthy relationship. At least we communicate with each other and 
I think that we have a good understanding of each others point of view, and 
if 1'm honest I think that we prevent each other from any excesses. It's not 
like it used to be when managers were here to support consultant decisions. 
Now they're here to challenge them, so of course there is going to be conflict. 
Although these Traditional professionals have experienced a change in their 
relationships with management, the relationships with patients appears to have 
remained unchanged to any significant degree: 
The relationship between doctor and patient is still one which is privileged, 
and I won't allow anyone else to interfere with that relationship 
As a nurse I have always enjoyed a close and special relationship with 
patients, and that's very important to me, so I've gone out of my way to 
prevent that changing 
At the end of the day, no matter how the NHS might change, the relationship 
between me and my patient won't, and that's the important thing to keep in 
mind 
Related to this picture of a somewhat intimate relationship which exists between the 
Traditional professional and patient is the focus which they adopt in relation to the 
quality of care, which is primarily concerned with the process of care, rather than the 
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structure or outcome: 
I think that the money which is being spent on sprucing up the buildings and 
grounds would be better spent on patient care. After all you never hear a 
patient telling their relatives how impressed they are with the reception area 
carpet. What's important to them, and to me, is how well the doctors, nurses 
and others do their jobs. 
Quality of care is all about the way we do things. After all the patient can be 
admitted to a ward in a way which is caring, concerned and personalised or 
in a way which is of hand and routinised. Now in both cases the patient will 
have been admitted and begun their treatment, but they will perceive the 
admission very differently erently 
To me quality of care is as much about the little things as the big things. For 
example yesterday on my ward I saw a student bring an elderly patient in a 
flower she had picked on her way back from lunch. Now that may seem a 
very little thing but that patient really felt cared for and important, and to me 
that is quality of caring. 
It is this relationship with patients, and the engagement in the care process which 
engenders most satisfaction for the traditional professional. They appear to receive 
support in their work both from the patients and from their professional colleagues, 
and this support is seen to be an essential component in their professional practice, 
enabling them to a large degree to be somewhat protected from the negative impacts 
of the managerialism which is experienced by some of their colleagues: 
Despite the stress and the hard work I wouldn't want to do any other kind of 
work. I know it might sound a bit twee, but when I finish a shift, no matter 
how bad it might have been, and how glad I might be to go home, I know that 
the patients will be pleased to see me back the next day, and that does matter 
to me. In many ways the patients care for us as much as we care for them, 
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and right, I know that we get our fair share of the moaners and groaners, but 
most of the patients do appreciate what we are trying to do for them, and they 
understand if we don't always get it right...... On a bad day it's the patients 
that keep me going, and it's the patients that make the job worthwhile. 
1 might come out of a management meeting absolutely seething, but when I get 
to the wards, things always seem better. There will always be sadness, 
distress and unhappiness in any hospital, after all people don't come here 
because things are going well for them, But we all work together, doctors, 
nurses and patients, to relieve some of this sorrow..... we even manage to find 
some humour in many situations, and we all help each other through the bad 
times. Well there must be something good about the work, otherwise so many 
of us wouldn't carry on doing it would we? 
Sometimes it feels as though it's a bit them and us, us being the nurses, 
doctors and patients, them being the managers! 
I get a lot of pleasure from the work that I do, I know this might sound a bit 
se fish, but I wouldn't be prepared to give up the satisfaction that I get from 
caring for a patient to the best of my ability. 
Good health care is almost totally reliant on good team work, and that's why 
it is so important for doctors, nurses and the paramedical staff to work closely 
together, and not allow the managers to divide us in an attempt to get the 
upper hand. 
The Traditional professionals can be seen to have retained, and even strengthened the 
characteristics within their professional practice which they viewed as important. 
Although inevitably experiencing a range of effects from the implementation of the 
NHS Reforms this group appears to have made conscious efforts to control their own 
practice environment, and demonstrate a confident awareness of their professional 
role within the NHS. 
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The Transformed professional 
The group of five health care professionals who placed themselves in the cluster 
towards the market justice end of the health care beliefs continuum appear to have 
embraced the values and beliefs underpinning the new NHS, demonstrating a strong 
commitment to the changes, and upholding a belief in the internal market as a force 
for driving improvement in health care: 
It was absolutely essential to exert some degree of control in the NHS, 
because by the end of the 1980s it was going out of control. I believe that the 
internal market that has been created does this fairly and at the same time it 
makes sure that those hospitals which are inefficient or wasteful either change 
their ways or lose out on their contracts to a point at which they might have 
to close down. 
Because of the system of contracts hospitals have to provide the services which 
the Health Authority and GPs are willing to pay for, rather than the services 
they choose to provide. This has meant that we have to constantly improve 
our services because if we don't and the hospital down the road does, well 
they will win our contracts, and we will then have to think about cutting back 
on staff`. 
We might have had to be dragged into the 1990s screaming and kicking, but 
now we 're here I can see the benefits. People have never really thought about 
what it was the NHS did, but by introducing the idea of contracts, this has 
now been closely examined. Like anything else, once money is introduced, 
then people start thinking about what it is they are getting for their money, 
and if they can get it cheaper elsewhere, then they will and if one business 
constantly charges more for the same, than their competitors, then they won't 
stay in business. It's common sense really, and to be honest I can't see why 
we haven't done it before, the system's not perfect by any means, but it's 
considerably better than what we had before. 
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Before the Reforms we all behaved pretty much as if health care was free, 
where of course it never has been free, but the way in which it was paid for 
was sort of hidden. I think that this meant that no-one ever considered what 
we did in terms of cost, and so there was a lot of waste, and because there 
was never any talk of care in terms of cost, both we and the patients acted as 
if there was no limit........ I think that this meant that we didn't value health 
care because we couldn't easily see the value in terms of money....... Since we 
changed to the contract system everyone, including the patients have become 
more aware that someone has to pay for what is wanted, and unless they do, 
then it can't be provided..... this has meant that we are much more careful in 
what we do and how we do it, and I think that it's a much more responsible 
way of going about our business. 
The Transformed professionals' initial response to the implementation of the NHS 
Reforms was positive, albeit guarded in some respects, and their on-going response 
has become increasingly positive as the effects of the changes become apparent. All 
the health care professionals interviewed who located themselves in this category had 
become actively involved in management either at Unit or Board level and viewed this 
as a positive move: 
In the beginning I was worried that because the changes were so great they 
would prove to be impossible to implement successfully.... now we have had 
our problems, but on the whole I think that it has been very successful, and 
the more I realise the full potential of the changes, the more I approve of 
them, it's revolutionized the way I work, and many others as well. I'm all in 
favour of professional staff becoming more involved in management, and to be 
quite frank I've no time for those colleagues of mine who are happy to moan 
and whine about management, but aren't prepared to get off their butts and 
get involved themselves. 
I've always supported the idea of the internal market, although I did have 
some doubts about the speed with which it was introduced, and I don't think 
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we had anywhere near enough time to do the sort of thorough preparation that 
would have made it easier. Some aspects of the Reforms have been more 
successful than others, the contracting process with the Health Authority needs 
to be much more streamlined for instance, but I think we've done spectacularly 
well with our fundholding GPs, and a very healthy relationship has developed 
there, and I don't think we've yet gone as far as we can in terms of GP 
contracts - there's a great deal of potential. 
I'm a real convert to the benefits of the internal market, it's worked much 
better than 1 ever thought it would. Becoming increasingly involved with 
management has given me a much broader perspective on the way the hospital 
functions, and I think that it's important for staff at all levels to make the 
effort to involve themselves in the running of their department. 
Whilst the Traditional professional was seen to have consciously restricted change to 
their professional practice, the Transformed Professional could be seen to have 
actively sought change, and the nature of this change can be seen to relate to the 
greater management role which they had taken on. 
I spend much more of my time involved in Unit management than I did before 
the Reforms, because the way the internal market works requires a lot of 
activity to keep the contracts properly monitored. Of course this does mean 
that I see less patients than I used to, but in a way that doesn't really matter 
because the Unit as a whole sees more patients, which is of course a benefit. 
I spend much less time on direct patient care than I used to before the Reforms 
came in, but I have accepted that this is the price that has to be paid if nurses 
at ward level are going to be able to have a say in how the hospital, or at 
least their Unit, is managed. Patient care is still the most important thing 
happening in the hospital, but unless services are properly managed patient 
care will suffer, and I know that a lot of the other ward sisters complain about 
the amount of paperwork and meetings they have to keep up with, but the 
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alternative - to opt out of management completely - is no longer possible, even 
though people may have got away with it in the past. 
I see my professional role differently than I used to, and if professional 
practice is to survive in the modern NHS, then it has to change to meet the 
needs of the new system. I'm not talking about giving up responsibilities, 
although I'm sure that as time goes by some of those responsibilities will 
naturally devolve to others, but about taking on extra management 
responsibilities. I think that it's only right that senior medical staff should 
have a significant say in how services are run, because they are the people 
with the clearest understanding of those services. I wish that some of my 
medical colleagues would spend more of their time and energy in trying to 
allocate resources fairly rather than continually complaining about the lack of 
resources. I enjoy the management aspects of my work, and I feel it to be a 
vital part of my professional role. 
Not surprisingly, the Transformed professionals have found the experience of the 
implementation of the NHS Reforms to be positive, and perceive the benefits of the 
implementation to have far outweighed the disadvantages. 
1 agree that the speed with which the changes were bought in created some 
problems, especially in regards to the initial contracts which we negotiated, 
but the benefits have been impressive, not only for the patients, but also for 
the staff ..... There has been quite a bit of negativity amongst my colleagues 
about the Reforms, but we had no choice but to make them work, and whilst 
that has entailed a lot of hard work, we are now reaping the benefits and I'm 
sure we'll continue to do so. It's been a real challenge, but I've always 
enjoyed a challenge and whereas when there have been changes in the past 
I've been very much on the sidelines, this time I've been in the thick of it, and 
so I've been able to see the whole picture and not just a part of it, and I think 
that it's been good for me and good for my patients as well. 
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I'm not saying that the implementation of the Reforms was painless, such a 
radical change always creates some discomfort at the very least, but it's also 
created some real opportunities for doctors and nurses to have their voices 
heard at Board level. 1 think the main trouble has been the attitude ostaff, of 
some of our staff were convinced that the Reforms wouldn't work and were 
totally negative about the whole thing, and so they have found the 
implementation of the changes particularly painful. I took a different 
approach - nothing I said was going to stop the changes coming in and so I 
had to make sure that I could live with them, and the key to that was 
understanding what was happening and what was trying to be 
achieved..... becoming involved in implementing the changes at ward level was 
very exciting, and I felt that my role expanded enormously during this time. 
At the beginning it was difficult to see how we could change so much in such 
a short time, and although we did experience a number of short term 
difficulties these were resolved pretty quickly, and all in all everything went 
surprisingly smoothly, and we began to see benefits for patients very quickly 
as waiting times fell, and new services were set up. 
When considering the Transformed professionals' relationships within the 
organisation, they can be seen to have aligned themselves with management, and any 
conflict which they experience has been with other professional groups or individuals: 
The key to effective health care services is good management, and that means 
a good management team, and I feel that here, we have developed a team 
which works well. We all have different backgrounds, but we respect that, 
and after all we have a difficult enough job to do without any political in- 
fighting. Where I experience most difficulty culty is in negotiating with my fellow 
medical staff, because as so often the ones with the least understanding of the 
situation, are the ones that do the most shouting. I know that some of them 
feel that I have `sold out' to management but what they don't realise is that 
it is not a case of them against us, but us against the threat from other local 
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hospitals. 
Because I am involved in Unit management, some of my colleagues seem to 
think that I no longer understand the important nursing issues, which is 
nonsense. Sometimes, I feel that the only people who are making any attempt 1 
to work together are the managers, and the rest are just out to fight for their 
own side, which is a very shortsighted way to go about things. 
I feel that we've got a good management team at this hospital, we are clear 
about what it is that we are trying to achieve, and work together to try and 
find ways in which we can do what it is that we want to do. I am well aware 
though, that some of the staff are very antagonistic towards management, 
which I can't really understand, because after all surely we are all trying to 
do the same thing - provide the best services that we can for our patients. I 
really can't see the point of wasting time and energy infighting each other 
when the job we have to do is hard enough already. 
At the same time that these Transformed professionals can be seen to have 
strengthened their relationships with management, they can also be seen to have 
undergone a change in the relationships that they developed with patients, and what 
appears to have happened is that there has been a move away from the individual 
relationship that was retained by the Traditional professional, and towards a 
perception of the central professional/patient relationship as being one which is client 
group focused rather than being focused on any individual patient. 
I have become more and more aware that I can't become too obsessive about 
what is happening to individuals, but that I need to be more concerned about 
the service that we offer these patients as a whole. Because after all I might 
fight - and win - to get a patient an extra-contractual referral authorised, but 
what I also have to consider is that £10,000 spent on one patient is £10,000 
that is not available for anyone else, and we have got to stop acting as if there 
is no bottom to the NHS purse. 
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With resources stretched as much as they are, we can't go on pushing for 
more and more resources to meet the needs of a few patients. We have to 
make sure that the money is spent where it will give most benefit... a few years 
ago I didn't appreciate this and if one of my patients needed something I 
would move heaven and earth to made sure that they got it, whereas now I 
would feel more comfortable in telling them that what they were asking for is 
just not available. 
I have to consider the needs of all my patients, and I don't feel that I have any 
right in putting one person's needs above another, and I have to make 
decisions which may disadvantage one or two patients, but will be beneficial 
for many more. 
This distancing from the individual patient which is a feature of the practice of the 
Transformed professional is reflected in their focus on the structure element of 
quality: 
One thing the NHS Reforms has done is that it has forced us to look at the 
way we do things, because now that we are in competition with other hospitals 
we must be seen to be at least as good as them, if not better. I feel that in the 
NHS we have been all too ready to talk about health care quality as if it has 
some mystique, when really it has more to do with the services we provide and 
the way in which we provide them, than with any airy fairy notions of the 
sanctity of the doctor patient relationship. OK, I realise that patients need to 
be greeted by name, given enough information, given a chance to ask 
questions and all that, but in the end it will have benefitted more patients that 
we have reduced waiting times than if we send Consultant X on an expensive 
course so that he talks to people in a way which is more `politically 
acceptable'. 
I know that the money which has been spent on upgrading certain areas of the 
hospital has been criticised by some people, but 1 happen to agree that the 
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surroundings do matter, they give a certain message to people, after all if a 
patient comes to an out patients department which is in need of a coat of 
paint, and littered with out of date magazines and notices, then I think that 
they must doubt whether that department can be relied on to give them the best 
sort of care 
In trying to improve the quality of our services it has been very important to 
examine the structure as well as the organisation, and in some cases we 
realised that we were trying to provide services in a way which actually 
prevented us being able to achieve any real quality, and those things have 
been changed, and quality has improved 
The Transformed professionals, in constructing their new way of practice, obtain 
support for, and satisfaction from their professional practice from their management 
role and management colleagues, rather than from patients or professional colleagues: 
I find my management role taking up more of my time recently, and although 
I am relatively new to management, I have found the business manager and 
others very supportive, I feel that I can talk to them about any difficulties we 
are experiencing in the Unit, and although there is not always a clear 
solution, it helps that others appreciate my point of view, and can understand 
the situation in which I have to work 
I get a lot of satisfaction from being able to see something through from 
beginning to end, which to be honest is something that is missing in patient 
care, with the rapid throughput of patients we have nowadays. But when a 
new project comes up I can be pretty much sure that I will be encouraged to 
see it through, not that help is not available, but that project will be my 
responsibility until it is complete. 
Although 1 have not found it easy I do feel a sense of achievement when my 
budget balances at the end of the month, and I feel even better if I have 
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managed to make some savings, and in a way I feel that achievements like this 
are more readily recognised than what I may have achieved in terms of patient 
care - I've certainly had more positive feedback. 
The Transformed professionals have developed a very different framework for their 
professional practice than the Traditional professional, rather than seeking to retain 
the characteristics of traditional professional practice, this group of health care 
professionals actively sought to change the nature of their practice and are, in the 
main satisfied with their new professional roles. 
The Transitional Professional 
The, seven health care professionals who located themselves in the central cluster on 
the health care belief continuum share characteristics of both the Traditional and 
Transformed professional, but the impact of this duality seems to have created some 
distress amongst this group. Whilst they may indeed prove to be truly transitional, 
and undergoing further change which will locate them within one of the other two 
groups, there is some evidence to suggest that the experience of this group may 
predispose them to give up professional practice rather than undergo further change. 
What is clearly evident is that the health care professional within this group can both 
identify that they hold values which fall at either end of the continuum, and also 
recognise that these values are conflicting: 
I suppose that I must fall somewhere in the middle, it's difficult really because 
whilst I believe in the ideals of the NHS, I find it very difficult cult to see how we 
can attempt to meet those ideals, when there just can't be enough money to go 
round..... although I would argue with anyone that our system of free health 
care is the best in the world, and that people should be entitled to free health 
care, but I also believe that there has to be a limit to the care that can be 
provided, and that perhaps by bringing in the financial element, well that may 
be the only way limits can be imposed. 
Although I strongly support the idea of free health care to those in need, I 
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don't approve of wasting our health care resources, and so there should be 
some things that fall outside of the remit of the AWS... IVFfor instance. Whilst 
I feel very sympathetically towards infertile couples, I don't think that just 
because we can do something about it in some cases that we always should, 
and I don't see why the taxpayer should fund treatment for any sort of 
cosmetic surgery. Of course the problem is that there will never be any 
agreement on where the NHS should draw the line, and this is sure to cause 
problems, and in a way I feel that my support for free health care should be 
free from any exceptions, because when exceptions are made then the system 
must be weakened. 
I've certainly moved more towards the middle in recent years as I've become 
more aware of the impossibility of any attempt to meet all of the demand for 
health care. But at the same time I find it very difficult to reconcile my belief 
in the NHS with my acceptance of the internal market as a system for 
controlling expenditure on health care. 
The Transitional professionals exhibited a mixed response to the NHS Reforms, 
supporting some aspects, but opposed to others: 
I think that the idea of the contracting arrangements for health care is a good 
thing, because it has made many people stop and think what they are doing 
because they now have to compete with others, and this has forced them to 
work on improving their services. What I don't agree with is the idea of GP 
fundholding, and 1 don't think that some of the local GPs are handling it very 
well at all, they are attempting to play one hospital off against another, and 
are threatening to move their patients from hospital to hospital. When I 
consider the amount of time that is spent trying to dance to the tune of these 
GPs I just can't see that it's a useful exercise. 
I think that GP fundholding is an important way of strengthening primary 
care, and I believe that it has gone some way towards equalising the 
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relationship between GP and hospital consultant. What I cannot see the point 
of is the never ending round of contract negotiations with the Health Authority, 
it's a waste of time, and I don't see that it has been anything other than an 
extension of the management relationship they used to have with hospitals, 
another tool which they can use to attempt to control us. 
I haven't got any problems with the idea of an internal market, but what I 
can't tolerate is the bureaucracy that has been created, surely there must have 
been a way that the internal market could have been introduced without all 
this. 
The NHS needed to become more business like and in that respect the Reforms 
have been very successful, but like any business it has become more cut-throat, 
and 1 think that those of us working in the NHS just weren't prepared for that. 
The Transitional professional can be seen to have retained their pre-Reform roles as 
well as taking on an increased management role, but unlike the Transformed 
professional who underwent a role transformation, this can be seen more in terms of 
a role expansion, which has had negative effects in terms of the stress which has been 
generated : 
I often feel like 1 am trying to do two jobs, a ward sister and a manager, 
which to my mind are two separate jobs, even though I am always being told 
that being a ward manager includes both clinical and management duties. But 
what it is really is that I am given more and more to do all the time with 
nobody ever taking an any of my work. 1 have this vision of an unseen 
manager somewhere up in the Board Offices who won't be truly content until 
all of his work has been off-loaded to some other poor devil like me! 
I just can't be all things to all people, no matter what they expect of me, and 
it's totally unreasonable to expect me, or any of my colleagues, to be able to 
work under the sort of stress that we are being put under by the sheer volume 
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of our workload. I sometimes long for the days when I was simply concerned 
with patient care, and I didn't have to take on all of the management that 1 
am now expected to do. 
I don't have the time to do any aspect of my job properly, because there is just 
too much to do. If I concentrate on the clinical aspects of my work, then i 
neglect the management, and if I attempt to do all of the management that I 
am expected to do, then there just isn't enough time to devote to patients, and 
it's not only incredibly stressful but also demoralising, as I go home every day 
feeling that I haven't done anything to the best of my ability. 
How the Transitional professional has perceived the experience of the 
implementations of the Reforms, has been far more negative than their Traditional or 
Transformed colleagues, and there is evidence to suggest that there exists real 
distress amongst the health care professionals in this group, a significant number of 
whom were planning to leave the NHS or were at least considering such a move: 
I don't think that 1'm exaggerating if I say that the last few years have been 
pure hell for me, I used to love my work but not any longer, in fact I am 
going to be taking early retirement shortly, because I really don't see a place 
for myself in the hospital any longer. I always imagined that I'd die in 
harness so to speak, and retirement was never something that I looked forward 
to, but now I can't wait to go..... It saddens me the way that doctors and 
nurses are expected to practice nowadays, there is just no space for them to 
develop and perfect their skills, it's all rushing to meet deadlines and coping 
with crisis after crisis. I'm lucky I have the option to retire, I really don't 
know how some of my younger colleagues can face spending another 20 years 
in practice. 
Perhaps it's just that I don't cope well with pressure, but it's getting to the 
point when I don't know how much longer I can carry on. Every day brings 
more problems and more work, and I can never seem to get through all I need 
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to do in a day, no matter how late 1 work, and no matter how hard I work 
there is always someone complaining that there is something I haven't done, 
whether its the bed manager complaining that 1 haven't cleared beds quickly 
enough or a patient complaining that I haven't made her out patient 
appointment yet. 
In the years since the Reforms came in work has become more and more 
unbearable, there is such pressure on us to meet this target or that deadline, 
and if I worked 24 hours a day I just couldn't get through the amount of work 
that there is to be done, and now they are talking about rationalising my staff 
levels, which I know means a certain reduction, not an increase. Well if they 
do they can do it without me because I just can't go on, and that would be the 
straw that breaks my back. 
I think the time has come for me to consider another area of practice, and as 
much as I'd hate to give up hospital practice I don't think that I could face 
another 15 or 20 years working under this sort of pressure, and maybe my 
only way out would be to go into private practice, or perhaps go abroad to 
work. I don't think that it's only me that has found these changes so hard to 
stomach, when I look around me I see many of my colleagues struggling to 
survive in this so-called caring service - it's a joke really, or would be if it 
wasn't so tragic. 
It is amongst the group of Transitional professionals that relationships within the 
organisation seem to have become most fragmented: 
I am sure that the managers just see the nursing staff as a necessary evil. 
They might pay lip service to including us in the management process, but I 
don't see that we have developed an effective working relationship. To be 
honest I don't even think that as a group of senior nurses we work well 
together any longer, everyone seems to have retreated into their shell as they 
try and keep their own head above water. 
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I don't really know how I see myself any longer, as a clinician or as a 
manager, and to be honest I no longer fit into either camp with any degree of 
comfort. 
I am actively involved in Unit management, but this has its drawbacks in terms 
of working relationships. The managers see me as representing the interests 
of the medical staff and the medical staff see me as representing the interests 
of the Management Board, whereas of course we should all be here to 
represent the interests of the patients shouldn't we? But what this means is 
that many of my working relationships have become rather strained. 
When considering the relationships that the Transitional professional has with 
patients, again this group can be seen to fall between the Traditional and the 
Transformed professional. The Transitional professional perceives the relationship 
as being both with the individual and the client group as a whole, which generates 
some degree of conflict within their day to day practice: 
I feel that I am able to enjoy good relationships with my patients, but there is 
often a dilemma in trying to meet the needs of individuals, and at the same 
time trying to do the best that I can for the service as a whole. For example 
if, at the beginning of the financial year we use resources too liberally in 
order to meet the needs of all the individuals in our care, then we will have 
run short of resources at the end of the year, so patients then might not be 
able to have all they need, but who am I to deny patients what they need 
because someone else may need it later on in the year? 
Although I deplore having to discharge patients before I feel that they are 
really ready to go home, I sometimes have to do this in order to make room 
for the patients who need to be admitted for treatment, and it's very often 
dii cult to reconcile the needs of the patients we are caring for with the needs 
of those who are waiting to access that care. 
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I hate having to put limits on what we can provide for some of our patients, 
but unless I do we'd run out of money well before we run out of year, and 
then no-one would get anything. I think that the most I can do is to be honest 
with the patients about what it is that we can do, and generally they do 
understand. We tend to have more arguments from the relatives, who 
understandably want the best for their nearest and dearest. 
The attempts of the Transitional professional to relate to both the individual and the 
client group has resulted in a greater focus on the outcomes of care as a quality 
measure, although the quality of the process of care is also important for this group 
of health care professionals: 
I know that the way we do things is important, but I think that the real test of 
quality can only be seen in our results, and I don't know that we actually get 
enough information about the longer term outcomes of our service, because 
patients are sent home much quicker, and are more likely to be followed up 
by their GP than they used to be. 
I think that we need to find better ways of finding out about how successful 
our care has been, we don't always find out for instance if a patient that we 
have discharged has been readmitted to another hospital, unless that hospital 
or the GP lets us know, which they often don't. 
I think that there is still a great deal of waste in the NHS, and I think that they 
spend far too much money on prettying up the hospital, which in the end 
doesn't make a blind bit of difference in how quickly or how well a patient 
recovers, and to my way of thinking this is where we should be trying to 
improve things. 
This group of health care professionals was the only one not to identify clearly any 
source of support for their professional practice, and in some cases explicitly stated 
that they felt they were unsupported, although they did appear to derive some degree 
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of job satisfaction from their interaction with patients: 
Since the Reforms I feel that I've become more and more isolated, everything 
is done so differently it's as if we were trying to play a game without really 
knowing the rules, there's no form of staff support any more and I don't feel 
that I can go to the Director of Nursing with any problems I have, at least not 
in the same way that I used to be able to go to the nurse manager of our Unit, 
I just muddle along as best as I can in some circumstances. 
Although 1 do still get a lot of pleasure from my work with patients, I think 
that a lot of the old camaraderie of the hospital has been lost. We used to be 
prepared to work late or come in on our days off because we did really feel 
part of a team, but now I think we do those sort of things more because we 
fear that we might lose our job if we didn't. 
If it wasn't for the fact that I still enjoy my work with patients, I wouldn't still 
be here, because today's NHS is not a pleasant place to work. I get the 
feeling that they are prepared to work us into the ground, because there will 
always be someone else able to take our place. No-one really cares about the 
staff any more, we're expected to keep our heads down, get the work done and 
not cause any problems for the managers, and if we should have a problem - 
well forget it because no-one's interested or willing to help. 
This group of Transitional professionals can be seen to have responded in a different 
way to the implementation of the NHS Reforms than did their Traditional or 
Transformed colleagues, and the mixed values and beliefs that they hold, have 
prevented then from being able to construct their professional practice in a way which 
is both meaningful and manageable. 
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CHAPTER 11 
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN THE NEW NHS. 
A CONSIDERATION OF THE FINDINGS 
Major findings of the study 
A number of significant features of the impact of the NHS Reforms on professional 
practice were revealed during the study: 
(1) 97 % of doctors and nurses studied had experienced an increased 
workload. 
(2) The increase in workload had been greater in relation to indirect care 
and administration than in relation to direct care. 
(3) 91 % of doctors and nurses had experienced increased levels of stress. 
(4) 80 % of doctors and nurses had experienced an increased degree of 
conflict with hospital management. 
There had also been several notable changes in the way in which the nature of 
professional practice had changed for these doctors and nurses: 
(1) Over half of the doctors and nurses responding to the survey claimed 
that they were involved in a greatly increased bureaucracy. 
(2) Just under half of the doctors and nurses surveyed were spending less 
time with individual patients. 
(3) Almost four in ten doctors and nurses felt that they did not have 
adequate support, and three in ten were having to work longer hours. 
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When considering the quality of care which doctors and nurses felt that they offered 
to their patients: 
(1) Six in every ten believed the quality of care they gave to patients had 
worsened or failed to improve. 
(2) Only 41 % of respondents offered examples of improvements in quality 
of care. 71 % offered examples of deteriorations in the quality of care. 
(4) Over twice as many examples of deteriorations in quality were offered 
than were examples of improved quality. 
(5) Where deteriorations in quality were evident, these were experienced 
by a greater number of respondents than were improvements in quality 
(6) All six key principles of quality (Maxwell 1984, Shaw 1986) were 
seen to be threatened, but under greatest threat were the principles of 
equity and appropriateness. 
These findings must call into question the ability of the Reforms to deliver what was 
initially promised, and also the ability of the NHS to survive into the next century. 
Crucial to appraisal of the implementation of the Reforms must be an appreciation of 
the unintended consequences of the policy relating to the structure and function of the 
internal market. Although a small scale study into a large scale institution, the 
importance of the unintended consequences in relation to the professional practice of 
doctors and nurses has been demonstrated, and the interface between the health care 
professional and the organisation is an area which must be adequately addressed prior 
to any further major reorganisation or change in policy direction. 
Professional practice in the new NHS 
No matter how the health care system is structured, the way it functions will remain 
reliant on the effectiveness of the health care professional working within it. When 
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considering the typology of professional response to the NHS Reforms it can be seen 
that there are several issues which need to be appraised. The Traditional 
professional, whilst not sharing the values of the internal market system, and in fact 
opposing them, has nevertheless been able to retain a strong professional role within 
the health care system. It could be argued that this group of professionals has a 
particular role in identifying and preventing the potential excesses of the NHS 
Reforms, in acting as a brake to the more radical changes. Whilst they have 
experienced some negative effects from the policy implementation, they have to a 
degree cushioned the impact on everyday professional practice by their insistence on 
retaining their traditional professional role. 
The- Transformed professionals, in sharing the values of the new health care system, 
have been able to restructure their professional roles in a way which reflects those 
values, integrating their professional and management roles fully. They have 
developed new supportive relationships with their non-clinical management 
colleagues, which has accorded them some degree of protection from the conflict with 
their professional colleagues that their transformed role may have generated. In 
relocating the focus of their relationship with patients from the individual to the 
group, the Transformed professional has been able to perceive the benefits of the 
Reforms more readily, and has avoided the area of potential conflict between their 
management and their professional role that may have been more apparent had the 
focus of their relationship with patients remained at the individual level. 
The Transitional professionals are the group which has been most adversely affected 
by the implementation of the NHS Reforms, and the conflict which exists in the 
health care values that they hold is reflected in the conflict that they experience in 
their everyday professional practice. This area of conflict has been exacerbated as 
they try to meet the often incompatible needs of both the organisation and the 
individual patient, and it is this which has resulted in their negative experience of the 
Reforms. The negativity of their experience has been aggravated by the lack of 
support from colleagues, and is only partially mitigated by the satisfaction that they 
obtain from their interactions with patients. What must be a matter of concern is 
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that, to some in this group, the situation is viewed as irresolvable, so the only viable 
option is to leave the NHS. The existence of this disenfranchised group is an 
obviously unintended consequence of health policy implementation, but one which 
may prove to have very harmful long term effects on the health care system as a 
whole. The education of health care professionals is expensive, the acquisition of 
experience to function at an expert level takes years of clinical practice, and so it is 
essential to ensure that such valuable human resources are retained and encouraged 
to fulfil their potential within the system which has enabled their expertise to develop. 
Final considerations 
One question which needs to be asked is how typical are the hospitals in this study? 
If they are typical then what might be the effect on both the knowledge base of the 
health care professions, and the ability to deliver health care services if there is a 
decline in the number of experienced professional staff? Is it possible that the 
findings relating to doctors and nurses would be consistent for other professional 
groups? The shortage of appropriately qualified health care staff already presents 
problems in some areas, so is this situation likely to worsen? 
If, as this study would appear to suggest, the new NHS is an environment in which 
a significant number of health care professionals are unable to practice as effectively 
as they should, what needs to be changed? Is it the health care professional, or the 
system within which they engage in clinical practice? 
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APPENDIX 1 
Changes in workload relating to clinical speciality 
Workload Medical areas 
Greatly increased 21 (62%) 
Increased 12 (35%) 
Unchanged 1 (3%) 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 
IL- 
0 
Workload Surgical areas 
Greatly increased 24(67%) 
Increased 10(28%) 
Unchanged 1 (3%) 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 1 (3%) 
Workload Trauma/Orthopaedic areas 
Greatly increased 8 (53 %) 
Increased 7(47%) 
Unchanged 0 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
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Workload Intensive care 
Greatly increased 3 (33%) 
Increased 6(67%) 
Unchanged 0 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
Workload Theatre/Anaesthetics 
Greatlly increased 4(31%) 
Increased 9(69%) 
Unchanged 0 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
Workload Paediatric areas 
Greatly increased 3(20%) 
Increased 11 (73%) 
Unchanged 1 (7%) 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
Workload Other clinical areas 
Greatly increased 2 (33%) 
Increased 4 (67%) 
Unchanged 0 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
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APPENDIX 2 
Changes to level of direct care carried out by clinical speciality 
Direct care Medical areas 
Greatly increased 7(21%) 
Increased 14(41%) 
Unchanged 11 (32%) 
Decreased 1 (3%) 
Greatly decreased 1 (3 %) 
Direct care Surgical areas 
Greatly increased 6(17%) 
Increased 13 (36%) 
Unchanged 7(19%) 
Decreased 8(22%) 
Greatly decreased 2 (6%) 
Direct care Trauma/Orthopaedic areas 
Greatly increased 2 (13%) 
Increased 6 (40%) 
Unchanged 5 (33%) 
Decreased 2(13%) 
Greatly decreased 0 
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Direct care Intensive care 
Greatly increased 0 
Increased 3 (33%) 
Unchanged 5 (56%) 
Decreased 1 (11 %) 
LLGreatly decreased 0 
Direct care Theatre/Anaesthetics 
Greatly increased 1 (8%) 
Increased 5 (39%) 
Unchanged 2(15%) 
Decreased 5(39%) 
Greatly decreased 0 
Direct care Paediatric areas 
Greatly increased 0 
Increased 5 (33%) 
Unchanged 6(40%) 
Decreased 4(27%) 
Greatly decreased 0 
Direct care 
Greatly increased 
Other clinical areas 
0 
Increased 3 (50%) 
Unchanged 0 
Greatly decreased 2(33%) 
Decreased 1 (17%) 
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APPENDIX 3 
Changes in level of indirect care carried out by clinical speciality 
Indirect care Medical areas 
Greatly increased 17(50%) 
Increased 11 (32%) 
Unchanged 6 (18) 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
Indirect care Surgical areas 
Greatly increased 14(39%) 
Increased 14(39%) 
Unchanged 7(19%) 
decreased 1 (3%) 
Greatly decreased 0 
Indirect care Trauma/Orthopaedic 
Greatly increased 6(40%) 
Increased 9(60%) 
Unchanged 0 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
273 
Indirect care Intensive care 
1 
Greatly increased 1 (11 %) 
1 
Increased 3 (33 %) 
Unchanged 5 (56%) 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
Indirect care Theatre/Anaesthetic 
Greatly increased 6 (46%) 
Increased 6 (46%) 
Unchanged 1 (8%) 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
Indirect care Paediatric areas 
Greatly increased 0 
Increased 11 (73%) 
Unchanged 4(27%) 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 
IL- 
0 
Indirect Care Other clinical areas 
Greatly increased 1 (17%) 
Increased 3 (50%) 
Unchanged 2 (33 %) 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
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APPENDIX 4 
Changes to level of administration carried out by clinical speciality 
Administration Medical areas 
Greatly increased 18(53%) 
Increased 11 (32%) 
Unchanged 5 (15%) 
Decreased 0 
1[ 
Greatly decreased 0 
Administration Surgical areas 
Greatly increased 22(61%) 
Increased 13 (36%) 
Unchanged 1 (3%) 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
Administration Trauma/Orthopaedic 
Greatly increased 12 (80%) 
Increased 3 (20%) 
Unchanged 0 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
275 
Administration Intensive care 
Greatly increased 6 (67%) 
Increased 3 (33%) 
Unchanged 0 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
Administration Theatre/Anaesthetic 
Greatly increased 5 (39%) 
Increased 7(54%) 
Unchanged 1 (8%) 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
Administration Paediatric 
Greatly increased 5 (33%) 
Increased 9(60%) 
Unchanged 1 (7%) 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
Administration Other clinical areas 
Greatly increased 2(33%) 
Increased 4(67%) 
Unchanged 0 pü 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
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APPENDIX 5 
Changes to level of conflict with managers by clinical speciality 
Conflict with managers Medical areas 
Greatly increased 13 (39%) 
Increased 15(46%) 
Unchanged 4(12%) 
Decreased 0 
. 
L_Greatly decreased 2(6%) 
Conflict with managers Surgical areas 
Greatly increased 14(39%) 
Increased 13 (36%) 
Unchanged 8(22%) 
Decreased 1 (3%) 
Greatly decreased 0 
Conflict with managers Trauma/Orthopaedic 
Greatly increased 6(43%) 
Increased 7 (50%) 
Unchanged 1 (7%) 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
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Conflict with managers 
Greatly increased 
Increased 
Unchanged 
Decreased 
Greatly decreased 
Intensive care 
4(44%) 
4(44%) 
1(11%) 
0 
0 
Conflict with managers Theatre/Anaesthetic 
Greatly increased 5(42%) 
Increased 6 (50%) 
Unchanged 1 (8%) 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
Conflict with managers Paediatric areas 
Greatly increased 4(27%) 
Increased 8 (53%) 
Unchanged 2 (13%) 
Decreased 1(7%) 
Greatly decreased 0 
Conflict with managers 
Greatly increased 
Increased 
Unchanged 
Decreased 
Greatly decreased 
Other clinical areas 
2 (33%) 
2(33%) 
2(33%) 
0 
0 
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APPENDIX 6 
Changes to the level of stress experienced by clinical speciality 
Stress Medical areas 
Greatly increased 19(56%) 
Increased 12(35%) 
Unchanged 3 (9%) 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
Stress Surgical areas 
Greatly increased 23 (64%) 
Increased 10(28%) 
Unchanged 3 (8%) 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
Stress Trauma/Orthopaedic 
Greatly increased 9 (60%) 
Increased 5 (33%) 
Unchanged 1 (7%) 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
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Stress Intensive care 
Greatly increased 5(56%) 
Increased 4(44%) 
Unchanged 0 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
Stress Theatre/Anaesthetic 
Greatly increased 7(54%) 
Increased 6(46%) 
Unchanged 0 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
Stress Paediatric areas 
Greatly increased 6(40%) 
Increased 5(33%) 
Unchanged 3 (20%) 
Decreased 1 (7%) 
Greatly decreased 0 
Stress Other clinical areas 
Greatly increased 1 (17%) 
Increased 5 (83%) 
unchanged 0 
Decreased 0 
Greatly decreased 0 
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APPENDIX 7 
Changes to quality of care offered, by clinical speciality 
Quality of care Medical area 
Improved due to Reforms 7 (23%) 
Improved unrelated to Reforms 9 (29%) 
Unchanged 4 (13%) 
Worsened due to Reforms 9 (29%) 
Worsened unrelated to Reforms 2 (7%) 
Quality of care Surgical area 
Improved due to Reforms 3 (9%) 
Improved unrelated to Reforms 3 (9%) 
Unchanged 9 (27%) 
Worsened due to Reforms 17 (50%) 
Worsened unrelated to Reforms 2 (6%) 
Quality of care Trauma/Orthopaedic 
Improved due to Reforms 3 (23%) 
Improved unrelated to Reforms 1 (8%) I 
Unchanged 
! II 3 (23%) 
Worsened due to Reforms 5 (39%) 
Worsened unrelated to Reforms 1 (8%) 
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Quality of care Intensive care 
Improved due to Reforms 2(25%) 
Improved unrelated to Reforms 0 
Unchanged 4 (50%) 
Worsened due to Reforms 2(25%) 
Worsened unrelated to Reforms 0 
Quality of care Theatre/Anaesthetics 
Improved due to Reforms 3 (23 %) 
Improved unrelated to Reforms 2(15%) 
Unchanged 0 
Worsened due to Reforms 7(54%) 
Worsened unrelated to Reforms 0 
Quality of care Paediatric 
Improved due to Reforms 4(31%) 
Improved unrelated to Reforms 1 (8%) 
Unchanged 5 (39%) 
Worsened due to Reforms 3 (23 %) 
Worsened unrelated to Reforms 0 
Quality of care Other clinical areas 
Improved due to Reforms 1 (20%) 
Improved unrelated to Reforms 1 (20%) 
Unchanged 2(40%) 
Worsened due to Reforms 1 (20%) 
Worsened unrelated to Reforms 0 
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APPENDIX 8 
THE NHS REFORMS AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 
This survey is part of a study to explore the way in which the professional practice 
of doctors and nurses has been changed by the NHS Reforms of 1991. I would be 
very grateful if you could take the time to complete this questionnaire and return it 
in the enclosed envelope. 
All information will remain confidential, and will not be used for any purpose other 
than the study referred to above. 
If you have any queries or require further information please do not hesitate to 
contact Kay Caldwell on Tel: 0123 456 7890 
Please tick the appropriate box to indicate your answer 
(1) Where do you work? Greenfield Q 
Stockton Q 
(2) What is your profession? Medicine Q 
Nursing Q 
(3) What is your gender? Male 
Q 
Female Q 
(4) How old are you? Under 25 
Q 
26-35 Q 
36-45 Q 
46-55 Q 
56 or over Q 
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(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
How long have you worked in the NHS? Under 5 years 
5-9 years 
10-14 years 
15 + years 
How long have you worked in your present post? 
Under 5 years 
5-9 years 
10-14 years 
15 + years 
In which clinical speciality do you work? 
Medical speciality 
Surgical speciality 
Trauma/Orthopaedics 
Intensive Care 
Theatre/Anaesthetic 
Paediatrics 
Other 
Please specify 
0 
0 
0 
Q 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Q 
0 
0 
0 
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(8) What effect have the NHS Reforms had on your workload? 
Greatly increased Q 
Increased Q 
Unchanged Q 
Decreased Q 
Greatly decreased Q 
(9) If your workload has changed in what area has this occurred? 
(a) Direct care that is patient oriented and carried out in direct contact 
with the patient. 
Greatly increased Q 
Increased Q 
Unchanged Q 
Decreased Q 
Greatly decreased Q 
(b) Indirect care that is patient oriented but not carried out in direct 
contact with the patient e. g. liaising with others on behalf of the 
patient. 
Greatly increased Q 
Increased Q 
Unchanged Q 
Decreased Q 
Greatly decreased Q 
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(c) Administrative work that is not oriented to an individual patient e. g. 
budget control. 
Greatly increased Q 
Increased Q 
Unchanged Q 
Decreased Q 
Greatly decreased Q 
(10) Has the level of stress generated by your work changed as a result of the 
reforms? 
Greatly increased Q 
Increased Q 
Unchanged Q 
Decreased Q 
Greatly decreased Q 
(11) Has there been any change in the degree of conflict you experience with your 
managers as a result of the Reforms? 
Greatly increased Q 
Increased Q 
Unchanged Q 
Decreased Q 
Greatly decreased Q 
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(12) Has your practice changed since as a result of the Reforms? Please give 
examples. 
(13) Please give examples of any improvements in the quality of care as a result 
of the Reforms. 
(14) Please give examples of any deteriorations in the quality of care as a result of 
the Reforms. 
(15) In terms of the effects of the NHS Reforms on the care you give to your 
patients, which applies to you? 
Care improved due to the Reforms Q 
Care improved unrelated to the Reforms Q 
Care remains unchanged 
0 
Care worsened unrelated to the Reforms Q 
Care worsened due to the reforms Q 
Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this questionnaire 
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